ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Barbara S. Mabra, brings this action seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since September 29, 2004, due to degenerative disc disease, diabetes, and high blood pressure. (R. at 50, 57.)
After administrative denials of her claim, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on November 18, 2008. (R. at 204-45.) A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (Id.) On March 20, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 13-22.) This decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on March 11, 2011 when the Appeals Council denied review. (R. at 3-5.)
Plaintiff thereafter timely commenced this civil action. In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff's contends, in part, that the ALJ erred in discounting her credibility; failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence of her treating physician; erred in concluding that she was capable of performing her past work; and improperly relied on her own lay opinion. Following the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition, this matter is now ripe for review. For the following reasons it is
Plaintiff, who was fifty eight years old at the time of the administrative hearing, has a GED and one year of business college. Her past relevant work was as a tool crib attendant and a quality control technician. (R. at 212-13.)
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she stopped working in September 2004 because she was unable to do her job after hurting her back, and her employer was not able to accommodate her restrictions. (R. at 214, 229.) Plaintiff suggested, however, that if she could have returned to her past position as a quality control technician, and perform the work in the same manner, she would have been able to do so at the time she stopped working. (R. at 215.) Plaintiff also indicated that she looked for work in the summer of 2005. (R. at 211.)
Plaintiff stated that her worst problem was her back condition. (R. at 216.) She testified to having back pain since 2002, but indicated that the pain had become worse over time. (R. at 216-18.) Plaintiff reported that her back pain is constant and often goes down both of her legs. (R. at 216.) Plaintiff estimated that on an average day her pain was an eight on a ten point scale. (R. at 217.) On the day of the hearing, she measured her pain at nine. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she received medication for her condition, but that her doctor had not recommended surgery nor had she seen a specialist. (R. at 218.) Plaintiff had last received an MRI in January 2007, although she indicated this was because her insurance would not cover an additional MRI. (R. at 219.) At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff had been using a cane for the past six months. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that her other conditions, diabetes and hypertension, were well controlled. (R. at 220.)
Plaintiff estimated that she could stand in one place for 15 to 20 minutes. (R. at 217.) She stated that she walks for 30 minutes every other day. (R. at 218, 227.) She felt that she could lift approximately ten pounds comfortably. (R. at 218.) Plaintiff testified that she lies down for 15 minute periods to relieve her pain. (R. at 217.) She reported that she lies down approximately three times a day. (R. at 230.) Plaintiff originally stated that she could sit an hour or an hour and a half without having a problem. (R. at 218.) She later testified, however, that she could only sit for about 30 to 45 minutes before needing to get up to relieve pain. (R. at 230.) She also indicated that her pain forces her to lose concentration on tasks. (R. at 231.)
In terms of daily activities, Plaintiff testified that she takes care of her personal grooming and hygiene except she cannot bend down to tie her shoes. (R. at 221-22.) She reported doing some household chores including making her bed, preparing meals, laundry, and dusting. (R. at 22.) Plaintiff stated that she drives about twice a day, normally to the store and to visit family. (R. at 209.) She indicated that she has to make short trips to the grocery store rather than getting everything at once. (R. at 223.) Plaintiff reported going out to visit family members approximately once a week. (R. at 225-26.)
Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the lumbar spine on July 19, 2002. (R. at 88.) The MRI findings included a diffuse annular bulge at L5-S1; central disc protrusion at L4-5; and diffuse annular disc bulge at L3-4. (Id.) The overall impression was "[m]ultilevel degenerative changes, a component of central canal and lateral recess stenosis most severe at L4-5 where there is also a central disc protrusion." (Id.)
