C. KATHRYN PRESTON, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter came on for hearing May 16, 2014 to consider the Objection to Proof of Claim (the "Objection") (Doc. #41) filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee, Frank M. Pees (the "Trustee"), and the Response of Heartland Bank to Trustee's Objection to Proof of Claim (the "Response") (Doc. #45) filed by Heartland Bank (the "Creditor"). Present at the hearing were Don L. Mains, representing the Trustee, and David A. Skrobot, representing the Creditor. After the hearing and at the invitation of the Court, the Creditor filed a Memorandum in Continued Support of Heartland Bank's Response to the Trustee's Objection to Proof of Claim . . . and Request for Withdrawal of Objection (the "Support Document") (Doc. #49). Thereafter, the Trustee filed his Reply Memorandum of Chapter 13 Trustee in Support of the Trustee's Objection to Proof of Claim (the "Reply") (Doc. #50).
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and General Order 05-02 entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, referring all bankruptcy matters to this Court. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(A) and (B).
On September 12, 2013, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, [and] Deadlines (the "Notice") (Doc. #10) was issued September 16, 2013, and provided notice that the Meeting of Creditors was scheduled for October 16, 2013, and that the deadline to file a proof of claim for all creditors other than governmental entities was January 14, 2014. The Certificate of Notice (Doc. #12) indicates the Bankruptcy Noticing Center mailed a copy of the Notice to the Creditor on September 19, 2013. The Creditor does not dispute that it received the Notice.
The Debtor filed a Third Amended Chapter 13 Plan (the "Plan") (Doc. #19) on October 11, 2013, that provided for a 100% dividend to unsecured creditors, and same was confirmed on November 18, 2013. According to the Chapter 13 Trustee's Recom[m]endation in Favor of Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan (Doc. #23), the Debtor is an above-median-income debtor, the best interest dividend is 0%, and the Plan is projected to last sixty months.
As a result of miscalendaring the due date, the Creditor did not file a proof of claim until January 16, 2014. On that date, the Creditor filed proof of claim number 19-1 (the "POC") as a general unsecured claim in the amount of $9,007.61. Subsequently, the Trustee filed the Objection on the basis that the POC was filed untimely. The Creditor acknowledges the POC was filed out of time, but argues that the Objection should be overruled because it fails to serve a purpose as required by 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5). In addition, the Creditor argues that allowing the POC will not prejudice any other unsecured creditors because the Plan proposes to pay the unsecured creditors in full. The Creditor urges the Court to exercise its equitable powers and allow the POC.
"A primary function of bankruptcy law is to provide a uniform method and a neutral forum for the prompt determination of claims held by creditors. Claims are made against a debtor's bankruptcy estate, normally by filing a proof of claim." In re Jenkins, 417 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (citations omitted). Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a creditor to file a proof of claim, and Section 502 governs the allowance of claims or interests. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502. Section 502 provides in pertinent part as follows:
11 U.S.C. § 502.
In re Glawson, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3654, *3-*4 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013).
Similarly, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are equally unforgiving of late-filed claims in a chapter 13 case. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) establishes the time within which a proof of claim must be filed. In a chapter 13 case, a proof of claim filed by a non-governmental entity must be filed no later than 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors. See Fed. R. Bank. P. 3002(c). "[Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure] 3002(c) is strictly construed as a statute of limitations barring the late filing of proofs of claim." In re Bailey, 151 B.R. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993) (citations omitted).
In re Glawson, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3654, *4-*5 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013) (emphasis added). "Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) is thus an absolute bar to claims filed after 90 days where none of the exceptions set out therein are applicable." In re Glow, 111 B.R. 209 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (citations omitted). In this case, the Meeting of Creditors was scheduled for October 16, 2013, and the deadline to file a proof of claim for all creditors other than governmental entities was January 14, 2014. The Creditor filed the POC two days after the deadline on January 16, 2014. Moreover, none of the exceptions delineated in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) apply to the Creditor. As such, the POC filed by the Creditor must be disallowed under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(9) as untimely.
Though the Creditor acknowledges the POC was filed late, it urges this Court to use its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 and allow the POC, on the basis that the Plan provides for unsecured claims to be paid in full, the other unsecured creditors will not be prejudiced by the allowance of the POC, and the Debtor did not oppose the Creditor's filing of the POC. The Court, however, is not willing to exercise its equitable powers in such a manner because to do so would subvert the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Though § 105 confers broad equitable powers upon the bankruptcy court, those powers are not without limit. Architectural Bldg. Components v. McClarty (In re Foremost Mfg. Co.), 137 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court tells us that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988); see also Rice v. United States (In re Rice), 78 F.3d 1144, 1151 (6th Cir. 1996).
