ORDER, AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Faith Carr and Bruce Carr, husband and wife, bring this tort action against DJO Global, Inc., formerly known as DJO Incorporated (hereinafter "DJO Global"), and DJO, LLC (hereinafter "DJO LLC") (collectively "Defendants"). Diversity jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This matter is now before the Court for consideration of three motions: (1) DJO LLC's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6) (doc. 7); (2) Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their First Amended Original Complaint (doc. 23); and (3) DJO Global's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (doc. 8). These motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for disposition.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

The genesis of this action is an injury that Faith Carr allegedly sustained as a result of her use of a Don Joy Iceman — a continuous cold therapy device purportedly designed, manufactured, and distributed by Defendants — following her knee surgery. (Doc. 3).

Together with her husband, Mrs. Carr originally filed a complaint against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Ohio on December 30, 2011. DJO Global and DJO LLC subsequently removed the case to this Court.2 On February 9, 2012, DJO LLC filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 7). On the same day, DJO Global filed a motion to dismiss challenging this Court's personal jurisdiction over it, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). (Doc. 8).3 Following briefing on both of Defendants' motions, on May 2, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint.4 (Doc. 23). On May 14, 2012, DJO LLC and DJO Global filed separate responsive briefs in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend. (Docs 25, 26).

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their First Amended Original Complaint (doc. 23) is granted, and the Court recommends that DJO LLC's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' original complaint (doc. 7) be denied as moot. Furthermore, the Court recommends that DJO Global's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (doc. 8) be denied, and Plaintiffs be permitted to conduct limited discovery as to DJO Global to investigate jurisdictional facts.

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend and DJO LLC's Motion to Dismiss

Rule 15 provides, "a party may amend its pleadings with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision to grant or deny leave to amend lies within the discretion of the district court. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). "A court need not grant leave to amend, however, where amendment would be `futile.'" Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182)). Courts find futility "when the proposed amendment would not permit the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. Thus, courts may deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Although the grounds discussed above may warrant denial of leave to amend in certain circumstances, courts interpret Rule 15(a) "as setting forth a `liberal policy of permitting amendments to ensure the determination of claims on their merits.'" Oleson v. United States, 27 F.App'x 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Here, with the liberal policy of Rule 15(a) in mind, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint (doc. 23).

DJO LLC does not raise a "futility" argument, but instead argues in its responsive brief that it and DJO Global would be subject to prejudice as a result of Plaintiffs' motion to amend. (Doc. 25). However, Defendants themselves acknowledge that they have engaged in virtually no discovery thus far (id. at PageID 288; doc. 26 at PageID 295), and the Court notes that the discovery cut-off is May 14, 2013 — more than eight months away (doc. 15). Therefore, the Court finds Defendants' allegations of prejudice to be without merit.5

Furthermore, in light of the Court's Order granting Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, DJO LLC's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' original complaint for failure to state a claim (doc. 7) should be DENIED AS MOOT — since it is addressed to a pleading which is no longer operative — AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILE.

B. DJO Global's Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), DJO Global filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because it has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the State of Ohio. (Doc. 8).

In support of its motion, DJO Global attached an unnotarized, two-page affidavit of Tighe Reardon ("Reardon"), DJO LLC's Vice President of Corporate Tax. (Doc. 8-1, PageID 94-95). Reardon avers that DJO Global is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in California, and that DJO LLC is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of DJO Global. (Id.; PageID 96, 98). He also avers that DJO Global is a holding company that "transacts no business, maintains no office, has no employees, pays no taxes, and does no advertising in Ohio." (Id., PageID 94-95). Furthermore, Reardon asserts that DJO does not own any real estate in Ohio, manufacture any products at issue in this case that are sold in Ohio, and has no agent in Ohio for conducting business. (Id). He acknowledges that DJO Global was known as DJO Incorporated until it formally changed its name on February 10, 2011. (Id.).

In response, Plaintiffs maintain that they have not yet had the opportunity to examine the relationship between DJO Global and DJO LLC; nor have they had the opportunity to test the assertions raised in DJO Global's motion or Reardon's affidavit. (Doc. 16). Plaintiffs request a period of limited discovery on the issue of this Court's personal jurisdiction over DJO Global. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiffs request that Reardon's affidavit be stricken because it is based on information "gained through corporate sources," not his own personal knowledge. (Id.; cf. doc. 8-1, PageID 94).

When faced with a personal jurisdiction issue, a federal district court has three procedural alternatives: (1) "[it] may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone;" (2) "it may permit discovery in aid of the motion;" or (3) "it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion." Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Court's "decision whether to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a 12(b)(2) motion is discretionary." Burnshire Dev., LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron Corp., 198 F. App'x 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 614 n. 7 (6th Cir. 2005)). "Although the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless the plaintiff's claim is `clearly frivolous.'" Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). See also Drexel Chem. Co. v. SGS Depauw & Stokoe, No. 94-5564, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15760, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1995) (When "the written submissions raise[] disputed issues of fact with regard to cross-corporate entanglements . . . the district court should [allow] further discovery or [hold] an evidentiary hearing."); Tech. & Servs., Inc. v. TACS Automation, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-11132010, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81496, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 29, 2010).

Allowing Plaintiffs a period of time in which to conduct limited discovery — related to whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over DJO Global — is warranted in the present case. Although DJO Global lists all of the contacts it does not have with the forum state, DJO LLC — the company that manufactures, sells, and distributes the Don Joy Iceman — is a wholly owned subsidiary of DJO Global. The Sixth Circuit has long held that a wholly owned subsidiary may subject its parent company to minimum contacts with the forum state under certain circumstances. Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1964). Additional facts regarding the relationship between DJO Global and DJO LLC, as well as the contacts by DJO Global with the forum state, are needed to determine whether the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for limited discovery on the matter of jurisdiction is well taken. The Court RECOMMENDS that DJO Global's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (doc. 8) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILE, and Plaintiffs be granted until October 15, 2012 to engage in limited discovery on the sole issue of personal jurisdiction over DJO Global.

III. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:

Additionally, the Court RECOMMENDS as follows: