BETH A. BUCHANAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter is before this Court on the Motion to Dismiss Adversary Complaint [Docket Number 7] filed by Defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee, in trust for the registered holders of ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-FM2, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates ("
In their Motions to Dismiss, HSBC and Clunk argues that Plaintiff-Debtor, Carlean Dates ("
This Court agrees. The claims in Ms. Dates's Complaint are substantively the same as the claims she raised in Adversary Case Number 16-1052. Her claims remain precluded by the state court determination that HSBC holds a valid lien against Ms. Dates's residential property. Accordingly, her Complaint is dismissed.
On December 21, 2018, Ms. Dates filed her current bankruptcy case.
On March 21, 2019 and March 25, 2019, HSBC and Clunk,
In the prior adversary proceeding, Ms. Dates's claims against HSBC were dismissed by this Court based on the res judicata effect of a prior state court judgment [Id., Docket Number 30]. Specifically, this Court examined the binding effect of a January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry ("
In their current Motions to Dismiss, HSBC and Clunk argue that the same January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry precludes Ms. Dates's repeated attempt, with her current Complaint, to challenge the validity of HSBC's lien and assert fraud on the part of HSBC and Clunk related to enforcing that lien through foreclosure.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334, and the standing General Order of Reference in this District.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In determining a motion to dismiss, the court must "`construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). However, in determining such a motion, a court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Id.
Because a defendant is entitled to fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, the plaintiff's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Consequently, to survive the filing of a motion to dismiss, the complaint "`must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Varljen v. Cleveland Gear Co., Inc., 250 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2001) (further citation omitted).
Generally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court may not consider matters beyond the complaint. Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that if matters outside of the complaint are considered, the motion to dismiss is effectively converted to a motion for summary judgment). However, "`[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider: (1) any documents attached to, incorporated by, or referred to in the pleadings; (2) documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's allegations, even if not explicitly incorporated by reference; (3) public records; and (4) matters of which the court may take judicial notice.'" Embassy Realty Investments, LLC v. City of Cleveland, 877 F.Supp.2d 564, 570 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (further citation omitted). See also Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that although matters outside the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, documents attached to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, "[a] defendant may introduce certain pertinent documents if the plaintiff chooses not to do so." Embassy Realty, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 570. "Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document." Id. As such, this Court may consider a critical document attached to HSBC's Motion to Dismiss that is referred to in Ms. Dates's Complaint and is central to her claims without converting HSBC's Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment.
In this proceeding, the state court foreclosure action and foreclosure judgment are referred to in Ms. Dates's Complaint [Adversary Docket Number 1, ¶¶ 19, 37] and the foreclosure litigation is central to her claims. Accordingly, this Court may consider the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry in the foreclosure proceedings that is attached to HSBC's Motion to Dismiss [See Docket Number 7, Ex. C].
In addition, this Court may take judicial notice of the pleadings and documents of record in the prior adversary proceeding between the parties, Adversary Case Number 16-1052. See Saylor v. United States, 315 F.3d 664, 667-68 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have held that the court may take judicial notice of its own record in the prior case on which [a] claim preclusion argument is premised."); St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.1979) (stating that judicial notice is particularly applicable to the court's own records of prior litigation closely related to the case before it); In re Rooney, 436 B.R. 454, 455 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of its prior case dockets and records).
