OPINION & ORDER

[Resolving Doc. 11]

JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.

On October 6, 2016, Defendant Kristopher L. Courtney filed a motion to supress and for return of seized property.1 The Court held a suppression hearing on November 21, 2016. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to suppress.

A. Background

Defendant Courtney argues that in September 2016, police executed multiple search warrants lacking in probable cause. He also argues that the police illegally arrested him. Thus, Defendant Courtney claims that much of the evidence against him is inadmissible.

In August 2016, a confidential reliable informant ("CRI") contacted Cleveland Police Department Detective Robert McKay.2 McKay had known the CRI "for approximately 15 years," and prior information from the CRI had aided prosecution of various drug-related crimes.3 The CRI told Detective McKay that Defendant Courtney was selling heroin out of 2973 E. 130th Street in Cleveland and that people were planning to rob Courtney.4

Based on the CRI's tip, Detective McKay and others began an approximately two-and-onehalf week investigation. The investigation included surveillance, utility record subpoenas, property record searches, and installing a GPS tracking device on Defendant Courtney's vehicle.5

Surveillance and GPS tracking revealed that Defendant Courtney "follow[ed] a daily pattern."6 Courtney drove his 2008 Chevy Silverado to 2973 E. 130th Street's upstairs apartment in Cleveland daily.7 He traveled from that location in the Silverado to "make suspected drug transactions," and people also came to the apartment.8 The affiant and other officers witnessed Defendant Courtney "make[] hand to hand transaction[s]."9 At night, Courtney returned to either 13695 Shady Oak Boulevard in Garfield Heights or 3532 Normandy Road in Shaker Heights.10

Record searches and a trash pull revealed that the listed properties were owned by Defendant Courtney's friends and/or family members, and that he also received mail to at least some of the locations.11

Based upon this information, police applied for three warrants, one for each property. 12 Detective McKay served as the affiant for the warrants, and testified not only to the CRI's tip, but also to the information uncovered through the investigation.13

On September 2, 2016, at approximately 3:00 PM, police executed the three search warrants and uncovered evidence including controlled substances to mail linking Defendant Courtney to the searched properties.14

While officers were executing these search warrants on Cleveland's east side, other officers were tracking Defendant Courtney on the west side.15 According to the Government, officers pulled Defendant over and "performed a brief investigatory stop," but did not arrest Defendant or search him or his vehicle.16

Within five minutes of the vehicle stop, officers executing the residence search of 2973 E. 130th Street's upstairs apartment found narcotics and mail linking Defendant to the property.17 The officers radioed this information to officers who had stopped Courtney, and the officers proceeded to arrest him.18

Defendant was then transported to 2973 E. 130th so that arresting officers could aid in the search.19 After being read his Miranda rights, Courtney told officers that he had keys to the downstairs apartment at 2973 E. 130th property.20

Pursuant to CPD policy, the arresting officers performed an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle before it was towed.21 A drug dog also alerted for controlled substances in the vehicle.22 But, according to the Government, a full search was not performed until after the police obtained a search warrant a few days later.23 In the searches, police uncovered "miscellaneous documents."24

Later the same day, police obtained and executed another search warrant for 2973 E. 130th Street, Rear Down Apartment, Cleveland, Ohio.25

On October 6, 2016, Defendant Courtney filed a motion to suppress and for return of seized property.26 Defendant argues that all evidence seized from the properties is inadmissible because Detective McKay's affidavit, and therefore the warrants, lack probable cause.27 Specifically, Defendant argues that the CRI's tip was unreliable and probable cause does not exist without it.28

The Government responds that the CRI's tip was reliable and constitutes valid support for the warrants.29 And, even without the CRI's tip, the Government contends that the searches were supported by probable cause.30

The Court held a November 21, 2016 suppression hearing. During the hearing, Defendant Courtney also protested being pulled over and arrested, as well as the search of his truck and 2973 E. 130th, downstairs apartment. The Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue.31

Defendant argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest him during the searches, and therefore all evidence uncovered later is inadmissible.32 The Government responds that no evidence was seized as a result of the Terry stop, and police would have discovered the evidence regardless. 33

B. Legal Standard

A. Search Warrant and Leon Exception

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."34 Probable cause indicates a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. An affidavit used to establish probable cause must provide the official issuing the warrant a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.35 The Court judges warrant affidavits "based on the totality of the circumstances."36

But even if a warrant is ultimately found invalid, the Leon rule provides that evidence found based on that warrant is admissible if law enforcement officers acted in good faith and reasonably relied on the warrant.37

B. Terry Stop

The Fourth Amendment also protects individuals against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government.38 These protections extend to Terry stops—brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.39 To make a Terry stop, an officer must show objective grounds for reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity "may be afoot."40 In other words, the officer must observe some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.41 A court determines "reasonable suspicion" by looking at the "totality of the circumstances" of the case to decide whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing.42

While Terry stops require reasonable suspicion, arrests require probable cause.43 Probable cause can develop during the course of a Terry stop.44

The Exclusionary Rule enables a court to suppress evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. However, the "inevitable discovery" exception permits use of otherwise unlawfully obtained evidence if the government would have eventually discovered the evidence during its investigation.45

C. Discussion

A. Search Warrant and Leon Good-Faith Rule

Defendant Courtney argues that the CRI's tip was inherently unreliable because the CRI has a criminal history, drug problem, and lacked first-hand knowledge. 46 Without the CRI's tip, Courtney argues that the search warrants lack probable cause.47 The Court disagrees.

