GEORGE J. LIMBERT, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the undersigned on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") on September 26, 2016. ECF Dkt. #12. In the motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff Harry W. McElfresh's ("Plaintiff") complaint should be dismissed because the complaint was not timely filed. Id. at 1. Plaintiff did not file a response.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF Dkt. #12) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice.
Plaintiff filed the instant suit on June 6, 2016. ECF Dkt. #1. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned on July 25, 2016. ECF Dkt. #10. On September 26, 2016, Defendant filed the motion to dismiss currently at issue and the transcript of proceedings before the Social Security Administration (the "Transcript"). ECF Dkt. #12. Per the Court's Initial Order, issued on June 16, 2016, Plaintiff had thirty days following the filing of the Transcript to file a brief on the merits of his case. ECF Dkt. #6. This thirty-day period has since passed with no brief having been filed by Plaintiff. Likewise, the thirty-day period for Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's motion to dismiss has passed with no response having been filed. See Local Rule 7.1.
In the motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's case is barred by Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), and thus should be dismissed with prejudice. ECF Dkt. #12 at 2-4. Sections 205(g) and 205(h) of the Act authorize judicial review in cases arising under Title II of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 205(g)-(h). 42 U.S.C. § 205(g) provides:
42 U.S.C. § 205(h) then provides:
Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 205(g) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for judicial review in cases arising under the Act, such as the instant case.
Per 42 U.S.C. § 205(g), a claimant must file a civil action in federal district court within sixty days after receiving notice of any final decision issued by Defendant to obtain review of that decision. The date of receipt is presumed to be five days after the date of such notice, unless the claimant can show that the date of receipt was outside of the five-day period. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 422.210(c). The Notice of Appeals Council Action, the final decision issued by Defendant in this case, was issued on March 25, 2016. Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that he received the final decision outside of the five-day period presumed for receipt. Accordingly, the sixty-day period to commence a civil action, preceded by the five-day period presumed for receipt of notice of the final decision, expired on May 29, 2016. Defendant correctly asserts that since May 29, 2016, was a Sunday, and May 30, 2016, was a holiday, Plaintiff was required to commence his civil action on or before May 31, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Plaintiff did not commence the instant suit until June 6, 2016.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF Dkt. #12) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice. herein.
498 U.S. at 96 (internal citations omitted).