JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.
Cleveland Police Officer Aaron Petitt sent a racially-charged text and the City of Cleveland (the "City") suspended him for six days. Petitt and Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association ("CPPA") sue the City, alleging free speech and due process violations. Defendant City of Cleveland moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
This case arises from an April 27, 2017 text exchange between Cleveland Police Officers Aaron Petitt and Sean Gorman. Gorman received a call to go to a Cleveland strip joint. Gorman texted Plaintiff Officer Petitt to ask for help:
Ultimately, Gorman resolved the police call incident without Petitt's help.
On April 3, 2018, the City disciplinarily charged Petitt with using "disparaging remarks when referencing an Arabic male during a potential police action."
The Gorman-Petitt exchange seems of little importance. Gorman asked for help with "some middle eastern types" apparently hassling patrons at a strip joint. Petitt responded with a text using the term "haji", apparently a not-complimentary Arab reference. Petitt shared the reference only with Gorman. The City only learned of the reference while conducting an unrelated investigation of Gorman.
The City held a pre-disciplinary hearing on April 17, 2018.
Plaintiffs then brought this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the City's actions violated Plaintiffs' freedom of speech and due process rights.
The Court grants summary judgment if the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the City's policies or customs caused a constitutional violation.
The Constitution prohibits the state from punishing citizens for protected speech.
First, Petitt's haji reference did not relate to a "matter of political, social, or other concern to the community."
Second, Petitt was not speaking as a private citizen. The question is "whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties."
Third, Petitt's interest in using an arguably offensive epithet barely registers as an interest at all. To the extent it is an interest, it is easily outweighed by Defendant's interest in prohibiting its officers from using offensive language.
Accordingly, Petitt's freedom of speech claim fails.
Petitt also claims that the City violated his substantive due process rights. He can show a violation by demonstrating "an arbitrary abuse of executive power so egregious that it shocks the conscience of the public."
Although somewhat difficult to discern, Petitt seems to argue that it was arbitrary and capricious for the City to determine that "haji" was a sufficiently disparaging term to justify the six-day discipline because the word is ambiguous.
The City's discipline does seem overblown. Petitt had sent one seemingly private text message to another officer with an only-arguably insulting ethnic reference. No public statement was made. Petitt's reference to "tune up" a citizen, an apparent reference to using force on the citizen, seems more offensive. But this does not make out a substantive due process claim. Public employers make suspect employee decisions without necessarily running afoul of the Constitution.
It is true that haji may: (i) refer to a Muslim who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca or (ii) be used as derogatory slang for Arabic persons.
Also, the City found that Petitt had failed to cover his tattoos and failed to deescalate. Failing to cover his tattoos was a Group I violation, warranting a maximum fiveday suspension.
Although the City may have overreacted, Petitt's substantive due process claim fails.
Petitt also claims that the City violated his procedural due process rights.
First, Petitt claims that no government policy prohibits the use of ambiguous words.
Second, Petitt argues that the City did not provide him with adequate prior notice that using the word "haji" would violate the City's rules.
A regulation must "give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes."
It does not appear that Petitt challenges the procedure used to suspend him. Nor could he, the City sent Petitt a letter outlining the charges, presented evidence at a hearing, and allowed Petitt to cross-examine its witnesses and present competing evidence.
CPPA claims the City violated its substantive and procedural due process rights as well. It alleges that it is required to represent, educate, and train its members and that these duties will be impeded, it argues, by the City's ability to punish an officer for "one word with an ambiguous meaning."
CPPA has not, however, demonstrated how this amounts to a constitutional violation. To the extent CPPA is making a vagueness challenge, as discussed supra, the City's rule against racial epithets is sufficiently specific for constitutional purposes. CPPA's remaining arguments concern either Petitt's injuries or speculative future injuries to other officers—neither of which CPPA has standing to pursue.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.