ENTRY AND ORDER OVERRULING MIKUTA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. #24)

THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.

On February 11, 2015, this Court entered an order (the "Order") overruling Defendant James Mikuta's ("Mikuta's") Amended Motion To Stay and granting Plaintiff The Reynolds & Reynolds Company's ("Reynold's") Motion To Confirm Arbitration Award. (Doc. #22.) Mikuta now asks the Court to reconsider the Order. (Doc. #24.) Pursuant to an expedited briefing schedule issued by the Court, Reynolds has responded to Mikuta's Motion To Reconsider (doc. #25) and Mikuta has replied (doc. #26). This matter is, therefore, ripe for decision.

Mikuta's Motion for Reconsideration provides at least two (2) reasons for reconsideration. The relevant legal provisions will first be set forth followed by an analysis of each of Mikuta's stated reasons for reconsideration.

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS

Although Mikuta offers no legal basis for a motion for reconsideration in this case, he does cite, in his Conclusion, to a case involving a motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). So the Court will assume that Mikuta is bringing this Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e).

In the Sixth Circuit, a district court may alter a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) "based upon: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice." Nolfi v. Ohio Kentucky Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2012)(citing Leisure Caviar, LLC v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010)). Finally, a Rule 59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of the judgment." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, n.5 (2008)(quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).

TIMELY FILED AND SERVED NOTICE

Mikuta first argues that his Notice of Motion To Vacate/Modify Arbitration Award was timely served.1 However, whether or not his Notice was timely served was and is irrelevant to the determination that this Court has jurisdiction.

This Court previously opined that it was unable to determine if the Motion To Vacate/Modify Arbitration Award was served on Reynolds within ninety (90) days of when the Arbitration Award was delivered to Reynolds and Mikuta. Therefore, it was unable to definitively determine whether the State Court had jurisdiction.

Mikuta has now identified previously-available evidence showing that he served notice of the filing of his Motion To Vacate/Modify Arbitration Award within the three (3) months provided in both Ohio and Federal law. Not because it is newly discovered evidence, but to prevent a manifest injustice, the Court agrees that there is evidence that Mikuta served notice of the filing of his Motion To Vacate/Modify within the three (3) months provided in both Ohio and Federal law.

STATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Mikuta next argues that the State Court has jurisdiction. In his Reply Brief, Mikuta acknowledges in his Reply Brief that there is concurrent jurisdiction and argues that the fact that the State Court has jurisdiction requires federal abstention. He also, for the first time, asserts arguments regarding the Colorado River factors.

Although not using the specific term, Mikuta asserts that the State Court has exclusive jurisdiction2 because the Employment Agreement that he signed with Reynolds provided at paragraph 18 Governing Law that, "[t]his Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Ohio. However, Mikuta also agreed in this same Employment Agreement in paragraph 9 Arbitration that, "...judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Therefore, Mikuta may have agreed that his employment agreement was governed by Ohio law but he also agreed that judgment upon an arbitration award could be affirmed in any court with jurisdiction. This conclusion was also reached by the State Court in which Mikuta filed his Motion To Modify/Vacate Arbitration Award. Thus, the State Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court notes that it earlier determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. #17.) Prior to that determination, Mikuta's argument was that diversity of citizenship did not exist. Mikuta made no argument then about which law to apply or with regard to the Colorado River factors. Therefore, an attempt now to argue subject matter jurisdiction based upon which law to apply is simply an attempt to relitigate what has already been argued and decided, although Mikuta should be credited, if any credit is due, with coming up with a new argument.

This Court earlier evaluated the Colorado River factors, and determined that an evaluation of these factors weighed in favor of this Court exercising subject matter jurisdiction. Mikuta offered no argument regarding the Colorado River factors until filing a Reply Brief to his Motion for Reconsideration. Even if Mikuta's arguments regarding the Colorado River factors had merit, which they do not, the Colorado River factors favor this Court exercising jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Mikuta's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's judgment granting Reynolds' Motion To Confirm Arbitration Award (doc. #24) brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) is OVERRULED. Mikuta has not identified a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law or a need to prevent manifest injustice which would alter the outcome of this Court's judgment granting Reynolds' Motion To Confirm Arbitration Award.

DONE and ORDERED.