Probable Cause

The CRI's tip was properly included in the affidavit and relied on by the issuing judge. An informant can be deemed reliable in a variety of ways. In the Sixth Circuit, the affiant's testimony alone that the CRI "has given accurate information in the past" is sufficient.48 "The affidavit could [also] state that police corroborated significant parts of the informant's story."49

Here, the affidavit did both. The CRI's tip was corroborated by the subsequent investigation.50 And, Detective McKay testified that he had known the CRI for 15 years and that the CRI had provided reliable information in the past. The CRI's contribution to the affidavit was therefore properly used by the issuing judge.

Defendant Courtney's specific objections to the CRI's reliability fail. First, Courtney provides no evidence that the CRI has a drug problem or criminal history that would impair his or her reliability. Regardless, this accusation is largely irrelevant where the affiant provides other indicia of the CRI's reliability.51 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the CRI's tip came from anything other than first-hand knowledge. And, even if it did not, the issuing judge can consider hearsay in an affidavit.52

Even without the CRI's tip, probable cause is still satisfied. Officers witnessed Defendant Courtney make what appeared to be hand to hand drug transactions. Surveillance and a trash pull revealed that Courtney moved between one location where he sold drugs and two others where he slept—a pattern of behavior police have found common to drug trafficking.53

"[A]ffidavits for search warrants . . . [m]ust be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion."54 The issuing judge properly found probable cause based on the affidavits' common-sense implications.

Leon Good-Faith Rule

Had the Court found the search warrant invalid, evidence recovered at the first three properties55 would still be admissible under the Leon good-faith rule.

Under Leon, "where officers rely in an objectively reasonable fashion on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is subsequently found to be invalid, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the fruits of the search."56 Application of the exception depends on "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization."57

Upon review of the affidavit, the Court finds that law enforcement officers were justified in relying on the warrant in executing the first three searches on September 2. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant Courtney's motion to suppress as to evidence collected at 2973 E. 130th Street, Rear Up Apartment; 13695 Shady Oak Boulevard, Garfield Heights; and 3532 Normandy Road, Shaker Heights.

B. Terry Stop

While the Terry stop of Defendant Courtney was improper, evidence seized from Defendant's truck and the downstairs apartment at 2973 E. 130th is admissible.

The officers did not have a proper basis for stopping Defendant Courtney. At the suppression hearing, the Government argued that stopping Defendant was justified by the need for officer and public safety. But Bailey v. United States58 makes clear that officers executing a search warrant may not detain suspects outside the "immediate vicinity" of the premises on this rationale alone.59 Because Defendant was on the opposite side of Cleveland, officer and public safety do not support the Terry stop.

Nor did officers have independent reasonable suspicion that Defendant was, or was about to be, immediately engaged in criminal activity.60 Although officers suspected that Defendant had used his Chevy Silverado to make drug transactions, there is nothing to suggest that Defendant was engaging in a drug transaction on September 2. The Government provides no "particularized and objective basis"61 for stopping Defendant Courtney.

Although Defendant was subjected to an unlawful Terry stop, the evidence subsequently seized from his vehicle and the downstairs apartment at 2973 E. 130th is admissible.

First, this evidence was seized pursuant to his lawful arrest as opposed to the unlawful stop. Police arrested Defendant based upon grounds unrelated to the improper Terry stop. No evidence was seized during the duration of the improper Terry stop, which lasted approximately five minutes. Once officers performing the search of the apartment alerted the traffic-stop officers of the narcotics they found, there was probable cause to arrest Defendant.62 Defendant was then properly Mirandized and voluntarily told police that he had keys to the downstairs apartment. Therefore, the inventory search of Defendant's vehicle63 and the later searches of both his vehicle and the downstairs apartment at 2973 E. 130th—both sanctioned by a warrant64—were fruits of his legal arrest and voluntary statements to police, not the illegal Terry stop.

Second, even if any evidence was seized during the illegal Terry stop, the inevitable discovery rule provides its admissibility. After searching the first three properties, police could arrest Defendant Courtney, question him, and issue a warrant for his truck. These steps constitute "routine procedures"65 that would have led police to discover any evidence found in Defendant Courtney's truck and the downstairs apartment at 2973 E. 130th.

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant Courtney's motion to suppress as to evidence collected from 2973 E. 130th Street, Rear Down Apartment and Defendant' Courtney's 2008 Chevy Silverado.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendant Courtney's motion to suppress.

IT IS SO ORDERED.