STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal for which the Court, acting pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ordered a remand to the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for further administrative proceedings upon joint stipulation of the parties. (Docs. 12, 14). Now before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff's counsel for a contingency fee award in the amount of $3,612.50. (Doc. 15). The motion, which is unopposed by the Commissioner (See Docs. 16, 17), is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
Plaintiff entered into a fee agreement with her counsel authorizing a 25% contingency fee of past due benefits payable to the Plaintiff. (Tr. 136-37). Following remand by this court, the Commissioner entered a fully favorable decision resulting in the entitlement of past due benefits. Counsel is seeking $3,612.50, which is 25% of the total past due benefits less the amount of $6,000.00, which is the amount Plaintiff's counsel anticipates will be paid by the Commissioner for work at the Administrative level.
As noted above, Title 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) authorizes the Court to award attorney's fees following the successful prosecution of Social Security disability appeals. However, such fees may not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits which the claimant receives as a result of the appeal. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Furthermore, the attorney must show, and the Court must affirmatively find, that a contingency fee sought, even one within the 25% cap, is reasonable for the services rendered. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Section 406(b) "does not displace contingent-fee agreements," but rather "calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases." Id. A 25% contingency fee agreement "should be given the weight ordinarily accorded a rebuttable presumption." Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989). A deduction of a contingency fee award may be appropriate when (1) counsel acted improperly or provided ineffective assistance, or (2) "counsel would ... enjoy a windfall because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended." Id. Such an award is not improper merely because it results in an above-average hourly rate. Royzer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d 981, 982 (6th Cir. 1990). As the Sixth Circuit explained:
Id.
In the present case, there are no allegations of improper conduct or ineffectiveness of counsel, nor any suggestion that counsel expended only minimal effort, which would cause the Court to reduce the amount of the requested fee. Moreover, in light of counsel's experience in Social Security matters (see Doc. 15 at 3-4), it does not appear that the requested fee would result in an undeserved windfall.
It is therefore