WALTER HERBERT RICE, District Judge.
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman (Doc. # 15), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) has expired, hereby
Accordingly, it is hereby
2. The Commissioner's non-disability determination is
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Statement of Specific Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 13), Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 14), the administrative record,
Plaintiff filed for SSI on February 26, 2007, alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2005. Tr. 27. Plaintiff claims she is disabled due to a number of impairments including degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and Parkinson's Disease. Tr. 29.
After initial denials of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ
Tr. 29-36 (brackets and footnote added).
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 24-26; see Casey v. Sec'y of H.H.S., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993). Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal on September 18, 2012.
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified before the ALJ that she is forty-seven years old, weighs 230 pounds, and completed the tenth grade. Tr. 569, 571. Plaintiff stated that she lives with her husband and brother-in-law. Id. She has never held a driver's license. Tr. 570. Plaintiff stopped working in 2003 when she was laid off, and has not worked since. Tr. 571.
Plaintiff testified that she experiences pain in her legs. Tr. 577. She walks slowly, and is limited to standing or walking for up to fifteen minutes at a time. Tr. 577-79. She also testified that she can sit for twenty minutes at a time, but sitting in a chair causes leg pain. Tr. 577. Plaintiff testified that her lifting capabilities are limited to "about a gallon of milk," but that her hands are "shaky." Tr. 579. Plaintiff experiences shaking in both hands and is able to write, but she has difficulty grasping and using a writing instrument. Id. She also testified that she has difficulty manipulating buttons or tying laces on her shoes, and requires assistance when getting dressed. Id. Plaintiff recently developed swelling in her legs. Tr. 580. The swelling is intermittent, and is exacerbated by extended periods of standing. Id. Plaintiff testified that she has difficulty concentrating, and is easily distracted. Id.
On a typical day, Plaintiff does light household chores, watches television, and goes to bed around 11:00 p.m. Tr. 578. Plaintiff testified that she can perform household chores only with the assistance of her husband. Tr. 577. She is able to cook simple dishes and load the washing machine, but is unable to load clothes into the dryer. Tr. 578. Although Plaintiff attends church occasionally, she sits in the back of the congregation so that she can stand up periodically as needed. Tr. 581.
Hershel Goren, M.D., a medical expert ("ME"), also testified at the hearing after reviewing Plaintiffs medical records.
The ME opined that Plaintiffs symptoms did not meet any Listings, individually or in combination, and opined that Plaintiff is doing well and suffers from no other severe impairments besides Parkinson's. Id. Further, he testified that Plaintiffs RFC would allow her to carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and that she had no other exertional restrictions. Id. Postural restrictions identified by the ME included no climbing or balancing, no unprotected heights, and only occasional fingering with either hand. Tr. 574. Finally, the ME addressed an MRI showing Plaintiffs spinal stenosis.
Vanessa Harris, a vocational expert ("VE"), also testified at the hearing. Tr. 581-83. The ALJ proposed a hypothetical regarding Plaintiffs RFC to the VE. Tr. 582-83. The VE testified as to Plaintiff's prior work as a horticultural worker and confirmed that Plaintiff could no longer perform such work. Tr. 581. The VE was then asked about a hypothetical person of Plaintiffs age, education, and work experience. Id. The VE outlined limitations to the hypothetical person's ability to lift; to be on their feet for extended periods of time; to work near moving machinery, around unprotected heights, or other dangerous instrumentalities; as well as an inability to fully use their hands, or have many personal contacts. Tr. 582. The VE concluded that such an individual, like Plaintiff, could perform 4,500 light jobs in the regional economy, including positions as a box sealing inspector, garment sorter, and marker. Id.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner's administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir.2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is "disabled" under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) rejecting the opinions of her treating physicians; and (2) challenging her disability allegations on credibility grounds. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and merits reversal.
The treating physician rule "requires the ALJ to generally give greater deference
`these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.'"
Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). Thus, an ALJ must give controlling weight to a treating source if the ALJ finds the treater's opinion wellsupported by medically acceptable evidence and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
Closely associated with the treating physician rule is the "good reasons rule," which "require[s] the ALJ to always give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the weight given to the claimant's treating source's opinion." Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). "Those good reasons must be `supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.'" Id. at 406-07. When the ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating physician's assessment, "the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician." Id. The ALJ's failure to adequately explain the reasons for the weight given a treating physician's opinion "denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record." Id. at 407.
As an initial matter, the Court acknowledges that an ALJ is not required to accept a physician's conclusion that his or her patient is "unemployable." Whether a person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and a treating physician's opinion — that his or her patient is disabled — is not "give[n] any special significance." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir.2004) ("The determination of disability is ultimately the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician"). However, "[t]here remains a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great deference." Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir.2009) (citation omitted).
In his sparsely worded opinion, the ALJ failed to provide an adequate justification
The ALJ's opinion is also silent regarding the other 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 factors — including, inter alia, the length of the treatment relationship; the frequency of examination; and the treater's specialization and experience. Although the ALJ listed the factors he was required to consider, he did not apply these factors to the record before him. Tr. 34. Without such analysis, or any significant discussion of Plaintiffs treating physicians, the Court is unable to meaningfully review the ALJ's finding that the treater's opinions are not entitled to deferential or controlling weight. Accord McHugh v. Astrue, No. l:10-cv-734, 2011 WL 6130824, at *4 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 15, 2011) (As a rule, the ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and his [or her] conclusion ... When an ALJ fails to mention relevant evidence in his or her decision, the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored) (brackets added; internal quotations and citations omitted). The ALJ's failure to meaningfully review the applicable factors deprives the Court of its opportunity to consider whether the ALJ provided "good reasons" for giving less than controlling weight to the findings of Plaintiffs treating physicians. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406-07.
Finally, the ALJ, without good reasons or medical basis for doing so, went beyond the recommendation of Plaintiffs treating physicians and the ME, and improperly made his own RFC finding regarding Plaintiffs ability to lift. Tr. 32. The ME testified that Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. Id. Dr. Trevino, on the other hand, opined that Plaintiff could lift or carry no more than five pounds at a time, and thus could not perform sedentary work. Tr. 415, 437. In his decision the ALJ seemingly adopts the recommendation
Because the ALJ failed to consider the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 in determining the weight to give Plaintiffs treating physicians, failed to adequately discuss his discrediting of Plaintiffs treating physicians' opinions, and incorrectly supplanted his own findings for those of Plaintiffs treaters and the ME, the ALJ's non-disability finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Accord Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406-07. The ALJ's decision thus warrants reversal under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remand for reconsideration of Plaintiffs RFC. On remand, the ALJ shall consider anew the medical evidence of record and properly analyze that evidence under the controlling Social Security regulations. Such review of Plaintiffs treating physicians shall apply the good reasons requirement. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)) ("We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give [claimant's] treating source's opinion").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs first assignment of error meritorious, and the ALJ's decision unsupported by substantial evidence.
