PAMELA A. BARKER, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Objections of Plaintiff Robert W. Walp ("Plaintiff" or "Walp") to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert regarding Plaintiff's request for judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") denial of his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 17.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Objections are overruled, the Report & Recommendation ("R&R") is accepted, and the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
In October 2014, Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of June 30, 2014. (Doc. No. 10 (Transcript ["Tr."]) at 11.) The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id.) On May 17, 2017, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified. (Id.) A vocational expert ("VE") also testified. (Id.) On June 16, 2017, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 11-26.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). (Doc. No. 1.)
The case was referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for a Report and Recommendation. The R & R concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and recommends that the decision be affirmed. (Doc. No. 16.)
Plaintiff raises one objection to the R & R, i.e., that the Magistrate Judge failed to "reconcile [a] logical inconsistency" between the ALJ's finding of marked limitations in the area of interacting with others in his analysis of Listing 12.08, and moderate limitations in this area in his Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") analysis. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court has conducted a de novo review of the issues raised in Plaintiff's Objections.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), "[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d 1499 (Table), 1994 WL 532926 at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) ("Any report and recommendation by a magistrate judge that is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo review by the district court in light of specific objections filed by any party.") (citations omitted); Orr v. Kelly, 2015 WL 5316216 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2015) (citing Powell, 1994 WL 532926 at *1). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). "A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).
Under the Social Security Act, a disability renders the claimant unable to engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can result in death or that can last at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The impairment must prevent the claimant from doing the claimant's previous work, as well as any other work which exists in significant numbers in the region where the individual lives or in several regions of the country. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Consideration of disability claims follows a five-step review process.
The Court's review of the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" McGlothin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 299 Fed. Appx. 516, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted)).
If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's finding that the claimant is not disabled, that finding must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently. Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed even if substantial evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).
In his sole Objection, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to adequately address a "logical inconsistency" in the ALJ's findings regarding Plaintiff's ability to interact with others. (Doc. No. 17.) Specifically, Plaintiff notes that, while the ALJ assessed marked limitations in this area in the context of evaluating whether Plaintiff met or equaled Listing 12.08, the ALJ proceeded to assess a Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") that imposed only "overall" moderate limitations in social functioning. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this error is not harmless because "[i]f a marked limitation in interaction would have translated to a residual functional capacity for no interaction with others, then no jobs would exist for such an individual to perform, per the vocational expert testimony at hearing." (Id. at 2.)
Here, at step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe mental impairments of "conduct disorder/intermittent explosive disorder/impulse control disorder, and depression/bipolar disorder." (Tr. 14.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet or equal the requirements of Listing 12.08. (Tr. 14-15.) In relevant part, the ALJ concluded as follows:
(Tr. 14-15) (emphasis added).
At step four, the ALJ proceeded to consider the hearing testimony, medical evidence, and opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff's physical and mental limitations. (Tr. 16-19.) The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's statements that he could not work because of "extreme anger" and an inability to work well with others. (Tr. 16.) In addition, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's history of incarcerations for disorderly conduct and assault. (Tr. 16, 18.) The ALJ then discussed the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's mental impairments, including a psychiatric hospitalization in 2015 and counseling sessions in 2016. (Tr. 18.) While recognizing Plaintiff's complaints of anger and impulse control issues, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a "limited treatment history" and had "reported mostly mild symptoms to treating sources . . . without evidence of hallucinations, delusions, obsessions, compulsions, cognitive disorder, current suicidal/homicidal ideation, or other serious issues."
With regard to the opinion evidence, the ALJ accorded "significant weight" to the opinions of state agency reviewing psychologists Drs. Tangeman and Goldsmith,
(Tr. 19.) The ALJ included the following mental limitations in the RFC: "[T]he claimant . . . [is] limited to the performance of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; occasional and superficial interaction with co-workers, with superficial defined as no tasks involving arbitration, negotiation, confrontation, directing the work of others, persuading others, or being responsible for the safety and welfare of others; no contact with the public; and limited to simple work-related decisions." (Tr. 16.)
Plaintiff argues remand is required because the ALJ's decision is internally and logically inconsistent as to the degree of limitation in the area of social functioning. The Court disagrees. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff had marked limitations in his ability to interact with others based on his impulse control and anger issues but expressly noted that, for purposes of the RFC, Plaintiff "can nevertheless work in a job with occasional and superficial interaction with co-workers, and no contact with the public." (Tr. 15.) The ALJ then proceeded to include these limitations in the RFC. (Tr. 16.) As both the Magistrate Judge and ALJ correctly note, these limitations are consistent with the opinion of Dr. Tangeman, who found Plaintiff had marked limitations in his ability to relate to the general public but only moderate limitations in his abilities to get along with co-workers and supervisors. (Tr. 100.) Dr. Goldsmith also concluded Plaintiff had moderate limitations in his abilities to relate to the others, finding he could "relate on a superficial level with minimal public contact" and "is limited to occasional and superficial interpersonal contact." (Tr. 135.) Moreover, in his RFC analysis, the ALJ explained his reasoning for not imposing more restrictive mental limitations, noting Plaintiff's "limited treatment history," improvement with therapy and medication, and generally mild reported symptoms.
In light of the above, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ's decision is not logically inconsistent regarding the issue of Plaintiff's degree of limitation in social functioning. The ALJ accorded Plaintiff the benefit of imposing marked limitations in his ability to interact with the general public, and adequately explained his reasoning for otherwise imposing moderate limitations in social functioning.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Objection is overruled. The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