Plaintiff began treating with Thomas Brunsman, M.D., at Jamestown Family Medicine, Inc., at least as early as July 29, 2002. (R. at 191.) At this time, Plaintiff reported that she had injured her back at work on the first day of July. (Id.) Following review of Plaintiff's July 2002 MRI, Dr. Brunsman prescribed pain medication. (Id.) In June 2003, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Brunsman that she was having trouble meeting the lifting requirements of her job, which required her to lift greater than fifty pounds. (R. at 188.) At this time Dr. Brunsman diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic lumbar strain and degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine. (Id.) In October 2003, Dr. Brunsman noted pain and tenderness in Plaintiff's lumbar region upon examination as well as mild paraspinal muscle tenderness. (R. at 187.) In January 2004, Plaintiff was performing full duties at work, but was sometimes having her coworkers help her with lifting. (R. at 186.) Dr. Brunsman once again noted tenderness upon examination and continued prescribing Plaintiff medication for the pain. (Id.)
In addition to Dr. Brunsman, Plaintiff also received treatment from Frank Klamet, M.D., beginning in October 2003. (R. at 99.) Upon initial examination, Plaintiff reported that her diabetes was well controlled. (Id.) Dr. Klamet, however, indicated that reviewing her past examinations Plaintiff's diabetes was uncontrolled. (Id.) Following physical examination, Dr. Klamet noted that "[back] pain is elicited with straight leg test bilaterally but is kind of vague." (R. at 100.) Dr. Klamet diagnosed Plaintiff with insulin dependent diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia. (Id.) In May 2004, Dr. Klamet noted that Plaintiff's lab results were not great, but that her blood pressure was much better. (R. at 98.) In June 2004, Plaintiff's gait and station appeared normal. (R. at 96.) On September 1, 2004, Dr. Klamet noted that Plaintiff's diabetes was still poorly controlled, but that her blood pressure was under excellent control. (R. at 94.)
On August 9, 2004, Plaintiff underwent a second MRI of the lumbar spine. (R. at 89.) Testing results included small left paracentral disc protrusion at the T11-12 level; small foraminal disc protrusion at the T12-L1 level; a shallow circumferential disc bulge and degenerative changes of the facet joints at the L3-4 level; and mild disc degeneration at the L4-5 level. (R. at 89.) Maurice Miller, M.D., who interpreted the test results, found "[c]entral canal stenosis of a mild degree at the L3-4 and L4-5 levels." (R. at 90.) Dr. Miller also noted that Plaintiff "appears to have short pedioles on a developmental/congenital basis." (Id.) Finally, Dr. Miller reported that "[d]isc bulging and facet changes contribute to the central canal stenosis and lateral recess stenosis." (Id.)
Plaintiff received treatment from Dr. Brunsman throughout 2004. (R. at 177-84.) In August 2004, Dr. Brunsman noted that Plaintiff's back pain was traveling down her leg and recorded positive straight leg testing upon examination. (R. at 184.) On September 28, 2004, Dr. Brunsman assigned a lifting restriction of twenty to twenty-five pounds. (R. at 183.) In October 2004, Dr. Brunsman opined that Plaintiff could return to work with no heavy lifting, assigning a twenty to twenty-five pound limit. (R. at 181.) Nevertheless, in November 2004, Dr. Brunsman noted that Plaintiff's lumbar strain and degenerative joint disease had "resulted in her inability to work," although Plaintiff reported "feeling much better" on pain medication. (R. at 179.) December 2004 treatment notes appear to reflect a decreased range of motion in Plaintiff's back. (R. at 177.)
The record also contains Dr. Brunsman's treatment notes from 2005 and 2006. (R. at 159-77.) Examinations, apparently performed in this period, included findings of back tenderness, positive straight leg raising, and decreased range of motion.
