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ABREON, INC. v. CAVEO LEARNING CENTER, 2:14-cv-487. (2014)

Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio Number: infdco20140819a53 Visitors: 5
Filed: Aug. 15, 2014
Latest Update: Aug. 15, 2014
Summary: Order JAMES L. GRAHAM, District Judge. Plaintiff Abreon Inc. brings this action against Caveo Learning Center and three employees of Caveo, Gretchen Schmidt, Daniel Fetherolf and Jennifer O'Bryon, who were formerly employed by Abreon. The complaint alleges that the individual defendants have breached their employment agreements with Abreon by: using and disclosing Abreon's confidential information and trade secrets in their new employment with Caveo; soliciting former Abreon clients; and in th
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Order

JAMES L. GRAHAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Abreon Inc. brings this action against Caveo Learning Center and three employees of Caveo, Gretchen Schmidt, Daniel Fetherolf and Jennifer O'Bryon, who were formerly employed by Abreon. The complaint alleges that the individual defendants have breached their employment agreements with Abreon by: using and disclosing Abreon's confidential information and trade secrets in their new employment with Caveo; soliciting former Abreon clients; and in the case of Schmidt, working for a competitor of Abreon. The complaint asserts numerous claims, including breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and copyright infringement.

Several motions have been filed by the parties. Abreon has moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from: using or disclosing Abreon's confidential information, trade secrets and copyrighted information; soliciting former clients; and in the case of Schmidt, working for Caveo. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and failure to state a claim. Defendants have additionally moved for summary judgment as to the copyright infringement claim.

The court conducted a telephone conference with the parties on July 28, 2014. In the conference, the court identified the venue issues — both venue as to the Southern District of Ohio and venue as to the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Ohio — as ones on which the parties should focus in further briefing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; S.D. Ohio Local Civ. R. 82.1. Defendant Schmidt is the only party located in this district. Abreon and Caveo are not Ohio corporations and do not have their principal places of business in Ohio. Fetherolf and O'Bryon reside respectively in Pennsylvania and California. Schmidt resides in Ohio, albeit in Cincinnati, which is not in the Eastern Division.

Abreon maintains that venue is proper in both this district and this division because the employment agreements that the individual defendants signed contained a forum selection clause selecting the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Ohio as the forum for any employmentrelated dispute that would arise.1 See Compl., Ex. B, § 13. Abreon concedes, however, that the parties' contractual agreement cannot override the legal requirements for venue. See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 568, 577-78 (2013).

In its briefing, Abreon has focused on the issue of whether venue in this district is proper under § 1391. Upon a preliminary review, the court believes that both sides to this dispute present colorable arguments as to the issue of venue in this district.

Nonetheless, Abreon does not address the issue of whether venue is proper in this division under Local Rule 82.1. Abreon argues only that in 1988 Congress repealed a federal venue statute that made distinctions between divisions within a district. See Pub. L. 100-702, § 1001 (repealing 28 U.S.C § 1393). Even so, courts still have the authority to create and enforce local rules regarding divisional venue. See Moysi v. Trustcorp, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 336, 338-39 (N.D. Ohio 1989); Jordon v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., Inc., 728 F.Supp. 409, 419 (W.D. Va. 1990) ("This court agrees with the court in Moysi that the purpose in repealing § 1393 was not to prohibit divisional venue, but rather not to require it.").

Local Rule 82.1(c) provides, "An action against a defendant or defendants resident in this District shall be filed at the location of Court that serves a county in which at least one defendant resides." The complaint alleges that defendant Schmidt resides at an address located in the city of Cincinnati, which is located in Hamilton County, Ohio. Under Local Rule 82.1(b), Hamilton County is served by the Western Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Given that Abreon has offered no grounds that would establish a connection between this suit and the Eastern Division (such as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim having occurred in the Eastern Division), Local Rule 82.1(c) requires that this suit be brought in the Western Division.

Accordingly, this action is hereby transferred to the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Cincinnati.

FootNotes


1. Apparently, Abreon's predecessor, SARCOM, was based in central Ohio, but Abreon's principal place of business is Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thus, the basis for why the forum selection clause selected the Eastern Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio no longer exists.
Source:  Leagle

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