REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner, an inmate at the Hamilton County Justice Center in Cincinnati, Ohio, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which has been construed as brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because, when the action commenced, petitioner was seeking federal habeas relief prior to his trial or conviction in criminal cases that were then pending before the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. (See Docs. 1, 3). On May 28, 2014, the undersigned issued an Order requiring the respondent to file an expedited return of writ responding to the allegations of the petition alleging a violation of petitioner's federal constitutional speedy trial right. (See id.). This matter is now before the Court on the petition and respondent's return of writ, which was filed on June 25, 2014. (Docs. 1, 6). In addition, petitioner has filed motions to amend the petition, which were filed, respectively, on May 22 and July 17, 2014. (Docs. 2, 8).
As discussed in the May 28, 2014 Order (see Doc. 3), a prisoner, who has exhausted all available state remedies as a prelude to seeking federal habeas relief, may file a pretrial petition under § 2241 to the extent he seeks "to demand enforcement of the [State's] affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial." See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973); Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1981). However, it is also well-settled that a federal court should not interfere in pending state court criminal proceedings absent the threat of "irreparable injury" that is "both great and immediate." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). Abstention from adjudicating the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to the state court's entry of the final judgment of conviction is justified by considerations of comity. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Therefore, intrusion into state proceedings already underway is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (1973); Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Furthermore, even if extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant federal court intervention into on-going state criminal prosecutions, the petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546.
In this case, it appears on review of the petition and proposed amendments to the petition that petitioner does not face great and immediate irreparable injury justifying federal intervention into any pending state criminal trial proceeding or prior to his exhaustion of state appeal remedies after the trial court's entry of final judgment. The Sixth Circuit has recognized exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine in only three scenarios: (1) when the petitioner seeks a speedy trial, Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546-47; (2) when the petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on the ground that it would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); and (3) when the petitioner seeks to challenge the State's attempt to retry him rather than permit him to accept an initial plea offer originally rejected due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989). See, e.g., Pruitt v. Ohio, No. 1:10cv313, 2010 WL 2607246, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2010) (Hogan, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 2620804 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 2010) (Barrett, J.); Jenkins v. Kentucky, Civ. Act. No. 14-31-HRW, 2014 WL 2758762, at *2 (E.D. Ky. June 3, 2014) (citing and quoting Simpson v. Jones, No. 11-cv-422-JBC-CJS, 2012 WL 3912755, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. July 16, 2012) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 3912738 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2012)); Coleman v. Jones, No. 3:10cv163, 2010 WL 1643276, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2010); Robinson v. Michigan, No. 1:09cv231, 2009 WL 1067245, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2009). None of these exceptions apply here. Although petitioner has alleged a violation of his speedy trial rights, unlike the petitioner in Atkins, he does not seek a prompt trial date to ensure enforcement of his constitutional right, but rather asserts the claim as an affirmative defense in an effort to overturn the criminal charges brought against him. (See Docs. 1-2, p. 4; Doc. 8). Cf. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546-47 (pretrial consideration of an exhausted speedy trial claim was proper where the petitioner sought a prompt trial date, as opposed to dismissal of the charges, as relief); Pruitt, supra, 2010 WL 2607246, at *2 (holding that federal intervention to consider speedy trial claim was inappropriate in case where the petitioner was awaiting sentencing following entry of a guilty plea because he was seeking only dismissal of the criminal charges); see also Hill v. Michigan, No. 1:07cv271, 2007 WL 1893911, at *1-2 (W.D. Mich. July 2, 2007) (citing Atkins, the district court found "no exceptional circumstances" existed to justify consideration of a pretrial petition where the petitioner sought to have the federal habeas court dismiss a criminal charge brought against him). In any event, upon review of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts' on-line docket records in the challenged criminal cases (Case Nos. B138003-A and B1404316-A),1 it appears that petitioner was convicted upon entry of guilty pleas in the two cases and sentenced in entries filed August 8, 2014 to an aggregate prison term of fifty-four (54) months with "credit for five hundred forty one (541) days time served." Therefore, even if petitioner had sought in this proceeding to ensure enforcement of his constitutional speedy trial right, such claim for relief has been rendered moot.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that extraordinary circumstances existed to justify this Court's intervention in the state criminal proceedings prior to petitioner's convictions and sentences on August 8, 2014, the petition is nevertheless subject to dismissal because petitioner failed to exhaust available state court remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent states in the return of writ that petitioner raised a speedy trial claim in a pretrial motion to dismiss, which was filed with the trial court on May 29, 2014, after the instant action commenced. (Doc. 6, p. 2). Although it is unclear from the docket entries filed after May 29, 2014 in the state criminal proceedings whether or when the motion to dismiss was ruled on by the trial court, it appears that the motion was still pending before that court when respondent prepared and filed the return of writ in response to the allegations contained in the instant petition for federal habeas relief. (See Doc. 6, p. 2). In any event, it is certainly clear from the record that petitioner has not exhausted the state direct appeal remedy, which is now available for him to pursue.
Accordingly, in sum, the undersigned concludes that the petition filed by petitioner prior to his convictions and sentences in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Case Nos. B138003-A and B1404316-A is premature. Petitioner did not exhaust his claims for relief in the state courts before filing the instant application for federal habeas relief and still has the remedy of a direct appeal to pursue in the state courts. A stay of the case while petitioner exhausts his claims in the state courts is not warranted here because dismissal of the petition will not trigger any concerns about a potential statute of limitations bar to review of a future federal habeas petition.2 Cf. Pruitt, supra, 2010 WL 2607246, at *3 & n.2. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies, which includes the pursuit of a direct appeal from his August 8, 2014 convictions and sentences in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. B138003-A and B1404316-A.
2. Petitioner's motions to amend the petition (Docs. 2, 8) be DENIED as moot.
3. A certificate of appealability should not issue because, for the foregoing reasons, petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right that is remediable at this juncture in this proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
4. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that with respect to any application by petitioner to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in "good faith," and therefore DENY petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997).