At the request of the state agency, William D. Padmadan, M.D., performed a consultive examination of Plaintiff on February 15, 2006. (R. at 108-16.) At the time of this examination Plaintiff was not limping, displayed a normal gait, and showed no clinical signs of distress. (R. at 109-10.) Examination revealed generally normal findings as to Plaintiff's neck and extremities. (Id.) Following an examination of Plaintiff's spine and back, Dr. Padmadan noted straight leg raising results of 30 degrees in supine position and 80 degrees in sitting position. (R. at 110.) Dr. Padmadan felt that "[f]lexion at the hip on standing was inappropriately decreased, not reliable." (Id.) X-rays of Plaintiff's lumbar spine taken at this time yielded normal results. (R. at 116.) Dr. Padmadan diagnosed low back pain without signs of radiculopathy, hypertension, and type II diabetes. (R. at 110.) Ultimately, he concluded that Plaintiff's "upper extremity functions for reaching, handling, fine, and gross movements were intact." (Id.) Dr. Padmadan opined, however, that "[b]ased upon this clinical evaluation, [Plaintiff] may need restrictions for isometric exercises such as lifting, pushing, and pulling, because of her hypertension more than her back." (R. at 110-11.)
Dr. Brunsman completed an undated form describing Plaintiff's conditions and abilities sometime around August 2006.
Dr. Padmadan re-examined Plaintiff on September 5, 2006 because an MRI showed degenerative changes.
On December 30, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a third MRI.
Plaintiff received further treatment from Dr. Brunsman from late 2006 until at least September 2008. (R. at 125-49.) Dr. Brunsman routinely found back tenderness upon examination during this period. (See e.g. R. at 131,137,145.) Dr. Brunsman continued to prescribe medication for Plaintiff's pain. (R. at 125-49.)
In 2008, Dr. Brunsman offered opinions regarding Plaintiff's impairments and abilities on a number of occasions. On September 3, 2008, Dr. Brunsman wrote a letter stating that Plaintiff "has been unable to work since September 2004" and in his opinion was permanently disabled. (R. at 141.) Dr. Brunsman further opined that Plaintiff's "chronic back pain limit[s] her ability to lift, bend, twist and stand for prolonged periods of time." (Id.) Dr. Brunsman indicated that Plaintiff's condition has gradually worsened over time. (Id.)
On September 9, 2008, Dr. Brunsman completed a functional capacity form. (R. at 150-51.) Dr. Brunsman opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry up to ten pounds frequently and eleven to twenty-four pounds occasionally. (R. at 150.) According to Dr. Brunsman, Plaintiff was capable of occasionally pushing/pulling and reaching above her shoulders, but could never be expected to bend, squat, crawl, or climb. (Id.) Dr. Brunsman felt Plaintiff could sit for 2 hours continuously and a total of 6 hours in a workday with rest; stand and/or walk for 1 hour continuously and 2 hours in a workday with rest; and alternatively sit/stand for 6 hours continuously or 8 hours in a workday with rest. (Id.) Ultimately, based on these and other restrictions he listed on the form, Dr. Brunsman concluded that Plaintiff had a moderate limitation of functional capacity and was capable of sedentary work activity. (R. at 151.)
Dr. Brunsman completed a second functional capacity form on September 16, 2008. (R. at 152-53.) Although many of Dr. Brunsman's answers were the same as his previous answers on the September 8, 2008 form, others differed. For example, Dr. Brunsman at this time indicated Plaintiff was only capable of sitting for 4 hours in a workday; standing and or walking for 2 hours in a workday; and alternatively sitting or standing for 4 hours in a workday. (R. at 152.) Dr. Brunsman once again found Plaintiff capable of sedentary work activity. (R. at 153.)
Dr. Brunman provided a third physical capacity evaluation, although this time on a different form, in November 2008. (R. at 154-55.) On this occasion, Dr. Brunsman concluded that Plaintiff could stand 1 hour in a workday, walk 1 hour in a workday and sit for 2 hours total in a workday. (R. at 154.) Dr. Brunsman indicated Plaintiff could occasionally carry eleven to twenty pounds and could frequently carry less than ten pounds. (Id.) Dr. Brunsman opined that Plaintiff could not use her hand repetitively for pushing and pulling and was unable to use her feet for repetitive movements such as operating controls. (R. at 155.) According to Dr. Brunsman, Plaintiff could occasionally climb stairs or ladders, but could not bend, kneel, squat, or crawl. (Id.)
