MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONALD C. NUGENT, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF #77). Defendant filed an Opposition to the motion, and Plaintiff filed a Reply. (ECF # 80, 81). Following a review of the parties' submission and all applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff originally filed suit in state court, and Defendant Intellicorp Records, Inc. removed the case to federal court with the consent of Defendant Cato Corp. Removal was not contested. This court has original subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Both counts of the Amended Complaint are claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a federal statute. Therefore, this Court has original jurisdiction over the case and removal was proper.1

This Court previously found that under the United States Supreme Court case Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016) and Article III of the United States Constitution the claim against the Cato Corporation in Count One of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing. The United States Supreme Court has held that when a Plaintiff lacks Article III standing, as opposed to statutory standing, in connection with a particular claim, the court has no federal jurisdiction to decide that claim. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 97, 101-105 (1998).

Plaintiff now argues that, upon finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the standing issue, the Court was required to remand this claim back to state Court. Defendant contends that any remand would be futile and the Court should clarify that its dismissal of Count One was with prejudice. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." The Sixth Circuit has made clear that when triggered, remand is mandatory and there is no exception for futility. "[T]he futility of a remand to state court does not provide an exception to the plain and unambiguous language of § 1447(c)." Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 496-97 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, if this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, it would have to be remanded, regardless of whether it had any chance of success.

However, under the circumstances of this case, and the precise wording of the statute, the automatic remand requirement of Section 1447(c) has not been triggered. Although the Court has found that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring Count One, a second cause of action, based on a federal statute, is still pending. None of the parties have argued that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the second claim.2 Section 114(c) applies when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case, not over an individual claim.3 All but one of the cases cited by the Plaintiff in support of its argument for remand involved the remand of an entire case not a single count within a properly removed, multi-count case.4

Although it is difficult to imagine how a state court could interpret a federal statute to permit recovery when there is no standing to raise the claim under federal law,5 Plaintiff is correct when it argues that the dismissal in this case should have been without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including a lack of Constitutional standing under Article III, requires a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., B & V Distrib. Co. v. Dottore Cos. LLC, 278 F.App'x 480, 487 (6th Cir. 2008).

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part, and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF #77). The motion is denied to the extent that it sought remand of Count One of the Amended Complaint. The motion for reconsideration also sought clarification of the type of dismissal ordered. It is granted in so far as the Court agrees that the dismissal of Count One should have been designated as "without prejudice." The Court's previous Order issued on February 24, 2017 is hereby amended to reflect this designation. IT IS SO ORDERED.