SARA LIOI, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Benny Wilmoth ("Wilmoth") and Garland Rivers ("Rivers") (collectively "defendants").
The sole remaining claim in this lawsuit is a claim of excessive force brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
There is no dispute that these are the facts. The question on summary judgment is primarily a legal one, namely, whether the force used under the circumstances was "excessive" within the meaning of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), when a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, it shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
An opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, by affidavits or by materials in the record, the opposing party must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Affidavits or declarations filed in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). A movant is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
In reviewing summary judgment motions, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n., 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1991). A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is "genuine" requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus, in most civil cases the Court must decide "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict[.]" Id. at 252.
Summary judgment is appropriate whenever the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The nonmoving party is under an affirmative duty to point out specific facts in the record as it has been established that create a genuine issue of material fact. Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F.Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Ohio 1992). The non-movant must show more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome summary judgment; it is not enough for the non-moving party to show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts. Id.
"When convicted prisoners bring claims of excessive force, [the Court] turn[s] to the Eighth Amendment, which forbids the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that constitutes `cruel and unusual punishment,' and specifically conduct that is malicious and sadistic." Coley v. Lucas Cnty., OH, 799 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992) (further citations omitted).)
"What is necessary to establish an `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' . . . varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)). "Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance, . . . the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[Not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Richardson v. Rupert, No. 3:14-cv-01415, 2015 WL 1456553, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.")).
An Eighth Amendment claim requires a prisoner to satisfy both a subjective component, which focuses on the state of mind of the prison official, and an objective component, which is contextual, requiring the pain that is inflicted to be sufficiently serious. See Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "The extent of a prisoner's injury may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation and may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied." Tuttle v. Carroll Cnty. Det. Ctr., 500 F. App'x 480, 481 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2010)).
Most of the factual scenario is established through Clark's own deposition testimony (Doc. No. 33 ["Clark Dep."]), much of which is corroborated by the unchallenged security camera and video footage made available by defendants.
Clark testified that, on January 10, 2013, the events began at breakfast in the facility's cafeteria. Clark claims that Rivers passed him up while collecting forks, also referred to as "sporks." Clark felt Rivers "skipped [him] on purpose" and, as a result, Clark "got salty." (Clark Dep. at 211-14.) Clark tried to add his fork to a friend's tray and Wilmoth observed this, accusing the youths of playing "hide the fork game." (Id. at 215.) Clark insisted that he did not play that game, largely because he was "20 years old." (Id.) Clark admitted that it made him "mad" when Wilmoth accused him, and that they continued to argue. (Id. at 216.) Clark claimed that Wilmoth also threatened to "tear up"
After breakfast, the youths returned to the day room in their unit where they were allowed turns going to the restroom. (Id. at 223.) Clark testified that he continued to argue with the officers because they were allegedly threatening to tear up his room. (Id. at 225-26.) Clark claims he got conflicting orders from two officers, one (apparently Wilmoth) telling him to go to the day room, and the other (Michael Franklin, whom he refers to as "Frank") telling him to return to his cell. This made him "mad" and Wilmoth threatened to use a signal (a code) for other officers to come and give assistance.
Clark admitted that, after the code was pressed, he was "heated" and "punched the door" twice with his fists. (Id. at 231.) Clark further admitted that Franklin tried to calm him down by talking to him,
After Clark "squared up with Rivers" and saw Rivers and Wilmoth closing in, he "jumped over the couches, went over [ ] by the drinking fountain and waited for the OM
It is at this point that the parties' accounts diverge. Although in evaluating defendants' motion for summary judgment the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Clark, "[t]here is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). In such circumstances, the Court must also "view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape." Id. at 381; see also Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[W]here, as here, the record contains an unchallenged videotape capturing the events in question, we must only credit the plaintiff's version of the facts to the extent it is not contradicted by the videotape.").
As confirmed by the security footage (and outlined in detail below), Clark's deposition testimony about the occurrence in the day room is accurate up to the point where he claims to have jumped over the couches and then stood by the wall waiting for other officers to arrive. The footage "blatantly contradicts" that testimony, Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, showing that Clark never stopped running toward the direction of a water fountain on the wall, near where YS Crim had just entered the room and in close proximity to a bucket and mop (a potential weapon) remaining from cleaning that had occurred earlier.
The Day 1A, Day 2A, and Day 3A security footages confirm
The actual moment of alleged "excessive" force occurred within a span of about 2 seconds. When Rivers took Clark down, they both slammed into the wall and Clark "sustained a comminuted fracture of the distal third of the humerus of the right arm." (Bradley Decl. ¶ 4.) Dr. Bradley attests that a comminuted fracture "usually occurs due to direct impact of the upper arm, such as a collision with another player during contact sports, falling on the shoulder, or as the result of being in a motor vehicle accident." (Bradley Decl. ¶5; see also Clark Dep. at 287 (Rivers "hit me like a football player" in the upper body).) Dr. Bradley declares that "the initial break to Youth Clark's right arm occurred when he fell into the wall and onto the floor[.]" (Id. ¶ 6.)
Clark argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the force used was excessive. (Opp'n at 699.) He asserts that the use of force was clearly unnecessary and unreasonable because he was unarmed and had no intention of obtaining a weapon or causing any harm. (Id. at 701.) But, although the security footage certainly shows Rivers using force to stop Clark's forward movement, there is nothing to suggest excessive force, that is, there is nothing to suggest that any guard, including Rivers, "maliciously and sadistically" broke Clark's arm. Under the circumstances, this was an accidental injury.