Finally, on November 6, 2008, Dr. Brunsman completed a form regarding Plaintiff's disorders of the spine. (R. at 156.) Dr. Brunsman submitted that Plaintiff had spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, and facet arthritis. (R. at 156.) Additionally, Dr. Brunsman provided that Plaintiff's lumbar spinal stenosis manifested with both chronic nonradicular pain and weakness. (Id.) Dr. Brunsman felt it was unknown whether Plaintiff could perform various activities such as walking a block at a reasonable pace on an uneven surface. (R. at 157.)
Steven Rosenthal testified at the administrative hearing as a vocational expert. After asking Plaintiff a few questions regarding her past work, Mr. Rosenthal classified Plaintiff's past work as tool crib attendant, a medium exertional level position, and quality control technician, a light exertional position. (R. at 235.) Mr. Rosenthal stated, however, that from Plaintiff's testimony it appeared that she had performed her quality control position at the sedentary level. (R. at 236.)
Mr. Rosenthal testified that if Plaintiff was capable of medium work she would be able to perform both of her past jobs. (Id.) If Plaintiff was able to only occasionally bend, Mr. Rosenthal still felt that she could perform her past quality control position. (Id.) The ALJ also asked Mr. Rosenthal to consider whether Plaintiff could perform her past work if she was limited to light work, could only occasionally bend, could not sit for more than 30 minutes at a time, and could not stand for more than 30 minutes at a time. (R. at 236.) After some clarification as to how Plaintiff performed her past work, Mr. Rosenthal concluded that Plaintiff would not be capable of her past tool crib position, but could perform her past quality control work. (R. at 236-38.)
Mr. Rosenthal further testified that, if Plaintiff was limited in the manner suggested that Dr. Brunsman's September 9, 2008 and September 16, 2008 functional capacity forms suggested, she would still be able to perform her past work as a quality control technician. (R. at 241.) Mr. Rosenthal indicated, however, that if a person was limited to the extent outlined in Dr. Brunsman's November 3, 2008 physical capacity evaluation she would be unable to perform substantially gainful employment. (R. at 240-41.) Finally, Mr. Rosenthal indicated that if Plaintiff was assumed to be entirely credible she would be incapable of work. (R. at 241-42.)
The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act in her March 20, 2009 decision. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009. (R. at 15.) At the first step of the sequential evaluation process,
Upon review of the medical records, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative changes of the lumbar spine, type II diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. (R. at 15-16.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 69.)
At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). (R. at 17.) In reaching this decision the ALJ noted that Dr. Brunsman gave multiple opinions regarding Plaintiff's functioning. (R. at 18.) The ALJ, however, chose not to accept, or give any great weight to these opinions for various reasons including the inconsistencies between Dr. Brunsman's functional capacity opinions. (R. at 18.) The ALJ also indicated that she did not give the opinions of Dr. Padamadan great weight due to their inconclusive nature. (R. at 18-19.) Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff's subjective complaints to be not entirely credible. (R. at 20-21.)
Based on the above RFC and Mr. Rosenthal's testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as both a tool crib attendant and quality control tester.
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it `is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."). Under this standard, "substantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must "`take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, "if substantial evidence supports the [Commissioner's] decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the Commissioner's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, "`a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
As noted above, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision on a number of grounds. Plaintiff's contentions include that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical evidence, that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC assessment, and that the ALJ improperly relied on her own lay opinion and interpretation of the medical evidence. Upon review, the undersigned agrees that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC determination because the ALJ improperly relied on her own medical judgment. The undersigned further concludes that under the circumstances of this case, remand is appropriate.