In her Complaint, Ms. Dates challenges the validity of HSBC's note and mortgage lien against her Residential Property and alleges fraud on the part of HSBC and Clunk stemming from their enforcement of this allegedly invalid lien through foreclosure proceedings. This is not the first time Ms. Dates has challenged HSBC's lien nor is it the first time this Court has been asked to evaluate her claims in light of the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry. Accordingly, this Court incorporates its analysis of res judicata and the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry's preclusive effect from its prior decisions in Adversary Case Number 16-1052, namely its Memorandum Decision Granting the Motion to Dismiss Amended Adversary Complaint as to Defendant HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as Trustee [Adversary Case Number 16-1052, Docket Number 30] ("
In its Memorandum Decision Granting HSBC's Motion to Dismiss in the prior adversary proceeding, this Court reviewed the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry and its determination that HSBC held a valid second lien on Ms. Dates's Residential Property subject only to the first lien of the Treasurer for taxes [Adversary Case Number 16-1052, Docket Number 30, p. 4]. This Court concluded that the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry was a final adjudication on the merits and the State Court's determination as to the validity of HSBC's lien was entitled to preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata [Id., pp. 8-11]. This Court then concluded that Ms. Dates's claims raised against HSBC in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding "question the same basic facts addressed in the State Court Proceeding: the validity of the 2011 assignment [of the mortgage and note] to HSBC and its resulting lien rights against Ms. Dates's Property and the ability of HSBC to collect under the promissory note." [Id., p. 11]. Accordingly, res judicata precluded this Court from "re-determining the validity of HSBC's lien rights and its ability to enforce the note and mortgage against Ms. Dates's Property." As such, this Court dismissed her claims against HSBC [Id., pp. 11-12]. Likewise, this Court granted Clunk judgment on the pleadings in the prior adversary proceeding because Ms. Dates's claims against Clunk rested on the invalidity of HSBC's note and mortgage and, thus, were also precluded by the January 29, 2014 State Court Judgment Entry [Adversary Case Number 16-1052, Docket Number 73, p. 7].
Ms. Dates's claims in her current Complaint [Adversary Case Number 19-1011, Docket Number 1] are of the same substance as those in Adversary Case Number 16-1052. She repeats her challenge of the validity of HSBC's lien and asserts fraud on the part of HSBC and Clunk related to the assignment of the lien and enforcing the allegedly invalid lien through foreclosure. Although Ms. Dates did not directly respond to HSBC's and Clunk's motions to dismiss in a timely manner, she did file three affidavits requesting that this Court vacate three prior rulings that were more procedural in nature [Docket Numbers 25-27 (requesting this Court vacate its orders at Docket Numbers 19-21)]. In her affidavits, she argued that res judicata does not apply to the state court Judgment Entry because the judgment does not address the chain of title argument she is currently raising.
This Court wants to emphasize to Ms. Dates that the validity of HSBC's lien against her Residential Property was determined by the State Court and is not subject to review by this Court. Continued filing of adversary complaints to challenge HSBC's lien in this Court will be reviewed under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011's standard for frivolous filings and filings presented for an improper purpose including harassment and unnecessary delay. Filings found in violation of Rule 9011, after appropriate due process is given, may result in sanctions. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c).
This Court
Accordingly, Ms. Dates's Complaint [Docket Number 1] is
On April 12, 2019, Ms. Dates sought additional time to respond to HSBC's and Clunk's motions to dismiss, asserting that she had only received the motions to dismiss on April 11, 2019—even though HSBC and Clunk certified that Ms. Dates was served with the motions to dismiss on March 21, 2019 [Docket Number 7 and 8] and March 25, 2019 [Docket Numbers 10 and 11], respectively.
On April 29, 2019, this Court granted Ms. Dates's requests for additional time, giving her until May 13, 2019 to respond to HSBC's and Clunk's motions to dismiss [Docket Number 19 and 20]. The record reflects that the Bankruptcy Noticing Center served the orders granting additional time by first class mail to Ms. Dates at her address of record on May 1, 2019 [Docket Numbers 22 and 23].
In her May 14, 2019 affidavits, however, Ms. Dates alleges that she did not receive these orders until May 11, 2019, which she claims did not give her sufficient time to respond by the May 13, 2019 deadline. As such, she seeks to vacate the April 29, 2019 orders and requests an additional 21 days, through June 3, 2019, in which to respond to the motions to dismiss. Ms. Dates's requests for additional time to respond to the motions to dismiss are denied. By her own admission, Ms. Dates received notice of the motions to dismiss by April 11, 2019, giving her more than four weeks to respond, which is ample time.