ORDER

THOMAS M. PARKER, Magistrate Judge.

On August 3, 2018, Bruce A. Hammock ("Hammock") filed a "request for service of subpoena." ECF Doc. 59, Page ID# 317. Hammock asserts that, because he is an indigent inmate proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), the U.S. Marshal Service should serve subpoenas for him. Id. Attached to Hammock's request are eight AO-88B subpoena forms and USM-285 process receipt and return forms, requesting that:

ECF Doc. 59-1, Page ID# 318-33. In each of the attached subpoena forms, Hammock requests that the items be delivered "[w]ithin thirty days of service of this Subpoena" to his address at Trumbull Correctional Institution. Id.

When an indigent plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the U.S. Marshals Service is required to serve his subpoenas. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases."); Martin v. Posey, No. 15-CV-2294, 2017 WL 412876, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017); LaFountain v. Harry, No. 10-CV-943, 2015 WL 5749469, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2015), adopted by No. 10-CV-943, 2015 WL 5749469 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015); Brown v. Ross County, No. 14-CV-333, 2014 WL 4284874, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2014). Nonetheless, the Court may exercise its discretion to screen a subpoena request, relieving the U.S. Marshals Service of its duty when appropriate. Martin, No. 15-CV-2294, 2017 WL 412876, at *7; see also Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[i]t is well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court").

Notwithstanding the traditionally broad scope of discovery permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery requests must be "relevant to a party's claims or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Lewis v. ACB Business Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad"). The proportionality analysis requires courts to consider several factors, including "the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court sua sponte must limit discovery if "(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

Under Rule 45(a)(1)(iii), a subpoena must "command each person to whom it is directed to do the following at a specified time and place: attend and testify; produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person's possession, custody, or control; or permit the inspection of premises." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(iii). A subpoena may not command its target to create an affidavit, as creating an affidavit is not contemplated by Rule 45. See Martin, No. 15-CV-2294, 2017 WL 412876, at *7-8 (relieving the U.S. Marshals Service of its duty to serve an affidavit facially commanding its target to create an affidavit, and directing the plaintiff to redraft a subpoena that complies with Rule 45). Further, a subpoena directed to a non-party may not impose an undue burden, such as when it is facially overbroad or would cause the non-party target to incur an unwarranted expense or inconvenience. Cf. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 819 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the standard on a motion to quash a subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv)).

All of Hammock's proposed subpoenas are facially overbroad, as his requests for production do not include a limit to items in the targets' "possession, custody, or control." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(iii). Hammock's demand that McDaniels create an affidavit is also inappropriate for a subpoena, as the creation of an affidavit is not contemplated by Rule 45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(iii). Furthermore, his requests for "any and all" records from Dr. Cline, Mobilex, Dr. Flanigan, OSU WMC, and the Louis Stokes VAMC do not fit within Rule 26(b)(1)'s proportionality requirement, as he does not limit his request to his personal medical records or specify a range of relevant dates. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Hammock's request that Mark Cockley produce "any and all public information regarding his past clients, which had dash camera footage as evidence from a Mansfield Police Department cruiser" is similarly overly broad. Moreover, this request is likely barred under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), as Hammock has not shown why he cannot obtain information about the City of Mansfield Police's dash camera footage through less onerous means, such as using: (1) interrogatories or written depositions, under Rules 31 and 33, to explore why the City of Mansfield has a budget item for dash camera equipment, but no dash camera footage; or (2) written deposition questions, under Rule 31, to ask Cockley about dash camera footage without violating any attorney-client privilege he may be bound by.3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Thus, the Court could deny Hammock's motion for service of his subpoenas, and relieve the U.S. Marshals Service of its duty to serve Hammock's subpoenas.

Nonetheless, as a pro se plaintiff, Hammock enjoys liberal construction of his filings. See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court directs that Hammock's subpoenas are to be liberally construed to request that:

The Court grants, in part, Hammock's motion for service, and directs the U.S. Marshals Service to serve Hammock's subpoenas as construed. A copy of this order shall be attached to each subpoena, so the recipients are advised as to their construction. Finally, the Court denies, in part, Hammock's motion for service with regard to his subpoena directed to Mark Cockley, and relieves the U.S. Marshals Service of its duty to serve it, because Hammock's request is not reasonably proportionate to the needs of his case and the public information he seeks could be obtained through less cumbersome means.

IT IS SO ORDERED.