REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVID A. RUIZ, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Juanita L. McLaughlin (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), challenges the final decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter "Commissioner"), denying her applications for a Period of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. ("Act"). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to an automatic referral under Local Rule 72.2(b) for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

On August 8, 2012 and August 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for POD, DIB, and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of May 7, 2011. (Transcript ("Tr.") 134, 238-265). The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 55-58, 115-133). Plaintiff participated in the hearing on October 8, 2014, was represented by counsel, and testified. (Tr. 28-54). A vocational expert ("VE") also participated and testified. Id. On December 3, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 22). On April 15, 2016, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. (Tr. 1-3). On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the Commissioner's final decision. (R. 1). The parties have completed briefing in this case. (R. 14 & 16-1).

Plaintiff asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ erred by failing to fully credit her testimony; (2) the ALJ erred by giving little weight to the opinions of two physicians of record; (3) the ALJ erred by not crediting the testimony of her friend; and, (4) the ALJ erred by relying on the testimony of the VE.1 (R. 14, PageID# 710-712).

II. Evidence

A. Personal and Vocational Evidence

Plaintiff was born in October 1974 and was 36-years-old on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 238). She has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English. (Tr. 21). She has past relevant work as a "wire harness assembler and inspector — hand packager." Id.

B. Relevant Medical Evidence2

1. Treatment Records

Prior to her May 7, 2011 alleged onset date, Plaintiff was seen on January 14, 2011, at the Community Mental Health Center. (Tr. 445). She reported feeling "depressed all the time" for years, as well as being prescribed Effexor "on and off" for ten years. Id.

On September 28, 2011, an MRI of Plaintiff's lumbar spine revealed no spondylolisthesis or spondylolysis, no compression fracture; normal morphology and signal, no spinal stenosis or neural foraminal narrowing; and minimal disc bulging at L5-S1. (Tr. 520).

On December 7, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by Mark J. Pellegrino, D.O., complaining of chronic pain. (Tr. 475). On a scale of 0 to 10, she rated her pain at level 8. Id. Plaintiff complained of joint pain, swelling, stiffness, and cramps. (Tr. 476) She denied global weakness or myalgia, focal weakness, neck pain, or back pain. Id. She had a mild bilateral antalgic gait, and no focal neurological deficits or swelling. Id. Dr. Pellegrino refilled her prescription for Percocet. Id. Throughout 2012, Plaintiff visited Dr. Pellegrino every other month, with similar treatment notes. (Tr. 483-494, 571-576).

In November of 2012, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Maskarinec complaining of a recent worsening of her pain. (Tr. 534). Plaintiff demonstrated spasms and decreased range of motion of the cervical spine in all directions. (Tr. 536).

On January 1, 2013, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Pellegrino complaining of chronic pain. (Tr. 577). She reported that medication improved her pain levels. Id. Plaintiff had a normal gait, normal range of motion of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine. (Tr. 578). Plaintiff received a Ketorolac injection. (Tr. 579). At her next visit two months later, Plaintiff reported a 50 percent reduction in pain from the Ketorolac injection, but relief lasted for only four days before the pain returned to normal pre-injection levels. (Tr. 581). She again had a normal gait and range of motion. (Tr. 583).

2. Medical Opinions Concerning Plaintiff's Functional Limitations

One June 8, 2011, John Maskarinec, D.O., completed a certification form under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") indicating that Plaintiff's condition commenced on June 3, 2011, and that he had treated Plaintiff on June 7, 2011. (Tr. 286-289). He checked a box indicating that Plaintiff was unable to perform her job functions. (Tr. 287). He stated that Plaintiff suffered from a mood disorder, which causes anxiety. Id. He noted that Plaintiff was not incapacitated for a single, continuous period of time, and that follow-up treatment would not necessitate a reduced schedule or part-time work. (Tr. 288). Her condition would also not cause periodic flare-ups preventing Plaintiff from performing her job functions. Id.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Maskarinec completed a short-term disability claim form indicating that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression, causing symptoms of "fatigue, quiet, stressed." (Tr. 294). He noted that Plaintiff had not been treated in an emergency room or confined to a hospital. Id. He did not offer any opinion concerning Plaintiff's physical functional limitations, marking "N/A" on that portion of the questionnaire. Id. He opined that Plaintiff was "guarded" in her abilities to use "judgment/decision making," "deal with work stresses," "function independently," "concentration/attention span," "emotional liability," and "caring for self/family." (Tr. 295).

