THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.
Mark Smead ("Smead") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that he is not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to Social Security disability benefits. On January 28, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman entered a Report and Recommendations (doc. #11) recommending that the Commissioner's Decision be affirmed. Smead subsequently filed Objections (doc. #12) and the Commissioner responded to Smead's Objections (doc. #13). This matter is, therefore, ripe for decision.
Smead sought financial assistance from the Social Security Administration by applying for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") in July of 2007. Smead claims that he has been disabled since August 15, 1993, due to back pain, depression and mood/personality disorders.
The Commissioner denied Smead's application initially and on reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Eve Godfrey ("Godfrey") held a hearing following which she determined that Smead is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Smead's request for review and ALJ Godfrey's decision became the Commissioner's
As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b), the District Judge has made a de novo review of the record in this case. Based upon the reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (doc. #11) and in Smead's Objections (doc. #12) and the Commissioner's Response (doc. #13), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court's file and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in its entirety and, in so doing affirms the Commissioner's decision that Smead is not disabled in accordance with Social Security regulations.
This Court's function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") decision. Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Security, 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). This Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria. Id.
Regarding the substantial evidence requirement, the ALJ's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (citing Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir.1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420; Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir.1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the ALJ/Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir.1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939).
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the ALJ's legal criteria — may result in reversal even if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factual findings. See Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. A reversal based on the ALJ's legal criteria may occur, for example, when the ALJ has failed to follow the Commissioner's "own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746(citing in part Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).
In this case, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria. WHEREFORE, Smead's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations are OVERRULED, and this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (doc. #11) in its entirety. The Commissioner's decision that Smead is not disabled in accordance with Social Security regulations is affirmed. Finally, the captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c). At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff Mark Smead ("Plaintiff) not "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act and therefore unentitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
This case is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Statement of Errors (doc. 8), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 9), Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 10), the administrative record (doc. 6),
Plaintiff filed his application for SSI on July 8, 2007, asserting that he has been under a "disability" since August 15, 1993. PageID 211-13. Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to back pain, depression, and mood/personality disorders. PageID 92, 104-05, 259, 302.
Following initial administrative denials of his application, an administrative hearing was conducted before ALJ Eve Godfrey in June 2011. PageID 82-124. On July 29, 2011, ALJ Godfrey issued a written decision, concluding that Plaintiffs impairments did not constitute a "disability" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. PageID 67-75.
Specifically, the ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of her decision, were as follows:
PageID 69-75 (footnote added).
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 57-61. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993). Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal on December 27, 2011. Doc. 2.
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that his back pain makes mobility difficult. PageID 92. He is not able to easily bend over. PageID 97. He spends most of his day trying to manage his pain, playing on the computer, or listening to music. PageID 93-94. Plaintiff lives alone in a house owned by his mother, and is able to do his own chores. Id. He has not worked for nearly 20 years, and is financially supported by his mother. PageID 90-92.
Plaintiff additionally testified that he cannot get along with others. PageID 92. He only leaves the house twice per month, and typically accompanies his mother to the store or a doctor's appointment. PageID 95. Plaintiff stated that when he goes out, he occasionally finds himself getting into confrontations with strangers. PageID 97. He relayed an incident during which he lit a cigarette as he exited a grocery store, and ended up arguing with another customer who told him he was breaking the law. PageID 95-97. Plaintiff has not had any run-ins with the police since being imprisoned more than twenty years ago for theft. PageID 91.
Plaintiff testified that he has at least five bad pain days per week where the pain makes him more irritable, and less able to tolerate being around others. PageID 98. He also testified that he experiences crying spells twice per week. PageID 104-05.
Plaintiff acknowledged a history of frequent alcohol use, but testified that he stopped drinking seven or eight months prior to the hearing. PageID 102.
