KENNETH S. McHARGH, Magistrate Judge.
This case is before the Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule. The issue before the court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Cynthia Taylor's application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 1381 et seq., is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, conclusive.
On December 29, 2011, Plaintiff Cynthia Taylor
Taylor's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (
An Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ") convened a hearing on January 15, 2014, to hear Taylor's case. (
On February 28, 2014, the ALJ issued her decision applying the standard five-step sequential analysis
Taylor briefs three legal issues:
(
Taylor was born on September 7, 1967, and was 38 years old as of her alleged disability onset date. (
Disputed issues will be discussed as they arise in Taylor's brief alleging errors by the ALJ. A short summary of relevant medical history follows here. As noted earlier, Taylor applied for Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits on December 29, 2011. (
As far back as 2001, the record reflects that Taylor
At an October 7, 2008, appointment with Trevor Bullock, D.O., she complained of abdominal pain, nausea, and chronic, frequent diarrhea, and reported that she had last seen a gastroenterologist in 2001, and reported that she had the colonoscopy in 2001. (
At a follow-up appointment with Dr. Bullock the next month, Taylor reported that she had begun the Bentyl, ". . . and she states that she is doing much better. Her [sic] she has decreased number of BMs throughout the day and she says they are more formed stools." (
At a January 27, 2009, appointment with Dr. Bullock, Taylor raised a number of concerns (depression, diabetes, etc.), but his notes do not reflect any complaints or discussion of her IBS, except to note that Bentyl was among her medications. (
Over three years later, at a September 20, 2012, check-up with Meredith Violet, D.O., Taylor reported that she was experiencing cramping pains and diarrhea, which began worsening several months previously. Taylor reported she had "started taking fiber again and taking Imodium without any improvement." (
At that time, Dr. Violet prescribed a continuation of the Bentyl, and reported that Taylor had an "unconcerning exam for acute abdominal issue most likely IBS flare caused by worsening depression/anxiety symptoms." She was referred to GI for a probable colonoscopy because she reported rectal bleeding. (
The following month, Taylor had an appointment with gastroenterologist Corey J. Sievers, M.D., on October 22, 2012. Taylor reported constant, dull abdominal pain across her lower abdomen, with diarrhea and more frequent bowel movements. (
On referral from Dr. Sievers, a colonoscopy was performed on Taylor on December 18, 2012. The results of the examination were normal, except for the presence of large internal hemorrhoids. (
Taylor returned to Dr. Sievers for a follow-up exam on April 22, 2013. She reported she was still having lower abdominal pain. "Since the last visit she has been doing about the same. `good' days are 5-6 BM per day and `bad' days are 8+ BM per day. Has `good' days about 3 times per week." (
Dr. Sievers prescribed a trial of Rifaxamine, and provided her samples and a discount card. He also suggested that she discuss with Dr. Violet changing her anti-depressants to a drug which was more beneficial for IBS patients. (
At her appointment with Dr. Violet shortly thereafter, on May 2, 2013, primarily to discuss her diabetes. Taylor also reported that the trial Rifaxamine did not work, that it increased diarrhea and muscle spasms. (
At a September 23, 2013, appointment with Elim Shih, Taylor complained of diarrhea and nausea. Taylor reported her history of IBS and abdominal cramping, and that she takes imodium and Bentyl for treatment. She complained that whenever she eats anything, she has immediate diarrhea, and that this had been ongoing for 9 days. She also complained of lower abdominal pain which is different from her IBS pain. Her chronic abdominal pain was described as diffuse crampiness or discomfort. (
At a 6-month follow-up appointment with Dr. Sievers on October 21, 2013, Taylor reported she was battling C. difficile diarrhea the last six weeks. (
At her November 25, 2013, appointment with Dr. Sievers, he determined that her c.diff infection had cleared. Taylor reported that she had been doing well, until the previous Thursday, when her IBS symptoms seemed to have worsened a little. She reported that she was stressed and anxious, in part because it was her first Thanksgiving without her parents around. Taylor said she had more episodes of diarrhea after eating, but that over-the-counter imodium helped somewhat. (
Several weeks after her January 2014 hearing with the ALJ, Taylor's counsel contacted Dr. Sievers to inquire whether Taylor's hearing testimony was consistent with his experience and history treating her. Counsel represented that
(
At the hearing, the vocational expert Burkhammer provided testimony. (
The ALJ posed a hypothetical question concerning an individual who can do a range of sedentary work, with the ability to alternate positions every 30-60 minutes, as needed, while remaining on task. The individual would have the occasional use of a cane, for example, when going to the bathroom; occasional use of foot controls bilaterally; frequent pushing and pulling of hand controls, and frequent handling and fingering, with the right hand. Postural limitations would be occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no exposure to unprotected heights, or moving mechanical parts; and no operation of a motor vehicle. The person should avoid concentrated exposure to humidity and wetness, extremes of hot and cold, as well as pulmonary irritants; and average but no high or strict production rate pace or quotas; would have occasional contact with others, but no conflict resolution, mediation, or anything involving intense or stressful interpersonal interactions. The person would work in a low stress, static environment with infrequent changes, gradually introduced. There would be an ability to take short bathroom breaks, with a bathroom in near proximity, or at least access to one. The ALJ asked if such an individual would be able to do any of the past work? (
In response to the ALJ's question, Burkhammer stated that such a hypothetical individual would be able to do Taylor's past work, with the exception of the office manager position, and the help desk position (because of the occasional interaction). (