On July 19, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Pellegrino for an examination. (Tr. 466). He reviewed her health questionnaire, past history, and review of systems checklist. Id. His impression was fibromyalgia and associated chronic pain syndrome and central pain syndrome. (Tr. 467). Dr. Pellegrino opined that it would be very difficult for Plaintiff "to sustain her specific job where she does a lot of standing and repetitive reaching, bending and lifting. In my opinion she would have permanent difficulties with these types of job abilities. . . ." (Tr. 467).

On October 13, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Gary J. Sipps, Ph. D., for a psychological examination for the purpose of evaluating her disability claim. (Tr. 552-557). Plaintiff reported that she first participated in psychological/psychiatric treatment about one year prior to the exam, but discontinued treatment after six months due to lack of insurance. (Tr. 553). Plaintiff indicated that her childhood had been satisfactory, and she maintains good relationships with her parents and siblings. (Tr. 552). Later in the exam, Plaintiff reported that she had experienced anxiety for four years, which she attributed to her bad childhood and physically abusive father. (Tr. 554). On mental status examination, Plaintiff had good grooming/hygiene, was dressed appropriately, had 100 percent intelligible speech with no looseness of association or tangentiality, had overt signs of anxiety, did not display any delusional or paranoid thinking, was oriented x 3, had average intellectual ability, and no suicidal ideation for the past three years. (Tr. 554). Regarding activities of daily living, Plaintiff reported that she read, watched television, and crocheted. (Tr. 553). She routinely attempts to wash the dishes, cook, clean the floor when she is able, and does laundry with assistance. Id. She maintains social interaction with her boyfriend, talks by phone with a friend weekly, and speaks with her mother and her son when they are available. Id. Plaintiff successfully completed a serial three task through six consecutive correct responses and could recall three of three objects after a five-minute period. (Tr. 554). She successfully recalled six digits forwards and four backwards and provided good responses to three of three analogies. Id. Dr. Sipps diagnosed depressive disorder NOS in partial remission with medication, and assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 53.3 Dr. Sipps opined that Plaintiff was not limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out instructions; not limited in her ability to perform simple tasks; limited in her ability to direct her attention and concentration effectively to multistep tasks based on her function report; not limited in her ability to respond appropriately to supervision and to coworkers in a work setting; and, limited in her ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a work setting. (Tr. 555-556).

On October 13, 2017, state agency physician Dr. James Cacchillo, D.O., reviewed the medical records and opined that, in an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry 20 pounds; frequently lift/carry 10 pounds; stand and/or walk for 6 hours; sit for 6 hours; frequently climb ramps/stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and, occasionally climb ladder, ropes or scaffolds. (Tr. 71-72).

On November 20, 2012, state agency psychologist Karla Voyten, Ph.D., reviewed Plaintiff's record and determined that Plaintiff's affective disorder was non-severe. (Tr. 69-70). Dr. Voyten opined that Plaintiff was mildly limited in her activities of daily living; maintaining social functioning; and, maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 70). She had no repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration. Id. She noted that Plaintiff's statement as to her symptoms was only partially credible due to inconsistencies in her reported activities of daily living. (Tr. 71).

After the hearing, on October 9, 2014, the ALJ solicited an opinion from a psychological medical expert ("ME"), Mary Eileen Buban, Psy. D., who was provided with the medical records on file. (Tr. 637). On October 30, 2014, Dr. Buban opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in her ability to understand and remember simple instructions, carry out simple instructions, and to make judgments on simple work-related decisions; had mild limitations in her ability to understand and remember complex instructions, carry out complex instructions, and to make judgments on complex work related decisions; mild limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with the public, interact appropriately with the supervisor(s), and interact appropriately with co-workers; and, moderate limitations in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 638-639).

C. Relevant Hearing Testimony

At the October 4, 2014 hearing, Plaintiff testified as follows:

Plaintiff's boyfriend, Vinny Jarvis, also testified. (Tr. 45). He indicated that Plaintiff cannot clean or even help with simple chores, such as laundry. (Tr. 46). She no longer helps with the bills. Id. She cannot concentrate. Id. As an example, he indicated he might ask her to start a load of laundry, but she will forget. Id. She gets painful knots on her body that are not visible, but can be felt to the touch. (Tr. 47).

