MEMORANDUM OPINION

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 18 ["Mot."].) The motion is unopposed by plaintiff.

Defendants raise several arguments in support of dismissal of this entire action, which was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, possibly, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971): (1) that it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for such actions, see Mot. at 153,1 citing Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983) and Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005 (Bivens); (2) that defendants are a private corporation and its individual employees who are not subject to suit under Bivens, see Mot. at 154-55, citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L. Ed. 2d 456 (2001) and Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 126, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L. Ed. 2d 606 (2012); and, (3) that the complaint fails to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, see Mot. at 155-56, citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868.2

Under Local Rule 7.1(d), plaintiff was required to file any opposition to the motion "within thirty (30) days after service[.]" No opposition has been filed and nothing on the docket suggests that plaintiff was not served with a copy of the motion. In fact, ten (10) days after the motion to dismiss was filed, plaintiff filed a "motion for an additional 28-56 days" (Doc. No. 20), seeking an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The Court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff was actually served with defendants' motion to dismiss.

The Court also notes that plaintiff's motion for extension of time was promptly denied by the assigned magistrate judge, but the service copy of the denial order that was sent to plaintiff by regular U.S. Mail was returned to the Clerk because plaintiff has failed to keep a current address on file. (See Doc. No. 25, returned mail.) Indeed, the very last entry on the docket is another piece of returned mail, reflecting the fact that the Clerk still does not have a current address for plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 48, docketed on March 15, 2017). This is plaintiff's responsibility, and plaintiff's failure. He has previously been explicitly ordered to provide a current address and did so at one time, but then apparently moved again. (See Doc. Nos. 26 and 35.)

Although pro se litigants are typically allowed more leeway than a person represented by counsel, this practice has its limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). At the very least, it is to be expected that a litigant both keep on file a current address and respond in a timely fashion to dispositive motions.3 Further, the Court itself need not fashion arguments on plaintiff's behalf in opposition to defendants' motion. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff has utterly, and in every respect, failed to prosecute his claims and/or to defend against the motion. It is clear to the Court that plaintiff has abandoned his claims by failing to keep the Clerk apprised of his current address and, more importantly, by failing to oppose the motion to dismiss.4 Scott v. State of Tennessee, 878 F.2d 382 (Table), 1989 WL 72470, *2 (6th Cir.1989) ("[I]f a plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant's motion, then the district court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the motion.").

There being no opposition to the motion, and defendants having advanced meritorious arguments, they are entitled to dismissal, and the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 18) is granted. All claims and all defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Further, the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.