S. ARTHUR SPIEGEL, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's August 6, 2014 Report and Recommendation (doc. 18), Plaintiff's Objections (docs. 23, 25), and Defendant's Response (doc. 24). For the reasons indicated herein, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Thomas McLafferty was an employee of Emery Industries, Inc., to which Defendant BASF Corporation is successor in interest (doc. 18). Plaintiff worked from 1967 to 1982 at which time he was injured in a car accident and prevented from working (
Plaintiff subsequently qualified for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration, which he alleges were granted to the date of his accident (
In 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he learned that he was eligible for total disability benefits (
By letter dated December 13, 2001, Defendant's retirement administrator Sheila Buljeta, advised Plaintiff that he was not eligible for benefits and to contact her if he had questions (
Seven years passed, and in 2008 Plaintiff contacted the "Labor Relations" department, which advised him to request copies of his personnel file from the company (
In June 2012, Defendant's Pension and Savings Committee decided to rule on his request for "disability retirement" even though he had never filed an application for benefits (
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, which was fully briefed, and considered by the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. This matter is now ripe for the Court's consideration.
The Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted (doc. 18). First, she found all of Plaintiff's claims preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (
Plaintiff responds that not all claims are preempted by ERISA, in particular claims for estoppel and prejudgment interest (doc. 23). Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a federal common law action for retirement pay because he has been away from work due to injury for 35 years, and his original agreement with Emery Industries, Inc., provided for such pay (
Plaintiff next contends that his ERISA claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because only a "fiduciary" can formally repudiate a benefits plan so as to trigger accrual of a cause of action (
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts so as to proceed under a claim for estoppel (doc. 24). Citing
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff's requested relief based on the theory of retirement benefits not accruing until he is 65 fails because his claim for disability benefits accrued in 1982 when he received a clear repudiation from a representative of the Company (
Plaintiff filed, without leave of Court, what essentially amounts to a SurReply, which the Court has reviewed due to his status as a
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's written submissions carefully, and appreciates his careful and clear framing of his argument, as well as his respectful approach to the Court and Defendant. There is no question that Plaintiff senses he was wronged, and that he should have been entitled to disability benefits under the Emery plan, since the time of his accident. Moreover, the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff's frustration in trying to get information over the years, only to be met with unanswered phone calls. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the record shows he received answers by mail that he simply did not want to accept.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff's claims fall under the scope of ERISA, and therefore his common law claims are subject to preemption. In the context of a motion to dismiss, the Court scrutinizes the Complaint, and Plaintiff's Complaint does not establish a claim for estoppel, as even Plaintiff concedes he cannot accuse the personnel director intended to deceive him, which would mean he cannot say the personnel director was aware that he was providing misinformation. Moreover, the true facts concerning plan eligibility are unambiguously stated in the plan, such that Plaintiff cannot allege he was unaware.
The bottom line here is that the Court finds the Magistrate Judge's conclusion correct that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Despite Plaintiff's arguments, the case law authority shows that no formal repudiation by the fiduciary committee was required, and the word from Defendant's agent was adequate to put Plaintiff on notice that his claim for benefits was being rejected. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the clear repudiation rule does not require formal repudiation, but turns on the plaintiff's knowledge or ability to know of his injury. Here the Court finds no question that Plaintiff knew or should have known as early as 1982 that under the terms of the plan, he needed to assert his rights to determine his eligibility for benefits.
Proper notice was provided to the Parties under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), including the notice that they would waive further appeal if they failed to file an objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in a timely manner.
Having reviewed this matter
SO ORDERED.