The VE testified that Plaintiff's past relevant would be categorized as an inspector, hand packager, Dictionary of Occupational titles ("DICOT") 559.687-014, light exertional, unskilled with an SVP of 2, and wire harness assembler, DICOT 728.684-010, light exertional, semiskilled with an SVP of 3. (Tr. 33-34). The ALJ posed the following hypothetical question to the VE:

(Tr. 50).

The VE testified that such an individual would be unable to perform Plaintiff's past relevant work. (Tr. 50-51). Nevertheless, he identified several examples of light exertional jobs that such an individual could perform: inspector, hand packager, DICOT 559.687-074 (1,600 jobs locally, 6,000 in Ohio, 100,000 nationally); inspector, electrical or electronic parts,4 DICOT 727.687-062; assembler, plastics, hospital products, DOT 712.687-010 (1,400 jobs locally, 5,000 in Ohio, 100,000 nationally). (Tr. 51).

Plaintiff's counsel inquired of the VE whether his "opinion take[s] into account someone who can't show up to work because of depression?" (Tr. 52). The VE responded that it was not his place to evaluate what a claimant can or cannot do, but rather to respond to hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ. Id.

III. Disability Standard

A claimant is entitled to receive benefits under the Social Security Act when he/she establishes disability within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 & 416.905; Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). A claimant is considered disabled when she cannot perform "substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a) and 416.905(a); 404.1509 and 416.909(a).

The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-stage process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at the time she seeks disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that she suffers from a medically determinable "severe impairment" or combination of impairments in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). A "severe impairment" is one that "significantly limits. . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Abbott, 905 F.2d at 923. Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment (or combination of impairments) that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment(s) meets a listed impairment, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant's impairment(s) does not prevent her from doing past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) and 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant's impairment(s) does prevent her from doing past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g), 404.1560(c).

IV. Summary of the ALJ's Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

(Tr. 13-22).

V. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). Review must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The court may look into any evidence in the record to determine if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether it has actually been cited by the ALJ. Id. However, the court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).

The Commissioner's conclusions must be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681. A decision supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned even though substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy, 594 F.3d at 512.

B. Plaintiff's Assignments of Error5

1. Credibility of Plaintiff

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not give adequate weight to Plaintiff's testimony regarding the impact her impairments had on her daily activities and her ability to work. (R. 14, PageID# 710). Plaintiff points to her testimony that she lost her last job because she was unable to get out of bed due to pain and depression, her memory and concentration problems, difficulty driving, her inability to perform household chores, difficulty with grooming and dressing, and an inability to lift her arms above her shoulders. Id.

According to Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016), evaluating an individual's alleged symptoms entails a two-step process.6 First, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant has a "medically determinable impairment" that could reasonably produce a claimant's alleged symptoms. Id. at *3. Once step one is satisfied, "[i]n considering the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual's symptoms," an ALJ must "examine the entire case record," including (1) the objective medical evidence; (2) an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; (3) statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and (4) any other relevant evidence in the individual's case record. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *4. When considering a claimant's own statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, an ALJ should evaluate "whether the statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence."7 Id.

However, "an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003); accord Sorrell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 656 Fed. App'x 162, 173 (6th Cir. 2016). "[C]redibility determinations with respect to subjective complaints of pain rest with the ALJ." Siterlet v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Villarreal v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.2d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[T]olerance of pain is a highly individual matter and a determination of disability based on pain by necessity depends largely on the credibility of the claimant," and an ALJ's credibility finding "should not lightly be discarded.")(citations omitted).

While an ALJ's credibility determinations concerning a claimant's subjective complaints are left to his or her sound discretion, those determinations must be reasonable and supported by evidence in the case record. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 249 (6th Cir. 2007). "In evaluating an individual's symptoms, it is not sufficient for [an ALJ] to make a single, conclusory statement that `the individual's statements about his or her symptoms have been considered' or that `the statements about the individual's symptoms are (or are not) supported or consistent.'" SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *9. Rather, an ALJ's "decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms . . . and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms." Id. (emphasis added). "While in theory [a court] will not `disturb' an ALJ's credibility determination without a `compelling reason,' Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001), in practice ALJ credibility findings have become essentially `unchallengeable.'" Hernandez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 644 Fed. App'x 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Payne v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 Fed. App'x 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010)).

In the present case, the ALJ acknowledged she must follow a two-step process to determine whether Plaintiff's symptoms, including pain, were credible. (Tr. 16). The ALJ found the first step was satisfied and states that Plaintiff's impairments "could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms." (Tr. 16). The ALJ conducted a thorough discussion of Plaintiff's medical treatment. (Tr. 16-20). Thereafter, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's alleged limitations as follows:

(Tr. 20).

