Michael J. Newman, United States Magistrate Judge
This Social Security disability benefits appeal is presently before the undersigned for disposition based upon the parties' consent. Doc. 4. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and/or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI in March 2011 alleging a disability onset date of April 4, 2009. PageID 260-72. Plaintiff claims disability as a result of a number of impairments including, inter alia, osteoarthritis, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder. PageID 73.
After initial denial of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Elizabeth A. Motta. PageID 91-114. The ALJ issued a written decision on January 9, 2013 finding Plaintiff not disabled. PageID 71-82. Specifically, the ALJ's findings were as follows:
PageID 73-82.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 52-54. Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal. Cook v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that, "[u]nder the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, [claimant] had 60 days from the Appeals Council's notice of denial in which to file his appeal").
In her decision, the ALJ set forth a detailed recitation of the underlying medical evidence in this case. PageID 73-80. Plaintiff, in her Statement of Errors, also summarizes the evidence of record. Doc. 9 at PageID 634. The Commissioner's response to Plaintiff's Statement of Errors offers no objections to Plaintiff's summary. Doc. 13. Accordingly, except as otherwise noted in this Decision and Entry, the undersigned incorporates the ALJ's recitation of the evidence as well as Plaintiff's summary of the evidentiary record. Where applicable, the Court will identify the medical evidence relevant to this decision.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730, the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is disabled under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly: (1) evaluate the opinion of her therapist, Teri Stephenson, a masters-level licensed professional clinical counselor ("L.P.C.C."); (2) determine her RFC; and (3) find her disabled at Step Three under Listing §§ 12.03 and/or 12.06. Doc. 9 at Page ID 635-39. Having reviewed the administrative record and the parties' briefs, and also having carefully considered the ALJ's decision, the Court finds that the ALJ carefully reviewed the record and appropriately assessed the evidence, including therapist Stephenson's opinion, reasonably concluded that Plaintiff did not
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of her therapist Ms. Stephenson, a licensed social worker. Doc. 9 at PageID 635. While social workers are not "acceptable medical sources" whose opinions can establish whether a claimant has a "medically determinable impairment[,]" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), their opinion, as an "other source," may be used by an ALJ "to show the severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) and how it affects [the claimant's] ability to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); see also Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir.2007). Other source opinions are entitled to consideration by an ALJ, and an ALJ's decision should reflect such consideration. Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir.2011); see also Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 (Aug. 9, 2006). In other words, an ALJ "should explain the weight given to [such] opinions ... or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator's reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the out-come of the case." SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6; see also Cruse, 502 F.3d at 541.
However, "SSR 06-03p ... does not require that an adjudicator articulate `good reasons' for the rejecting of an `other source's' opinion[,]" as the ALJ must do when discounting an opinion by a treating source. York v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-0466, 2014 WL 1213240, at *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 24, 2014) (citations omitted). To evaluate other source opinions, an ALJ may apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), i.e., length of treatment history; consistency of the opinion with other evidence; supportability; and specialty or expertise in the medical field related to the individual's impairment(s). Adams v. Colvin, No. 3:13-cv-255, 2014 WL 5782993, at *8 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 6, 2014).
Plaintiff saw therapist Stephenson for bimonthly appointments beginning in January 2012. See e.g., PageID 541-44, 603. In conjunction with treatment from therapist Stephenson, Plaintiff saw psychiatrist Pravesh Patel, M.D. PageID 80, 545. In October 2012, therapist Stephenson opined that Plaintiff experiences "marked" and "extreme" limitations
PageID 79-80.
The Court finds the foregoing discussion reflects appropriate consideration of
Accordingly, the weight accorded therapist Stephenson's opinion is supported by substantial evidence, and Plaintiff's first assignment of error is overruled. See Blakley v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.2009) ("[e]ven if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion[,]" the Court must give deference to the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence).
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 9 at PageID 637-39. A person's RFC is the most that an individual can do despite all physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R.
As noted, Plaintiff's RFC included the following limitations relevant to her mental health conditions:
PageID 76. The ALJ based the RFC determination on assessments from consultative psychologist Regina McKinney, Psy.D. (consistent with that of an earlier examination) and record reviewing psychologist Caroline Lewin, Ph.D., neither of whom found Plaintiff to have disabling limitations. PageID 79, 157-59, 466, 519-20. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on Dr. Lewin's opinion, which was given in October 2011, i.e., before Plaintiff began treatment with therapist Stephenson and Dr. Patel in January 2012. Doc. 9 at PageID 638-39; PageID 157-59.
The Court finds the ALJ reasonably relied on the consistent opinions of the consultative examiners and record reviewing psychologist in determining Plaintiff's RFC — notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Lewin's opinion predated the submission of medical evidence from therapist Stephenson and Dr. Patel. When an ALJ grants weight to the opinion of a psychologist who reviewed an incomplete record, the ALJ is required to indicate that he or she has considered the subsequently submitted evidence. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409 (citing Fisk v. Astrue, 253 Fed.Appx. 580, 585 (6th Cir.2007)). The ALJ's decision reflects appropriate consideration of the evidence submitted after the record reviewer's opinion. For example, in crafting Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ noted the moderate symptoms and GAF score of 51 found during a February 2012 mental status examination performed by Dr. Patel, and the limitations contained in therapist Stephenson's October 2012 opinion. PageID 79-80. Although the ALJ did not adopt therapist Stephenson's limitations in Plaintiff's RFC, the Court previously found the ALJ's discounting of such opinion supported by substantial evidence. See supra.
As to Dr. Patel's records, Plaintiff has not shown how his treatment notes translate into functional limitations beyond the significant mental-impairment limitations the ALJ included in Plaintiff's RFC. See Davis, 2012 WL 4378428, at *13. Dr. Patel's treatment notes document Plaintiff's diagnoses, PageID 582; self-reports — of "feel[ing] stressed and anxious," "having hallucinations," "get[ing] paranoid/freak[ed] out when around a lot of people," PageID 545; "feeling depressed, stressed[,] anxious[,] [and] paranoid[,]" PageID 560; "feel[ing] rage[,]" PageID 566 — observations of anxious mood/affect, PageID 545, 558, 560, 566, 570; and "severe persecutory delusions[,]" PageID 580. However, as previously noted, Dr. Patel did not express an opinion as to what limitations or restrictions, if any, result from Plaintiff's mental health conditions, see supra note 5, and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the limitations included — i.e., "simple, routine and repetitive tasks; low stress work ... no strict production quotas, no fast-pace, and few changes in the work setting; no contact with the public; and only occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors" — do not adequately
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ's RFC determination supported by substantial evidence, and Plaintiff's second assignment of error is overruled.
Finally, Plaintiff argues — without elaboration — that "the evidence supports a finding that... [she] meets/equals Listings [§§] 12.03 and/or 12.06 based on her multiple marked impairments, delusions, hallucinations, recurrent obsessions, and recollections of traumatic experiences." Doc. 9 at PageID 639. Plaintiff fails to address the requirements of these Listings or argue how she meets or equals every such requirement. See Evans v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 161, 164 (6th Cir.1987) (stating that Plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she meets or equals all of the criteria of a listed impairment). Accordingly, the Court considers such argument waived. See Kennedy v. Comm'r of Soc., Sec., 87 Fed.Appx. 464, 466 (6th Cir.2003) ("issues which are `averted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed augmentation, are deemed waived"') (quoting United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.1996)). Assuming, arguendo, that this argument is appropriately presented and thus merits review, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden to show either Listing 12.03 or 12.06 are met or equaled in this instance.
For the foregoing reasons,
