MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This civil case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for further discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) allow Plaintiff to depose Trooper Pohlabel;
Under Rule 56(d), "[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). In deciding a Rule 56(d) motion, the Court must consider "[a] number of different factors," including:
Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., Packard Elec. Div., 71 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
Here, a number of the Plott factors favor denial of Plaintiff's motion. As the Court previously noted, the initial Preliminary Pretrial Conference Order was issued on June 19, 2013 — i.e., over two years ago — setting an original discovery deadline of February 24, 2014. Doc. 16 at PageID 302; doc. 75 at PageID 1007. The Court subsequently issued an Amended Preliminary Pretrial Conference Order on April 16, 2014 — i.e., over a year ago — requiring the parties to complete discovery on or before January 13, 2015. Doc. 46 at PageID 724; doc. 75 at PageID 1007. The discovery deadline was, thereafter, extended two additional times, with the final discovery deadline being May 26, 2015. See doc. 75 at PageID 1007-08. Thus, the discovery period in this case has been significant. See docs. 16, 75. Plaintiff, however, waited until approximately April 2015, i.e., a month before the close of discovery to begin seeking any discovery. See doc. 75 at PageID 1008 (noting that the Court was "troubled by Plaintiff's failure to seek discovery until a month before the discovery deadline").
The Court does note, however, Plaintiff's difficulties in prosecuting this case. After filing his original complaint pro se, see doc. 1 at PageID 1, Plaintiff retained counsel who entered an appearance on Plaintiff's behalf on April 1, 2013. Doc. 9 at PageID 248. Subsequently, Plaintiff's retained counsel was suspended from the practice of law in Ohio and, as a result, was also suspended from the practice of law in this Court. See Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Scaccia, 21 N.E.3d 290, 296-97 (Ohio 2014); In re Scaccia, No. 1:14-mc-48 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2014). Thereafter, pursuant to this Court's Notation Order dated October 13, 2014, Plaintiff again was pro se in this case until the recent appearance of counsel on May 15, 2015. Doc. 80. Thus, Plaintiff's dilatory discovery efforts are somewhat mitigated by the fact that he has not had the continuity of counsel throughout this case.
With regard to the adequacy of Defendants' discovery responses, Plaintiff merely states that "Defendant's responses to [i]nterrogatories were not complete and contained improper objections." Doc. 121 at PageID 319. Plaintiff fails to point to any specific interrogatory response or objection in his motion, and cites no legal authority in support of his conclusory contention. Id. During the hearing held on September 3, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel pointed to Defendants' response to interrogatory 2 and 3 but, again, offered no argument concerning the propriety of Defendants' objections.
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court