Plaintiff's brief fails to identify any deficiencies in the ALJ's analysis or develop any real argument, other than suggesting Plaintiff's statements were corroborated by the medical evidence. (R. 14, PageID# 710). Given the above described deference owed to an ALJ's credibility determinations, it is insufficient to simply argue that the ALJ erred by finding a claimant less than fully credible. Plaintiff has not identified a single alleged shortcoming in the ALJ's credibility analysis. Plaintiff's argument is essentially nothing more than a disagreement with the outcome. As stated above in the standard of review, the court does not review the evidence de novo or make credibility determinations. Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681. As such, Plaintiff's first assignment of error is without merit.

2. Weight Ascribed to the Opinions of Drs. Pellegrino and Sipps

In the second argument, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by ascribing little weight to the opinions of Dr. Pellegrino and Dr. Sipps. (R. 14, PageID# 710-711).

With respect to Dr. Pellegrino, Plaintiff points to his July 19, 2011 assessment wherein he stated that she "continues to be bothered by significant pain and her pain is interfering with her ability to perform her job," that she would have difficulty performing a job with "a lot of standing and repetitive reaching, bending and lifting, and that she was permanently disabled from "these types of job[s]." (R. 14, PageID# 711, citing Tr. 466-467). Earlier in her brief, she suggests that Dr. Pellegrino was a treating source8 and that it was incumbent upon the ALJ to give good reasons for the weight assigned to the opinions expressed in the July 2011 assessment. (R. 14, PageID# 706).

First, the court does not agree that Dr. Pellegrino qualified as a treating source at the time he rendered these opinions on July 19, 2011. Plaintiff does not cite any treatment notes of record by Dr. Pellegrino that predate the July 19, 2011 opinion, and this court's own review has not uncovered any treatment in the record by Dr. Pellegrino before that date. The July 19, 2011 report itself, which is actually a letter from Dr. Pellegrino to Dr. Maskarinec, strongly suggests that it marked Dr. Pellegrino's first encounter with Plaintiff, because it thanks Dr. Maskarinec for the referral and "the opportunity to see [Plaintiff]."9 (Tr. 466-469). Significantly, the ALJ himself did not specify that he considered Dr. Pellegrino a treating source at the time the opinion was rendered. (Tr. 19). Dr. Pellegrino continued to see Plaintiff on a rather regular basis after he rendered the opinions in the July 19, 2011 letter, and likely became a treating source sometime thereafter. However, "subsequent visits to [a physician] are irrelevant in determining whether the [an] opinion was that of a treating physician when it was completed." Witnik v. Colvin, No. 14cv-257, 2015 WL 691329 at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2015) (White, M.J.) (emphasis added). "The question is whether [the claimant] had the ongoing relationship with [the physician] to qualify as a treating physician at the time he rendered his opinion." Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 506 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). In Kornecky, the Sixth Circuit declined to find a treating physician relationship, noting that visits to a physician after an assessment had been made "could not retroactively render [the doctor] a treating physician at the time of the assessment." 167 Fed. App'x at 506 n.10; cf. Daniels v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed. App'x 485 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a physician who only saw the claimant twice was not a treating physician despite the ALJ referring to the physician as such).

The opinion of a non-treating but examining source is not subject to the rigors of the treating physician rule. Other courts have determined that "the regulation requiring an ALJ to provide `good reasons' for the weight given a treating physician's opinion does not apply to an ALJ's failure to explain his favoring of one non-treating source's opinion over another." Williams v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5165458 at *5 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 2, 2015) (citing Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. App'x 496 (6th Cir. 2006); accord Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 2988433 at *8 (S.D. Ohio, July 1, 2014) ("the ALJ is not required to give `good reasons' for rejecting a nontreating source's opinions in the same way as must be done for a treating source"). While a claimant may disagree with the ALJ's explanation as to why little weight was assigned to a non-treating medical source, such a disagreement with the ALJ's rationale does not provide a basis for remand. See, e.g., Steed v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4479485 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2016) (McHargh, M.J.).

Instead, an ALJ, when arriving at the RFC assessment, "must always consider and address medical source opinions [and] [i]f the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (July 2, 1996); see also Puckett v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1584166 at *9 (N.D. Ohio April 21, 2014) (Vecchiarelli, M.J.) (explaining that, although the ALJ was not required to evaluate opinions of consultative examiners with the same standard of deference as would apply to an opinion of a treating source, he was required to "acknowledge that [the examiners'] opinions contradicted his RFC finding and explain why he did not include their limitations in his determination of Plaintiff's RFC") (emphasis added).