Burkhammer was then asked whether there were be additional work that such an individual could perform. He responded that there would be, at the sedentary level. The VE named, as one example, an addresser, DOT number 209.587-010. There are approximately 300 jobs locally, 4,000 in Ohio, and 100,000 nationally. However, the VE would exclude the rest of the sedentary, unskilled jobs available, because of the interaction requirements of the hypothetical. (
The ALJ then modified the hypothetical, to remove the "occasional contact with others" limitation, while maintaining the low stress environment, and no conflict resolution limitations. (
The vocational expert responded that there would be other jobs at the sedentary level, for this second hypothetical. The past relevant work already mentioned would still apply. Other jobs would include the addresser job. Also, food and beverage order clerk, DOT number 209.567-014. The VE stated that there are approximately 400 such jobs locally, 4,000 in Ohio, and 100,000 nationally. A third example would be receptionist, sedentary, SVP: 3, DOT number 237.367-010. There are approximately 600 jobs in the regional economy, 7,000 in Ohio, and 140,000 nationally. (
The ALJ then proposed a third hypothetical, assuming an individual who would be able to do the range of work in the first two hypotheticals; however, the individual would require bathroom breaks in excess of the customary two per day, and those bathroom breaks could exceed five minutes, up to 15 minutes per day. The question posed was whether such an individual would be able to maintain any kind of full time employment. The VE's response was, no. (
Counsel for Taylor was then given the opportunity to question Burkhammer. Counsel asked the VE to clarify that the data entry clerk was a job involving constant fingering, whereas the first hypothetical indicated a limitation to frequent fingering, on the right hand. The VE agreed that the data entry job was thus eliminated. (
Concerning the addresser position, the VE noted his understanding that the position was "kind of like a general, unskilled sedentary position," "almost a general office clerk." He noted that the DOT has the handling and fingering at frequent. (
Counsel moved on to the issue of the limitation concerning the bathroom. (
Also, if the hypothetical was modified to knock the use of the dominant right hand down to only occasional, there is so much paperwork and data entry, etc., in the sedentary jobs that they would be eliminated under the scenario. (
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in her February 28, 2014, decision:
(
A claimant is entitled to receive Disability Insurance and/or Supplemental Security Income benefits only when she establishes disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381. A claimant is considered disabled when she cannot perform "substantial gainful employment by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months." See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's benefits decision is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Blakley v. Comm'r of Social Security, 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" has been defined as more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). Thus, if the record evidence is of such a nature that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate support for the Commissioner's final benefits determination, that determination must be affirmed. Id.
The Commissioner's determination must stand if supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether this court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute differently, or substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983). This court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the court may examine all the evidence in the record in making its decision, regardless of whether such evidence was cited in the Commissioner's final decision. See Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989).
The first issue raised by Taylor is:
(
It is well-recognized that an ALJ must generally give greater deference to the opinions of a claimant's treating physicians than to non-treating physicians. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406; Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. This doctrine, often referred to as the "treating physician rule," is a reflection of the Social Security Administration's awareness that physicians who have a long-standing treatment relationship with an individual are best equipped to provide a complete picture of the individual's health and treatment history. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The treating physician doctrine requires opinions from treating physicians to be given controlling weight where the opinion is (1) "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) "not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406; Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. In other words, treating physicians' opinions are only given deference when supported by objective medical evidence. Vance, 2008 WL 162942, at *3 (citing Jones v. Commissioner, 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Even when a treating source's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ must still determine how much weight to assign to the opinion by applying specific factors set forth in the governing regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6). Social Security regulations require the ALJ to give good reasons for discounting evidence of disability submitted by the treating physician(s). Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406; Vance, 2008 WL 162942, at *3. Those good reasons must be supported by evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to subsequent reviewers the weight assigned to the treating physician's opinion, and the reasons for that weight. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406-407; Winning v. Commissioner, 661 F.Supp.2d 807, 818-819 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (quoting SSR 96-2p).
Remand may be appropriate when an ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons explaining the weight he assigned to the treating source's opinions, even though "substantial evidence otherwise supports the decision of the Commissioner." Kalmbach v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-2076, 2011 WL 63602, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 543-46).
