JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
A plaintiff seeking leave to amend its pleading after the "deadline passes . . . first must show good cause under
Once a party shows good cause, a court may grant a party leave to amend its pleading under Rule 15(a)(2).
Leave to amend should be granted so long as amending will not cause "undue prejudice to the opposing party."
The City Defendants seek leave to amend their answer nearly six months after the Court's May 15, 2017 deadline for amendments.
The Court finds that the City Defendants have not shown good cause for their delay in seeking to amend.
The City Defendants argue that newly discovered evidence requires that they amend their answer. Namely, the City Defendants claim that they have discovered that there was never a valid public records request made by Plaintiffs' attorney in 1998. The evidence they cite, however, was wholly within their control during the entire pendency of this litigation.
The City Defendants had almost two months between the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint and the Court's amendment deadline. If the City Defendants did not undertake an adequate investigation of their own files during that time period, then they must suffer the consequences of that lapse, not Plaintiffs. This "new evidence" therefore does not provide sufficient reason for the Court to grant leave to amend.
Further, amendment here is obviously prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Court's deadline for amendments passed almost six months ago. In the intervening time, the parties have nearly completed discovery, have fully briefed two rounds of dispositive motions, and are set to go to trial in less than a month.
Had the City sought to amend its answer closer to the original amendment deadline, Plaintiffs would have, at the very least, conducted additional discovery on the subjects the City now seeks to deny. With trial quickly approaching, conducting that additional discovery would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible.
The foregoing reasons are sufficient for the Court to deny the City Defendants' motion. However, the Court also denies this motion because amendment would be futile.
In multiple filings seeking various different forms of relief after summary judgment, the City Defendants have argued that there was no valid public records request.
In 1998, Plaintiffs' then-attorney Michael Watson sent a letter to former East Cleveland Mayor Emmanuel Onunwor asking to review the police investigation file from Plaintiffs' initial trial.
Under both the current and 1998 versions of the Ohio Public Records Act ("the Act"), Plaintiffs' attorney's letter to then-Mayor Onunwor could be a valid method of requesting public records.
The Act as it existed at the time of the request made no mention of any specific method for requesting information.
The City Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' Brady claim is not supported by the record. The City Defendants made this argument in their summary judgment briefing, and now seek to amend their answer to reflect their more recent arguments.
The City Defendants' original answer already largely reflects this argument.
Because Plaintiffs have already responded to the substance of this argument in their summary judgment briefing, they would not be prejudiced by amendment. The Court therefore
For the preceding reasons, the Court
IT IS SO ORDERED.