The ALJ offered the following assessment of Dr. Pellegrino's July 2011 opinion:

(Tr. 19).

Plaintiff fails to develop any meaningful argument suggesting that the ALJ's decision failed to satisfy the explanation requirement. In fact, given the vagueness of Dr. Pellegrino's statements, it is highly questionable whether it even conflicts with the RFC for light work, which requires, at most, six hours of standing/walking in an eight-hour workday.11 Furthermore, a number of courts have found that a physician's opinion, where it is "premised to a large extent upon the claimant's own accounts of [her] symptoms and limitations may be disregarded where those complaints have been properly discounted." Reinertson v. Barnhart, 127 Fed. App'x 285, 290 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that ALJ did not err by disregarding the opinion of a treating physician where the limitation in question appeared to be based not upon his own medical conclusion, but upon the conclusion of a different doctor and the claimant's self-assessment); Tate v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 467 Fed. App'x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no error where the ALJ discounted a treating doctor's opinion because there were substantial gaps in treatment and where the doctor's assessment appeared to be based on claimant's subjective complaints without sufficient support from objective clinical or neurological findings); see also Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 Fed. Appx. 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding treating physician's opinion was not entitled to deference where it was based on claimant's subjective complaints); accord Rogers v. Astrue, 2012 WL 639473 at *4 ("Simply recording Plaintiff's subjective complaints is not objective medical data. . . .") Because the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not credible, a determination that, as discussed above, is entitled to considerable deference, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to discount a medical source opinion that was primarily based on Plaintiff's self-reports of her symptoms.

Turning to Dr. Sipps, who performed a one-time consultative psychological evaluation, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ erred by not fully crediting his opinion. (R. 14, PageID# 711). First, it should be noted that the ALJ did not reject Dr. Sipps's opinions, but ascribed them partial weight. (Tr. 19). The Commissioner argues that RFC adopted by the ALJ is actually consistent with the Dr. Sipps's opinion. (R. 16, PageID# 737-738). The ALJ addressed Dr. Sipps's opinion as follows:

(Tr. 19).

Plaintiff's brief identifies two specific limitations assessed by Dr. Sipps: (1) that Plaintiff's difficulties with attention and concentration would limit her ability to perform multistep tasks effectively; and (2) that Plaintiff has limited coping skills and would be limited in her ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a work setting. (R. 14, PageID# 711, citing Tr. 555-556). The RFC, however, does not require Plaintiff to perform multistep tasks. (Tr. 15). Rather Plaintiff is limited to "simple, routine tasks." Id. Dr. Sipps specifically opined that Plaintiff "would not appear limited in her ability to perform simple tasks." As such, the court finds no inconsistency here. Turning to Plaintiff's alleged limited coping skills, the RFC limits Plaintiff to jobs where there is "no negotiation, mediation, or arbitration," and only occasional social interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors." (Tr. 15). Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that a limited ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a work setting is work preclusive, nor does she explain how the RFC fails to adequately account for this limitation.

Finally, even if Dr. Sipps's opinion was construed as more limiting than the RFC, the ALJ adequately explained his reasons for not incorporating them. Reading the decision as a whole, the ALJ sufficiently explained why he was giving little weight to the consultative examiners. The explanation requirement is not as rigorous as the good reasons requirement of the treating physician rule. See, e.g.,, Moscorelli v. Colvin, No. 1:15cv1509, 2016 WL 4486851 at **3-4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2016) (Lioi, J.) (observing that a thin explanation that would not constitute a good reason for discounting a treating source's opinion may, nevertheless, satisfy the explanation requirement for a non-treating source). First, the ALJ explained that the evidence showed Plaintiff retained the ability to perform unskilled tasks, and generally had logical thoughts and cooperative behavior. (Tr. 19). Second, the ALJ expressly ascribed "great weight" to the opinion of an ME, Dr. Buban, to whom the ALJ proffered post-hearing interrogatories.12 (Tr. 20). It is true, that more weight is typically afforded to examining sources, such as Dr. Sipps, than the opinion of a non-examining source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). Nevertheless, "it is not a per se error of law, as [claimant] suggests, for the ALJ to credit a nonexamining source over a nontreating source." Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 461 Fed. App'x 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012); accord Moscorelli, 2016 WL 4486851 at *3.

