Filed: Mar. 09, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 09, 2016
Summary: OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Doc 55, 1:10-CR-0056] [Resolving Doc. 1, 1:16-CV-0013] JAMES S. GWIN , District Judge . On August 16, 2010, Defendant-Petitioner Mitchell R. Lemaster pled guilty to a one count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). 1 At sentencing, this Court determined that Lemaster was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Under the ACCA, a defendant f
Summary: OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Doc 55, 1:10-CR-0056] [Resolving Doc. 1, 1:16-CV-0013] JAMES S. GWIN , District Judge . On August 16, 2010, Defendant-Petitioner Mitchell R. Lemaster pled guilty to a one count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). 1 At sentencing, this Court determined that Lemaster was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Under the ACCA, a defendant fa..
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OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc 55, 1:10-CR-0056]
[Resolving Doc. 1, 1:16-CV-0013]
JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.
On August 16, 2010, Defendant-Petitioner Mitchell R. Lemaster pled guilty to a one count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 At sentencing, this Court determined that Lemaster was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Under the ACCA, a defendant faces a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence if he is charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and has three or more earlier "violent felony" convictions. Lemaster's sentencing under the ACCA was based on three prior Ohio burglary convictions: one count of third-degree burglary, and two counts of fourth-degree burglary.2
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States. Johnson held that one prong of the ACCA's definition of a "violent felony" — the residual clause — violates due process and is unconstitutionally vague.3 As a result, predicate felonies under the residual clause cannot be the basis for sentencing under the ACCA.
Lemaster brings this habeas petition seeking re-sentencing and argues that his prior Ohio burglar convictions only qualified as predicate felonies under the residual clause. The government has filed a response to Lemaster's petition. The government largely concedes Lemaster's position.4 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Lemaster's petition.
I. Legal Standard
Title 28 United States Code Section 2255 gives a federal prisoner post-conviction means of collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence that he alleges violates federal law. Section 2255 provides four grounds upon which a federal prisoner may challenge his conviction or sentence:
1) That the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;
2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;
3) That the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or
4) That the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.5
To prevail on a § 2255 motion alleging a constitutional error, the movant "must establish an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings."6
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the one-year statute of limitations for seeking habeas relief runs from "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court."
II. Discussion
Defendant's petition is timely.7 Moreover, in light of Johnson, a criminal defendant who received an enhanced sentence under the residual clause of the ACCA received a sentence that was "imposed in violation of the Constitution."8
The parties both state that Defendant's predicate convictions for third- and fourth-degree burglary in Ohio fell under the residual clause only.9 The Court agrees. Defendant's earlier sentence was unconstitutional, and Defendant is entitled to relief.
The Court GRANTS Lemaster's petition. The Court will hold a hearing to resentence the Petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