The ALJ must consider, and weigh, all medical opinions that he or she receives in evaluating a claimant's case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Certain types of opinions, however, are normally entitled to greater weight. See id. For example, an ALJ must give the opinions of a treating physician controlling weight if they are "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are] not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record. . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even assuming that a treating physician opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ must still consider the amount of weight that is appropriate by applying the relevant factors. Id. Furthermore, an ALJ must "always give good reasons in [the ALJ's] notice of determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] [the claimant's] treating source's opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Importantly, in weighing the medical evidence, "`ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings.'" Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, "an ALJ may not substitute his [or her] own medical judgment for that of the treating physician where the opinion of the treating physician is supported by the medical evidence." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Bledsoe v. Comm'r of Social Sec., No. 1:09cv564, 2011 WL 549861, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2011) ("An ALJ is not permitted to substitute her own medical judgment for that of a treating physician and may not make her own independent medical findings.") In other terms, "[w]hile an ALJ is free to resolve issues of credibility as to lay testimony, or to choose between properly submitted medical opinions, the ALJ cannot substitute his [or her] own lay `medical' opinion for that of a treating or examining doctor." Beck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-398, 2011 WL 3584468, at *14 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2011) (Report & Recommendation later adopted).
Finally, the ALJ reserves the right to decide certain issues, such as a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Nevertheless, in assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant record evidence, including medical source opinions on the severity of a claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 404.1545(a). Furthermore, this Court has stressed the importance of medical opinions to support a claimant's RFC, and cautioned ALJs against relying on their own expertise in drawing RFC conclusions from raw medical data. See Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 1:08-CV-00828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2009) ("The residual functional capacity opinions of treating physicians, consultative physicians, and medical experts who testify at hearings are crucial to determining a claimant's RFC because `[i]n making the residual functional capacity finding, the ALJ may not interpret raw medical data in functional terms.'") (quoting Deskin v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 605 F.Supp.2d 908, 912 (N.D. Ohio 2008)); see also Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) ("As a lay person, however, the ALJ was simply not qualified to interpret raw medical data in functional terms and no medical opinion supported the [RFC] determination."); Paar v. Astrue, No. 09 C 5169, 2012 WL 123596, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2012) (remanding where an "ALJ created his own RFC based on his assumptions of what [the plaintiff] could do").
In this case, as detailed above, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of medium work.
Upon review, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC determination. Although the ALJ may have been justified in finding Plaintiff to be less than fully credible,
In reaching her RFC determination, the ALJ accounted for this medical evidence by relying on her own lay interpretation. Tellingly, the ALJ did not credit any medical opinion evidence in reaching her RFC assessment, as she gave no great weight to the all of the medical source opinions within the record. Rather, the ALJ based her RFC assessment on her own medical conclusion that the MRI results and other evidence would only justify limiting Plaintiff to medium exertional work.
Although Plaintiff's MRI results may appear minimal to the lay person, the ALJ was not qualified to translate this medical data into functional capacity determinations. See Roso v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:09CV198, 2010 WL 1254831, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2010) ("[T]he ALJ is simply not qualified to interpret the raw medical data in these MRI reports and no medical opinion in the record supports the ALJ's determination.") (internal quotation and citation omitted); cf. also Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 183 (2nd Cir. 2010) (holding that, although MRI results showed only mild degenerative changes of a claimant's lumbar spine "the ALJ was not at liberty to substitute his own lay interpretation of that diagnostic test for the uncontradicted testimony of [the treating physician], who is more qualified and better suited to opine as to the test's medical significance."). One federal court within this circuit has even gone as far as to set forth the following analysis, and general rule, under similar circumstances:
Deskin 605 F. Supp. 2d at 911-12 (footnotes and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the ALJ impermissibly relied on her own interpretation of the raw medical data. Furthermore, the ALJ substituted her interpretation in place of the opinions of Dr. Brunsman, the only medical source to offer detailed evaluations of Plaintiff's functional capacity.
If substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner's decision, the Court must decide the nature of remand. The Court has the discretion to enter "upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that "[i]f a court determines that substantial evidence does not support the Secretary's decision, the court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits only if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the undersigned finds that remand for further consideration is appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat'l Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that "failure to object to the magistrate judge's recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant's] ability to appeal the district court's ruling"); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant waived appeal of district court's denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to magistrate judge's report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A] general objection to a magistrate judge's report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal. . . .") (citation omitted)).
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