In the relevant portion of the decision, the ALJ noted that Taylor, in her hearing testimony, alleged that her IBS caused her to use the restroom eight to twelve times per day. The ALJ found that the record did not support those allegations. The ALJ pointed out that the December 2012 colonoscopy did not show any significant disease in her colon, which was "a significant detracting factor" for her credibility on this issue. (
Taylor states that Dr. Sievers, her treating gastroenterologist, issued an opinion
Taylor contends that Dr. Sievers' response constitutes an "opinion about Plaintiff's limitations with regard to her capacity for work based upon her medical conditions, which is classified under Social Security rules as a treating physician's opinion." (
Taylor asserts that the ALJ's analysis of her irritable bowel syndrome ("IBS") is contained in a single paragraph of the decision, where the ALJ rejected Taylor's testimony that her IBS causes her to use the restroom as many as 8 to 12 times per day, on the basis that the December 19, 2012 colonoscopy "fail[ed] to show any significant disease in the claimant's colon [which] represents a significant detracting factor for the claimant's credibility on this point." (
Taylor argues that the ALJ's rationale, that the colonoscopy was a "significant detracting factor" because it "fail[ed] to show any significant disease," is flawed medical reasoning. (
In addition, Taylor points out that there are no other medical opinions which contradict Dr. Sievers' opinion, and that the ALJ's misplaced reliance on a "normal" colonoscopy result to reject the opinion of a treating gastroenterologist is reversible error, and not supported by substantial evidence. (
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly weighed the medical source statements. (
The Commissioner argues that the form submitted by Dr. Sievers cannot be considered an "opinion" that would be given controlling weight. To be considered such a controlling "opinion," the opinion must describe what a claimant is still physically capable of, despite her limitations. (
Section 404.1527(a)(2) provides the following definition:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).
The Commissioner also cites Allen v. Commissioner, in which the court found that a physician's responses were "outside the scope of `medical opinions' as defined in [Section 404.1527(a)(2)," because the doctor's responses addressed the general relationship between the claimant's condition and the symptoms or limitations it may cause, "rather than addressing the specific extent of [the claimant's] limitations." Allen v. Commissioner, 561 F.3d 646, 651 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009).
The Commissioner contends that, even if Dr. Sievers' check-box form is deemed an "opinion," it was both unsupported and inconsistent with the record, which alone would be reason to discount the opinion. (
It cannot be said here that Taylor's complaints related to her IBS are absent from the medical record, or were never treated. As the medical evidence recited earlier demonstrates, Taylor suffered from IBS for years (see, e.g,
The Commissioner also contends that the ALJ is not required to discuss every factor in Section 1527(c), but is required only to include "good reasons" for the weight given to the physician's opinion, not an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis. (
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly found that the record does not support Taylor's testimony that her IBS symptoms had been present at similar levels for two to three years at the time of the hearing, and that her treatment had been largely preventative. (
Whatever the merits of that evidence, it is not to be found cited in the ALJ's decision. See generally
The undersigned finds that the ALJ's decision concerning the weight given to the opinion of Dr. Sievers is not sufficiently specific to make clear the weight assigned to the treating physician's opinion, and does not give good reasons for that weight. The court should accept the first assignment of error, and remand for further consideration of the treating physician's opinion and the weight to be assigned to it.
The second and third issues are related, and will be addressed together. Both concern the ALJ's findings concerning bathroom breaks, which is set forth in the ALJ's decision as follows:
(
The second issue raised by Taylor is "Did the ALJ err by assigning a residual functional capacity that is not supported by substantial evidence?" (
Taylor argues that the ALJ arbitrarily picked an amount of time that Taylor would be off-task to use the bathroom, but did not point to any evidence, let alone substantial evidence, supporting her opinion in that regard. Taylor contends that the RFC finding must be reversed. (
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ in fact found that Taylor's bathroom breaks could last "no more than five minutes in duration on average." (
The third issue raised by Taylor is "Did the ALJ err by finding work available in the national economy despite a residual functional capacity finding that allows for unlimited 5-minute breaks throughout the day?" Taylor notes that the ALJ never defined how many "short bathroom breaks" she would require in an average workday, and thus it is unclear how the ALJ is restricting Taylor. (
The Commissioner responds that, although the ALJ's finding does not specify how many additional breaks Taylor would require, the VE testified that up to approximately three additional breaks of no more than five minutes each would be acceptable, and would not reduce the occupational base. (
Taylor responds, however, that the VE testified that the jobs identified in his testimony would allow up to three additional breaks (beyond the standard two) maximum, thus Taylor would be incapable of the performance of substantial gainful activity. (
Even if the ALJ's finding that Taylor's bathroom breaks could last "no more than five minutes in duration on average" could be supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court finds that the ALJ failed to define how many "short bathroom breaks" Taylor would require in an average workday, and thus it is unclear how the ALJ is restricting Taylor in that regard.
The undersigned finds that the ALJ's decision concerning the undetermined number of "short bathroom breaks" is vague, is not sufficiently specific, and is not supported by evidence in the case record. The court should accept the third assignment of error, and remand for further consideration of the issue of bathroom breaks.
The court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence. The record evidence as discussed in the ALJ's decision is not such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate support for the Commissioner's final benefits determination. The decision of the ALJ should be remanded.
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge finds that the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the decision of the Commissioner be
Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004).