THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.
The Court has reviewed the July 5, 2012 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman (doc. 13), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2) has expired, hereby
Accordingly, it is hereby
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security appeal brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff Sibyl Satterwhite ("Plaintiff") "not disabled" and therefore unentitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 11), Plaintiff's Reply (doc. 12), and the administrative record (doc. 7).
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on December 6, 2006, alleging a disability onset date of November 21, 2006. Doc. 7-5 at PageID 143-45. Plaintiff claims she suffers from head and musculoskeletal injuries, bi-polar disorder, chronic pain, arthritis, memory loss, and depression. Id. at PageID 161.
Following initial administrative denials of Plaintiff's application, she received a hearing before ALJ Thaddeus J. Armstead, Sr. on September 15, 2009. Doc. 7-2 at PageID 71-101. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert, Suman Srinivasan. See id.
On October 23, 2009, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at PageID 54-70. Specifically, the ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
Id. at PageID 59-70.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. Id. at PageID 44-47; see also Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993). Plaintiff then filed this appeal on March 28, 2011. See doc. 2.
Plaintiff was 46 years old on her alleged disability onset date and thus considered a "younger individual." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.963. Plaintiff obtained her GED in 1988. Doc. 7-6 at PageID 168. Her past relevant work was a motor vehicle assembler and telemarketer. Doc. 7-2 at PageID 92-93.
On July 7, 1998, Plaintiff was in an automobile accident and ejected from her vehicle fifteen to twenty feet.
While in the hospital, Plaintiff, for four to five days, experienced "paranoid delusions, believing the nurses were trying to kill her with medicines and began hearing voices of [her] mother and other family mothers as well as a voice unfamiliar to her telling her to kill herself." Id. at PageID 233, 236. A doctor concluded that Plaintiff was having post traumatic psychosis. Id. at PageID 236, 238. Plaintiff continues to experience paranoid delusions. See, e.g., doc. 7-7 at PageID 389, 411, 418, 432; doc. 7-8 at PageID 493, 534, 578.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.2001). Thus, the Commissioner has a "`zone of choice' within which he can act without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis-may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). Thus, "a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for SSI, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id. A SSI claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is disabled under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir.2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
A mental impairment may constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The five-step sequential evaluation outlined above applies as well to the evaluation of mental impairments. However, the regulations provide a special procedure for evaluating the severity of a mental impairment at steps two and three for an adult. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a.
At step two, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant's "symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings" to determine whether the claimant has a "medically determinable mental impairment[]." Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652-53. If so, the ALJ "must then rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)" in four areas, commonly known as the "B criteria": (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. Id. at 653. The degree of limitation in the first three functional areas is rated on a five-point scale: none; mild; moderate; marked; and extreme. Id. The fourth functional limitation is rated on a four-point scale: none; one or two; three; and four or more. Id.
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's mental impairment(s) "meets or is equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder." Id. at 653-54. A claimant whose mental impairment(s) meet the requirements of the Listings of Impairments, located at Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations, will be deemed conclusively disabled. Id. If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a severe mental impairment that neither meets nor medically equals a listed impairment, the ALJ will then assess the claimant's RFC and proceed to steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
As a preliminary note, Plaintiff's pertinent medical records have been adequately summarized in the parties' briefs, see doc. 9 at PageID 593-601; doc. 11 at PageID 614-619, and the Court will not repeat them here.
Plaintiff's asserts one assignment of error: the ALJ erred in rejecting her treating psychiatrist's opinion and in relying, instead, on the opinion of a non-examining, state agency consulting psychologist. See doc. 9 at PageID 602-08.
Plaintiff was treated by Shirlann Knight, M.D. at Day-Mont Behavioral Health Care Center from March 2007 through June 2009. Doc. 7-7 at PageID 389-91, 396-422; doc. 7-8 PageID 492-515, 526-48, 574-84. Dr. Knight completed two forms from the Bureau of Disability Determination (BDD). In August 2007, Dr. Knight opined that Plaintiff's work-related skills
In May 2009, Dr. Knight completed interrogatories with respect to Plaintiff. Doc. 7-8 at PageID 540-48. Dr. Knight reported that she treats Plaintiff for schizoaffective disorder and polysubstance dependence, in remission. Id. at PageID 541. Dr. Knight noted that Plaintiff's former substance abuse was not a material factor to her mental impairments. Id. at PageID 542. Dr. Knight opined that Plaintiff did not have the ability to perform any of the listed work-related functions, i.e., sustain attention and concentration at work to meet normal standards of work productivity and work accuracy; understand, remember and carry out simple work instructions without requiring very close supervision; behave in an emotionally stable manner; and complete a normal workday and work week without interruption from her impairments. Id. at PageID 540-48. Further, Dr. Knight opined that Plaintiff had "marked" difficulties in maintaining social functioning and "marked" deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace. Id.