Clark further claims that, "[e]ven after [he] was thrown to the floor and he screamed out in pain to the guards, telling them he was injured[,] they continued to use unnecessary force causing serious and painful injury." (Id.) He asserts that the force used by Rivers and Wilmoth, who "knew that [he] was injured" and "heard [him] saying his arm was broken[,]" (Opp'n at 702), far exceeded the standard articulated in Norton v. Still, 526 F. App'x 509 (6th Cir. 2013).
Clark's assertion that he told the guards he was injured while they were handcuffing him (implying that it was excessive force to continue) is not borne out by the video taken by YS Arrington with a hand-held camera.
Throughout this video recording of the handcuffing, there is not a single instance where a guard raises his voice in anger or frustration at Clark, that is, there is no evidence to suggest any negative animus or aggressiveness toward Clark, nor any action taken "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm," Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, even in the stress of that moment. Notably, at all times both during and after the handcuffing of Clark, despite the fact that he had been acting aggressively, and further despite the fact that these events escalated within seconds, all the guards exhibited a calm and controlled demeanor, speaking quietly to Clark as they give him directives.
Viewing the video in the light most favorable to Clark, a reasonable jury could find that his screaming alone was an indication of pain, suggesting injury. But there is nothing in this video to suggest that the guards gratuitously inflicted pain on Clark after taking him down and while handcuffing him, even if they may have exhibited bad judgment in continuing to move him despite his undefined screams. See Jackson v. Jackson, No. 96-5118, 1997 WL 225659, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) ("[n]egligence and deliberate indifference are irrelevant to a claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment[,] [which] requires proof that force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.") (citing Hudson, supra). As recorded on the videotape, it was not until nearly four minutes into the video filmed with the hand-held camera that a guard appears to figure out that "there's something wrong with [Clark's] arm" (Video at 03:55) and, realizing the possible source of Clark's pain, directs the others not to touch the arm.
Clark asserts it was excessive force for Wilmoth to twist his arm behind his back during handcuffing, the movement that, according to Dr. Bradley, likely caused the displacement of the initial fracture that had occurred when Clark and Rivers slammed into the wall. Dr. Bradley actually attested that "the combination of him [Clark] being restrained and resisting would result in the fracture being displaced[,]" and that it would "not take much motion to cause displacement and pain." (Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Dr. Bradley also noted that "[b]y staff having Youth Clark's arm against his lower/middle part of his back in an `L' shape as is often seen in the handcuffing technique, the combination of motion of the arm upwards and Youth Clark's twisting his body while resisting would displace an already broken bone." (Id. ¶ 8.)
Without knowledge that Clark was injured, defendants' application of any force during the handcuffing was merely "a prison security measure [ ] undertaken to resolve a disturbance[.]" Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. There is no evidence suggesting that the "force was applied . . . maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. at 320-21 (further quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff's argument relating to the necessity of the handcuffing is more in the nature of "deliberate indifference" which, according to Whitley, is not the correct standard in this context. "It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterizes the conduct prohibited[.]" Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. When corrections officers are using force to restore order, "a deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of [] competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance." Id. at 320.
This case is quite similar to Booher ex rel T.W. v. Montavon, 555 F. App'x 479 (6th Cir. 2014), where plaintiff brought a claim on behalf of her minor son alleging that his rights were violated during an altercation with staff while he was in ODYS custody. Specifically, the complaint alleged that an officer "used excessive force by violently twisting Webster's [the youth's] hand and fracturing his left wrist[.]" Id. at 481. The Sixth Circuit explained:
Id. at 484.
No matter how much plaintiff attempts to turn this incident into an "assault" by defendants, no matter how much he "vigorously contests [d]efendants' assertions that the force used by [d]efendants Rivers and Wilmoth was reasonable[,]" (Opp'n at 697), the record evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to him, does not support his view. To the contrary, the video and audio that has been made available to the Court, which plaintiff himself admits is the "best evidence" (id. at 696), establishes that "no reasonable juror could believe [plaintiff's story]," and that, as a matter of law, this Court "should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Rather, as clearly depicted by the audio and video footage, the ODYS guards were acting to resolve a penological security situation that Clark had initiated and, further, that they exerted only the force necessary to bring the situation under control.
Here, even if the Court takes as true Clark's assertion that Rivers "tackled" him, the security footage shows that Clark (admittedly upset) tore off his shirt, strode assertively across the room, and slammed his fist into the wall. It shows that officers, particularly Franklin, tried to talk him down, but that he "squared off" with Rivers, took off running, jumped over two couches, and bounded toward Crim, who was entering the room in an area in close proximity to a bucket and mop. Rivers followed, running after Clark, and "tackled" him or "grabbed" him, causing both of them to fall against the wall, resulting in Clark's broken arm. While Clark continued to struggle, officers proceeded to handcuff him, an action whose twisting, when combined with Clark's resisting, ultimately exacerbated the break — a break that there is no evidence to suggest defendants knew existed at the time. When it became evident that Clark seemed injured, and that the injury was possibly to his arm, the handcuffs were removed. One of the guards instructed the other guards not to touch Clark's arm, and he was assisted to a chair, at which time, medical personnel, who had already been called, tended to him. See also Eguabor v. Hunter, No. 3:08-0248, 2009 WL 1043924, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. April 17, 2009) (granting summary judgment to defendant, concluding that "the use of some physical force" was justified, even though it resulted in plaintiff's broken leg, where "plaintiff created a disturbance [], was visibly agitated and angry, ignored verbal orders, cursed at correctional officers, threatened another inmate, and threw a trash can across the housing pod.").
Unfortunate as the result of this incident was for Clark, he fails to meet his burden of showing excessive force within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 36) is granted.