A recent decision from the Southern District of Ohio, Lowther v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-cv-3010, 2016 WL 7111604 at *7 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 7, 2016), adopted by 2017 WL 25551 (Jan. 2, 2017), reasoned that where a longitudinal picture of a plaintiff's mental health was lacking, each psychological medical source opinion necessarily was based on a limited amount of evidence." Lowther, 2016 WL 7111604 at *7. "Considering all of this," the court reasoned, "the ALJ's decision to place more weight on the conclusions" of a non-examining State Agency psychologist, who reviewed the record, than those of two consultative examining psychologists "was within the permissible `zone of choice' afforded to an ALJ." Id. (citations omitted). This court agrees with the sound reasoning of the Lowther decision, and finds that the ALJ did not err by assigning greater weight to the non-examining opinion of Dr. Buban, who had the benefit of reviewing the entire medical record—including the opinions of Dr. Sipps as well as any treating sources. (Tr. 20). Thus, to the extent the ALJ did not fully credit Dr. Sipps's opinions, he adequately explained why they were assigned less weight. As such, the second assignment of error is without merit.

3. Testimony of Plaintiff's Boyfriend

In the third assignment of error, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's decision to ascribe little weight to the testimony of her boyfriend, Vinny Jarvis. (R. 14, PageID# 711).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(4) & 416.913(a)(4), Mr. Jarvis's testimony would be categorized as "[e]vidence from nonmedical sources," which includes "any information or statement(s) from a nonmedical source (including you) about any issue in your claim. We may receive evidence from nonmedical sources either directly from the nonmedical source or indirectly, such as from forms we receive and our administrative records."13 An ALJ "generally should explain the weight given to opinions from these [nonmedical] sources or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator's reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case. . . ." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(2) & 416.927(f)(2).

Even before the regulation changes, ALJs were required to "explain the weight given to opinions for these `other sources' . . . [b]ut other-source opinions are not entitled to any special deference." Hill v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 560 Fed. App'x 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting SSR 06-03p at 6). The ALJ addressed Mr. Jarvis's opinion as follows:

(Tr. 18).

The decision adequately explained the weight assigned to Mr. Jarvis's testimony, a nonmedical source. Plaintiff's brief suggests that the testimony is actually consistent with the other medical evidence. Again, this argument is tantamount to a request for the court to conduct new credibility determinations and to reweigh the evidence. The assignment of error is without merit.

4. VE's Testimony

Finally, Plaintiff suggests the ALJ erred by ascribing "undue weight" to the testimony of the VE, because his testimony did not account for a limitation that the hypothetical individual would fail to go to work due to depression. (R. 14, PageID# 712).

At the fifth and final step of the disability analysis, if a claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, it must be determined whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in light of the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). At this final step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the existence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy that a person with the claimant's limitations could perform. Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1999); accord White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 312 Fed. App'x 779 (6th Cir. 2009). An ALJ's finding in this regard must be supported by substantial evidence (i.e. that the claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs). Workman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 105 Fed. App'x 794, 799 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Varley v. Sec'y of Health & Varley, 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987)).

Testimony from a vocational expert—in response to a hypothetical question—may constitute substantial evidence that a claimant retains the ability to perform specific jobs, so long as the hypothetical question accurately accounts for a claimant's physical and mental impairments. See, e.g., Pasco v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 137 Fed. App'x 828, 845 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Varley, 820 F.2d at 779)). However, "[t]he rule that a hypothetical question must incorporate all of the claimant's physical and mental limitations does not divest the ALJ of his or her obligation to assess credibility and determine the facts." Griffeth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 217 Fed. App'x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Redfield v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 366 F.Supp.2d 489, 497 (E.D. Mich. 2005)). In other words, when an ALJ presents hypothetical question(s) to the VE, the ALJ is required to incorporate only those limitations that have been accepted as credible. Griffeth, 217 Fed. App'x at 429 (citing Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiff's argument appears to be founded on her own testimony that she was terminated from previous employment due to absenteeism stemming from her depression. As discussed above, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff credible and there was no error in his credibility determination. As such, the ALJ was not obligated to include limitations that he had expressly rejected. Because Plaintiff has not identified any inaccuracy in the hypothetical question with respect to those limitations that the ALJ actually credited, the ALJ could reasonably rely on the VE's testimony. Plaintiff's final assignment of error is without merit.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED.