SARA LIOI, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion of petitioner Peyton Hopson ("petitioner" or "Hopson") for the undersigned to recuse from the above-captioned case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and (b)(1). (Doc. No. 4 ["Mot."].) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
Petitioner contends that two prior cases before the undersigned are the foundation for the motion to recuse from the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254: (1) Northern District of Ohio Case No. 5:15-cv-992 (Hopson v. Stark County Sheriff's Office); and (2) Northern District of Ohio Case No. 5:16-cv-621 (Hopson v. Stark County, et al.). In Case No. 5:15-cv-992, Hopson brought a prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted. The case was thereafter dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, which Hopson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Petitioner submitted an affidavit in support of the motion, which consists of a summary of these cases and two primary arguments. (Doc. No. 4-1 ["Aff."].) First, petitioner contends that the undersigned had a prior professional relationship with the Stark County Sheriff's department because the sheriff secured the Stark County courthouse when the undersigned was a Stark County Court of Common Pleas judge. Based on this alleged prior professional relationship, petitioner contends that the Court's impartiality can be reasonably questioned. (Aff. ¶ 3.) Second, petitioner argues that the Court's "deep seated antagonism" against Hopson is demonstrated by the Court's rulings in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621. Hopson cites a variety of case law that petitioner contends demonstrate the Court's rulings in Case Nos. 5:15cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621 are wrong, which, according to plaintiff, shows that the undersigned is prejudiced and biased against him and cannot be impartial in the instant habeas action.
"[A] judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification `bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.' United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2006). The burden is not on the judge to prove that he is impartial. In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004)." Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F. App'x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 144, "Bias or prejudice of judge," provides that:
"[T]he judge whose partiality is challenged has a duty to examine the [§ 144] affidavit to determine whether it is both timely and legally sufficient." Brautigam v. Damon, No. 1:11-CV-551, 2013 WL 6387500, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2013) (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Easley v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (6th Cir. 1988) (further citations omitted)); Huth v. Hubble, No. 5:14-CV-1215, 2016 WL 6610808, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2016) ("Although § 144 on its face appears to require automatic disqualification once the affidavit is filed, a district court judge has a duty to examine the affidavit to determine whether it is timely and legally sufficient.") (citing In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1163 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (further citation omitted)). "Affidavits of bias are strictly construed against the party seeking the judge's disqualification." United States v. Gordon, No. 11-20752, 2013 WL 673707, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As an initial matter, the Court assumes for the purpose of this analysis that petitioner's affidavit is timely filed
The Court accepts as true for the purpose of this analysis that the Court had a prior "professional relationship" with the Stark County Sheriff's department because the department provided security at the Stark County courthouse. According to petitioner, this professional relationship is the source of alleged bias, prejudice, and lack of impartiality against him in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621, and the foundation of the bias, prejudice, and lack of impartiality alleged in the motion.
First, the Stark County Sheriff's department is not a party in the instant habeas action. In any event, such a professional relationship, without more, is inadequate to bias a judge. See United States v. Angelus, 258 F. App'x 840, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2007) (judge's professional relationship with U.S. Marshals where U.S. Marshal's Office is located in the same building as the federal courthouse and provides protection for the courthouse is insufficient to warrant disqualification pursuant to §§ 455(a) and (b)(1)
Petitioner has proffered no evidence of a personal, close, or special relationship between the Court and the Stark County Sheriff's department, and there is none, that would cause the undersigned to be prejudiced toward petitioner in this case. When a judge's relationship with a party is merely that of a professional acquaintance, and "`not an intimate, personal relationship or a relationship in which [the judge] would be obligated [to a party],' recusal is not necessary." Id. (quoting United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993), as amended (Aug. 11, 1993)).
Petitioner's speculation, conclusions, beliefs, and opinions in the affidavit concerning bias and prejudice are insufficient under § 144. A judge "`need not recuse himself based on the subjective view of a party no matter how strongly that view is held.'" Brautigam, 2013 WL 6387500, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990) (further citation omitted)).
Petitioner further argues that the undersigned's alleged personal bias and prejudice against him in this case is demonstrated by the Court's adverse orders and rulings in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621. Personal bias, however, is prejudice "that emanates from a source other than the judge's participation in the proceedings or prior contact with related cases." Id. (citing Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir. 2003) (further citation omitted)). Disqualification under § 144 "cannot be premised on bias that stems from the `judge's view of the law or the facts of the case itself [.]'" Id. (quoting Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F.Supp.2d 869, 876 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (further citation omitted)).
Upon examining petitioner's § 144 affidavit and accepting the factual allegations as true, the Court concludes that the affidavit is legally insufficient to show bias or prejudice on the part of the undersigned. Accordingly, petitioner's motion pursuant to § 144 is denied.
Section 455(a) and (b)(1) provides:
Section 455(b)(1) requires the judicial officer to recuse if she has "personal bias or prejudice" concerning a party. The Court has already considered the issue of actual bias and prejudice in the context of § 144 and, as discussed above, determined that there is no basis for recusal because of actual bias or prejudice. Thus, petitioner's motion pursuant to § 455(b)(1) is denied.
With respect to § 455(a), the law "is straightforward and well-established in the Sixth Circuit. A district court is required to recuse himself only `if a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'" Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251 (6th Cir. 1989) (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983) (further citation omitted)). "This standard is objective and is not based `on the subjective view of a party.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1988)); see United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1990).
Petitioner's argument that a prior "professional relationship" between the undersigned and the Stark County Sheriff's department is a basis for reasonably questioning the Court's impartiality in this case fails under § 455(a) for the same reasons that the argument failed under the Court's § 144 analysis. Fharmacy Records, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 875 ("Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, a judge must recuse himself if a reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have questioned the judge's impartiality.") (quoting United States v. Hartsel, 199 F.3d 812, 820 (6th Cir. 1999)). Based on the proffered facts, the prior relationship between the undersigned and the Stark County Sheriff's department was, at most, that of professional acquaintances. There is simply no objective basis upon which the Court's impartiality toward petitioner in this habeas action, where the Stark County Sheriff's department is not a party, could reasonably be questioned. Wheeler, 875 F.2d at 1251. Petitioner's subjective view is not controlling. Id.
With respect to petitioner's argument that the undersigned's alleged lack of impartiality against him is objectively evidenced by the Court's orders and rulings in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621, "disagreement with a judge's decision or ruling is not a basis for disqualification." Fharmacy Records, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 876; see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994) ("the recusal statute was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Cheese v. United States, 290 F. App'x 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2008); Gordon v. United States, No. 2:01-CV-1166, 2010 WL 518148, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2010) ("It is well-settled that adverse rulings during the course of proceedings are not by themselves sufficient to establish bias or prejudice which will disqualify the presiding judge." (quoting Carlton v. United States, No. 05-50023, 2007 WL 2332496, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007) (internal citations omitted)).
Petitioner's subjective belief that rulings of the undersigned in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621 are wrong is an objectively insufficient basis upon which the impartiality of the Court can be reasonably questioned under § 455(a). Wheeler, 875 F.2d at 1251. Petitioner can, and has, challenged the Court's rulings in Case Nos. 5:15-cv-992 and 5:16-cv-621 in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner's motion pursuant to § 455(a) is denied.
"Although a judge is obliged to disqualify himself where there is a close question concerning his impartiality, he has an equally strong duty to sit where disqualification is not required." Angelus, 258 F. App'x at 842 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted) (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1972) (separate memorandum of Rehnquist, J. (collecting cases))). For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that recusal from the instant action is not required in this case, and plaintiff's motion is denied. This case shall proceed with the assigned judicial officer.