Gloria Lasoff, a vocational expert ("VE"), also testified at the hearing. PageID 106-23. The ALJ proposed a series of hypotheticals to the VE, each based upon a medical source opinion of record. The VE testified that the November 2009 physical RFC assessment of medical consultant Jerry McCloud, M.D., along with the mental RFC assessment of Katherine Lewis, Psy.D., if adopted together as Plaintiffs RFC, would mean that Plaintiff is capable of performing a full range of medium, light, and sedentary work. PageID 106-07. The VE testified that there are 3,900 medium exertional jobs and 500
However, the VE acknowledged that the limitations reported in February 2011 by Plaintiffs treating physician, Robert Brandt, M.D. — i.e., that Plaintiff cannot work more than one hour per day — if fully-credited by the ALJ, would preclude Plaintiff from performing all levels of work. PageID 106-07.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. Id.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). Thus, "a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is "disabled" under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
As a preliminary note, Plaintiff's pertinent medical records have been adequately summarized in his Statement of Errors and the administrative decision, see doc. 8, at PageID 530-35; PageID 70-74, and the Court will not repeat them here. Where applicable, the Court will identify the medical evidence relevant to its decision.
On appeal, Plaintiff challenges: (1) the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Brandt's opinion; (2) the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of the state agency psychologists; (3) the veracity and sufficiency of the VE's testimony; and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the ALJ's RFC finding. PageID 537-47.
The record contains Dr. Brandt's treatment notes from June 2009 through April 2011. PageID 418-28, 470-74, 484-87. On March 15, 2010, Dr. Brandt completed interrogatories for the Bureau of Disability Determination, and reported a diagnosis of chronic low back pain. PageID 416. However, when asked to identify the limitations caused by the reported impairment, Dr. Brandt noted that Plaintiff "needs full, more complete evaluation for ongoing [treatment]." PageID 417. In that report, Dr. Brandt additionally noted that Plaintiff "needs [a] full eval[uation] by [an] orthopedist or neurologist." PageID 415.
On February 7, 2011, Dr. Brandt opined that Plaintiff suffers from "severe" pain; cannot stoop, bend, or lift more than 10 pounds on even an occasional basis; cannot stand or sit for more than 15 minutes at a time; and can work less than one hour per day. PageID 475. Moreover, Dr. Brandt referenced an MRI taken a month earlier,
The ALJ accorded "little weight" to this opinion stating, "[t]he limitations imposed by Dr. Brandt on February 7, 2011, are inconsistent with the evidence of record and in fact, these findings are inconsistent with Dr. Brandt's treating records which show that [Plaintiff] needed a more comprehensive evaluation as there were no diagnostic testing showing objective results upon which to base an opinion." PageID 74. The ALJ further explained that Dr. Brandt's opinion indicates symptoms worse than the January 2011 MRI findings would predict. Id. Moreover, the ALJ found Dr. Brandt's assessment unsupported and inconsistent with other evidence in this case, and inconsistent with his own treatment notes. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's analysis in this regard constitutes reversible error.
The opinions of treating physicians are typically entitled to controlling weight. Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532,
Nevertheless, a treating physician's statement — that a claimant is disabled — is not determinative of the ultimate issue of disability. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir.1986). A treating physician's opinion is to be given controlling weight only if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other evidence of record. Id.; Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir.1997). Accordingly, an ALJ may properly reject a treating physician's opinion that does not meet these standards. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Likewise, a treating source's opinion as to a claimant's employability is a legal conclusion, and not a "medical source opinion," as defined by Social Security regulations, which the ALJ must accept. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)-(d). Social Security regulations mandate that the question — of whether or not a claimant is disabled — is an administrative issue reserved solely to the province of the Commissioner. Id.; see also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir.2004) ("The determination of disability is ultimately the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician"). Thus, the ALJ need not have given Dr. Brandt's opinion — that Plaintiff is disabled — either controlling or deferential weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1) ("A statement by a medical source that you are `disabled' or `unable to work' does not mean that we will find that you are disabled"); see also Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 ("Whether an individual is `disabled' under the Act. The regulations provide that the final responsibility for deciding issues such as these is reserved to the Commissioner").