Kristen Haskins, Psy.D. reviewed Plaintiff's treatment records, as requested by the BDD in January 2007. See doc. 7-7 at PageID 338-51. Dr. Haskins opined that Plaintiff had "mild" limitations in activities of daily living; and "moderate" limitations in social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. at PageID 348. Dr. Haskins also completed a Mental RFC Assessment in which she opined that Plaintiff was "moderately" limited in eleven of twenty categories. Id. at PageID 352-55.
Dr. Haskins' opinions are flawed, however, and unsupported by objective evidence in the record. In reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, she refused to consider Plaintiff's mental impairments on the erroneous assumption that they arose from the commission of a felony and were thus barred from consideration pursuant to DI 23501.001.
However, Dr. Haskins should not have applied that regulation to preclude Plaintiff's mental impairments from consideration because Plaintiff was not, in fact, convicted of a felony. See doc. 7-5 at
Doc. 7-6 at PageID 205-06. Plaintiff provided the Office with printouts from the Clark County Municipal Court's website showing that the vehicular homicide (third-degree felony) charge was dismissed at the prosecutor's request, and instead, Plaintiff pled "no contest" to vehicular homicide (a first-degree misdemeanor), and these printouts are now part of the record.
In evaluating the severity and effect of Plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ considered only the above-cited opinions of Dr. Knight and Dr. Haskins. With respect to Dr. Knight's opinion, the ALJ acknowledged her disability finding, but declined to give it controlling weight. Doc. 7-2 at PageID 65. Instead, the ALJ accepted the opinion of Dr. Haskins — that Plaintiff had only "moderate" limitations in social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace, and could "perform simple and moderately complex tasks in a static setting away from others with no supervising or handling of complaints." Id. at PageID 62, 66. Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing a reduced range of medium work. See id. at PageID 63-66.
The Court is troubled with the ALJ's decision to defer to the non-disability finding of Dr. Haskins, a non-examining, state consultative psychologist, who refused to consider most of Plaintiff's mental impairments on the erroneous assumption that she was convicted of a felony as a result of her car accident. Under Social Security regulations, the opinion of Plaintiff's treater, Dr. Knight, is presumptively "accorded the most deference" because of the "ongoing relationship between the patient and the opining physician." Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 461 Fed.Appx. 433, 439 (6th Cir.2012). Dr. Haskins, on the other hand, is presumptively "afforded the least deference," as she is a "non-examining source, who provide[d] an opinion based solely on review of [Plaintiff]'s existing medical records." Id.
The Court recognizes that it was not necessarily error for the ALJ to give greater weight to Dr. Haskins over Dr. Knight. See Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir.2009). "`In appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical ... consultants... may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.'" Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 1996)). This may be true, for example, if "`the State agency medical ... consultant's
Here, however, the ALJ gave more weight to Dr. Haskins' opinion, but failed to mention that Dr. Haskins erroneously excluded Plaintiff's significant mental impairments in making her disability determination. See doc. 7-2 at PageID 57-70. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409; Fisk, 253 Fed.Appx. at 585. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions in Plaintiff's case. Social Security regulations require an ALJ to evaluate the opinion of a non-examining, Stage agency psychological consultant by considering all relevant factors before deferring to that opinion over a treating source opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c), (e). Here, the ALJ relied on a flawed State agency consultative medical opinion in determining that Plaintiff was "not disabled," and failed to justify his reasoning for doing so. Therefore, the Commissioner's decision should be found unsupported by substantial evidence and reversed. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 410; Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir.2004).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignment of error is well-taken. This matter be remanded to the Commissioner under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 173-76 (6th Cir.1994). On remand, the Commissioner should obtain a new medical opinion — from Dr. Haskins or other qualified medical professionals — that considers Plaintiff's mental impairments which arose out of her motor vehicle accident on July 7, 1998.