In re Glawson, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3654, *7-*8 (Bankr. M.D. 2013) (citations omitted). In this case, the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure specifically provide for the disallowance of the POC based on its untimely filing, and none of the exceptions for allowing a late filed claim apply to the Creditor. The Creditor insists that because the Debtor did not object to the POC, the Court should allow same. This argument, however, ignores the fact that even though the Debtor did not object, the Trustee did; and once an objection to the POC has been interposed by a party in interest, the Court must follow the mandates of the Bankruptcy Code and the Rules. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise its equitable powers under § 105 to allow the POC because to do so would contravene the Bankruptcy Code and the Rules. Accordingly, the Objection must be sustained.
The Creditor also argues that the Objection should be overruled because the Trustee lacks a purpose for objecting to the POC as required under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5). A chapter 13 trustee "shall perform the duties specified in section[] . . . 704(a)(5) . . . [of the Bankruptcy Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1). 11 U.S.C. § 704(5) provides that "[t]he trustee shall if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5). The Creditor, in this case, argues that lack of timeliness is not a purpose for objecting to the POC but instead is a reason. The Creditor, however, has provided no authority for the proposition that a chapter 13 trustee objecting to a proof of claim based on untimeliness lacks a purpose as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. § 704(5), or that the trustee is prohibited from objecting to an untimely claim unless he can articulate a purpose. Nor did the Court find any such authority.
The Creditor relies upon dictum in In re Nwonwu, 362 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), for the proposition that no purpose would be served by objecting to a proof of claim solely on untimeliness in a chapter 13 case when the plan is sufficiently funded. In Nwonwu, a chapter 13 debtor neglected to list a secured creditor in her bankruptcy case. As a result, the secured creditor did not receive notice of the debtor's bankruptcy case until after the deadline for filing a proof of claim had expired. The secured creditor filed a motion with the bankruptcy court requesting authority to allow its late-filed secured claim. Neither the debtor nor the chapter 13 trustee in that case took a position regarding the creditor's request. The court, however, took the matter under advisement to determine whether a legal basis existed for granting the relief requested. After analyzing, inter alia, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) and 9006(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9), the court determined that the deadline for filing a proof of claim could not be extended in a chapter 13 case "even for an unlisted creditor that had no notice of the case. . . ." Nwonwu, 362 B.R. at 706. The court further stated "that the trustee may nevertheless pay the claim, even though tardy, if no party in interest (including the trustee) objects." Nwonwu, 362 B.R. at 706. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the following:
Nwonwu, 362 B.R. at 710.
The Creditor's reliance on Nwonwu is misplaced. First, the Nwonwu court ultimately concluded that the court did not have the authority to extend the deadline for filing a proof of claim, which actually supports the Trustee's position in this case. And second, the court's statement regarding the possibility that "no purpose would be served by objecting to a late-filed claim . . ." did not involve any analysis under 11 U.S.C § 704(a)(5) which is the statutory section upon which the Creditor relies for authority to overrule the Objection. In contrast, at least one court has found that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) and § 704(a)(5), "the chapter 13 trustee has a duty to object to claims filed after the deadline." In re McLarry, 273 B.R. 753, 754-755 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2002) (footnote omitted). The Trustee argues that he has had a consistent policy of objecting to untimely claims to ensure the orderly administration of the chapter 13 bankruptcy estate. Ensuring the proper administration of the estate clearly serves a purpose under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5). This Court is not persuaded that an objection to a proof of claim filed by the chapter 13 trustee on the basis that the claim is untimely fails to serve a purpose under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).
Moreover, overruling the Trustee's objection and allowing the untimely POC would produce an anomalous result. Though the issue in this case does not involve a request for extension of time to act, the caselaw analyzing same is instructive. Within certain limitations, a court may extend a specified time period within which a party must act even after the deadline has expired for doing so "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Bank. P. 9006(b)(1). In considering a request to extend a deadline which asserts that miscalendaring the date constitutes excusable neglect, numerous courts have found to the contrary and held that miscalendaring a deadline does not constitute excusable neglect. See In re Petuck, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2019 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2013); see also Jones v. Brown (In re Brown), 444 B.R. 173, 177 (S.D. Ind. 2011) ("[A] calendaring error does not excuse Counsel's failure to comply with the adversary complaint deadline."). It would be anomalous to deny a motion for extension of time on the basis that the party requesting the extension fails to show excusable neglect in miscalendaring a deadline but then allow a late filed claim even though the reason for missing the deadline is the same (i.e., miscalendaring a deadline). Accordingly, it is
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1)-(3).