The ALJ's analysis regarding Dr. Brandt's opinion is well supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ adequately discussed how Dr. Brandt's conclusions are inconsistent with his own treatment notes, as well as the other medical evidence of record. PageID 71-74. For instance, in 2009 and 2010, Dr. Brandt reported Plaintiff's back pain as both "stable" and wellcontrolled by medication. See PageID 418-28. Those notes also show an improvement from June to August 2009, along with an observation that Plaintiff had "no problems getting in and out of his car." PageID 419, 423-24. In January 2010, Dr. Brandt reported Plaintiff was ambulating normally, and his back pain was "stable." PageID 427-28. He also noted that Plaintiff was out of back pain medication, but "does a lot of OTC (over-the-counter) stuff [and] says his pills keep things under control." Id. In May 2010, when asked about his pain, Plaintiff reported he was "doing ok." PageID 474. Moreover, in November 2010 — just four months prior to his February 2011 opinion — Dr. Brandt noted Plaintiff was "[h]ere for meds [and][h]as not been in for a while," and was only in "mild distress." PageID 470-71.
In addition, the ALJ reasonably considered Dr. Brandt's March 2010 report, in
Furthermore, the ALJ's analysis shows that contrary medical evidence of record — including the September 2009 report of consultative examiner Damian Danopulos, M.D., and the November 2009 physical RFC report of Dr. McCloud — was properly weighed and considered. See PageID 71, 370-78. Dr. Danopulos found that Plaintiff moved about normally, had a normal gait, and had full strength and a full range of motion in his arms and legs. See PageID 371-73, 375-78. Dr. Danopulos also reported lumbar spine motions were normal, except extension was restricted to 20 degrees. PageID 372. Dr. Danopulos assessed only mild arthritic lumbo/sacral changes, and found Plaintiff had no muscle spasms upon examination. PageID 373, 376.
After reviewing the record, Dr. McCloud opined that Plaintiff was capable of occasionally lifting up to 50 pounds; frequently lifting 25 pounds; sitting, standing and/or walking for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and no restrictions in his ability to push or pull. Specifically, Dr. McCloud noted,
PageID 412.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because some evidence exists in the record which supports a finding of disability, the Court finds such an argument unavailing. See Buxton, 246 F.3d at 772. It is the Commissioner's function to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence, see Hardaway v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987), and that is exactly what the ALJ reasonably did here. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ's conclusion — that Dr. Brandt's opinion was not entitled to controlling or deferential weight — is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the opinions of state agency consultative examining psychologist Stephen Halmi, Psy.D.,
The record demonstrates the ALJ considered all of the mental-health related medical evidence, including Dr. Halmi's October 2009 evaluation, Dr. Lewis' mental RFC assessment,
The ALJ is ultimately responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC, taking into consideration the opinions of medical sources and other relevant evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e). Here, the ALJ reasonably weighed the evidence in formulating Plaintiff's mental RFC, which limits him to jobs with simple repetitive tasks in a non-public environment, and limited contact with co-workers. PageID 70-71. Such a finding is supported by the record as it reasonably accommodates the limitations identified by Drs. Halmi and Lewis. As such, the ALJ acted appropriately in resolving conflicts in the medical evidence. See Hardaway, 823 F.2d at 928.
At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiffs limitations impeded his ability to perform a full range of medium and light work. PageID 75. Accordingly, the ALJ consulted a VE to assist her in determining the extent to which Plaintiffs limitations eroded the unskilled medium to light work occupational base. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ unduly influenced the testimony of the VE. See doc. 8 at PageID 543. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "assumed an adversarial posture with [the VE] and began offering her own assessment of Plaintiff's employability while talking over the vocational expert." Id. at PageID 544.
Here, the ALJ did not simply ask the VE one or two hypotheticals based upon a predetermined RFC. Rather, the ALJ posed many hypotheticals to the VE, each carefully thought out and based upon a medical source opinion of record. In response, the VE provided adequate testimony demonstrating that there are 3,900 medium exertional jobs and 500 light exertional jobs in the regional economy, along with 4,100 sedentary exertional jobs in the state, which Plaintiff could perform if he were limited to non-public, simple, repetitive task work with minimal, superficial, and impersonal communications with others. PageID 111-12. As such, the ALJ's reliance upon the VE's testimony at Step Five was reasonable, and the Commissioner's burden was satisfied. See Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2003).
Plaintiff lastly argues that the ALJ's non-disability finding is, as a general matter, unsupported by substantial evidence. Again, the Court disagrees for two reasons. First, the record strongly suggests
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds fault with all eight of Plaintiff's assignments of error. The ALJ's decision is found supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed.