TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.
This civil action is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Monell Claim (Doc. 112) and Motion to Bifurcate (Doc. 113), Plaintiff's memoranda contra (Docs. 120 & 118), and Defendants' reply memoranda (Docs. 122 & 123).
On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff Adam M. Glowka brought this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Montgomery County Sheriff's Deputies Gerald H. Bemis ("Deputy Bemis") and Joseph P. Caito, III ("Deputy Caito," collectively, "Defendants").
Additionally, the FAC contains allegations that Defendants' employer, Montgomery County, through the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office (the "MCSO"), effectuated "policies, practices, customs and usages regarding the use of force against restrained and handcuffed persons [which] proximately caused [Plaintiff's] injuries," and that the MCSO "fail[ed] to train its officers adequately in the appropriate use of force," and further "ratified [Defendants'] excessive use of force."
Defendants move for summary judgment on the Monell claims, and, in the event that any survive, move for bifurcation of any Monell claims from Plaintiff's underlying excessive force claims against the individual defendants. (Docs. 112, 113).
As a threshold matter, Defendants vigorously dispute on the merits that any constitutional violation occurred and, accordingly, argue that any Monell claim must fail as a matter of law.
Beyond this overarching position, Defendants contend that there is no factual or legal support for a Monell claim in this case, largely in light of the undisputed evidence that the MCSO has, at all relevant times, maintained a thorough and ongoing training program to instruct on the proper use of force and to target and combat issues of excessive force, and has maintained comprehensive policies and procedures to investigate occurrences of use of force and discipline inappropriate conduct. (Doc. 112 at 3). Further, Defendants argue that no policy, procedure, or training program of the MCSO was the "moving force" behind any alleged constitutional violation in this case. (Id.)
Notably, the only Monell claims that Plaintiff articulates and now appears to be pursuing is directed at the MCSO's approach to Deputy Caito: to wit, the MCSO failed to adequately discipline and re-train Deputy Caito, despite knowing that he had committed multiple use of force policy violations in the past. (Doc. 120). Essentially, Plaintiff asserts that the fact that Deputy Caito was disciplined for using force in the past, and is now again alleged to have used excessive force here, calls into question the sufficiency of the entire MCSO disciplinary and training program, and that such failure amounts to deliberate indifference.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the court demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).
To succeed on a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a local governing body, a plaintiff must prove that his "constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the moving force behind the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights." Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2010); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978). Thus, "a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Id. at 694. Nor does § 1983 permit a plaintiff to sue a government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752-53 (6th Cir. 2006). "A plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under Section 1983 for the entity's own wrongdoing [which occurs when . . .] its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights." Id. A government entities policy or custom can be unconstitutional in two ways: (1) it can be facially unconstitutional as written or articulated (i.e., the
There are four types of Monell claims under which a plaintiff may prove the existence of a government entity's illegal policy or custom: "(1) the municipality's legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations." Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). However, in order for the government entity to be held liable, the policy or custom at issue must have been the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In other words, the `policy or custom' must be sufficiently `at fault' for the violation before liability will attach. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) ("municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and
In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts that the MCSO's "policies, practices, customs and usages regarding the use of force against restrained and handcuffed persons proximately caused [Plaintiff's] injuries," and that the MCSO "fail[ed] to train its officers adequately in the appropriate use of force." (Doc. 77, ¶¶ 49-50). However, Defendants argue that the undisputed facts support a finding that the MCSO's policies, practices, and customs were not only adequate, but even exceeded national standards.
To succeed on a claim for failure to supervise or train, the plaintiff must evidence that: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks the officer or employee was performing; (2) the inadequate training resulted from the defendants' deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to, or directly caused, the injury. Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal School Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). "
Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 619 F.Supp.2d 461, 482 (N.D. Ohio 2009); see also Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999).
It is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege merely that an officer's training and supervision were inadequate, or that the officer would not have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights had he or she been given more or better training and supervision. Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 1998). Indeed, where "the constitutional violation was not alleged to be part of a pattern of past misconduct, a supervisory official or a municipality may be held liable only where there is
Here, Plaintiff has failed to evidence that any training or supervision was deficient or inadequate, and, further, has failed to evidence deliberate indifference. Conversely, the detailed, regularly-scheduled, and ongoing training provided by Montgomery County, through the MCSO, is undisputed. Moreover, the MCSO's program of training and oversight, which is CALEA-approved, and meets, and at times even exceeds, national standards, is thoroughly documented in Montgomery County's policies and procedures. In short, the MCSO's use of force reporting and investigation system, as well as its use of force trend monitoring and targeted training programs, evidences neither failure to train and supervise, nor deliberate indifference toward the safety of the community.
Additionally, Plaintiff's attempt to characterize Deputy Caito's three disciplinary incidents as `use of force violations' is disingenuous.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts in his FAC that the MCSO ratified Defendant's use of excessive force. (Doc. 77, ¶ 51). Defendants argue that neither the MCSO, nor any supervisory official, ratified or condoned misconduct from any employee.
Failure to investigate complaints or discipline officers can give rise to § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1247 (6th Cir. 1989). "The theory underlying these cases is that the municipality's failure to investigate or discipline amounts to a `ratification' of the officer's conduct." Dyer v. Casey, 72 F.3d 129 (Table) (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Here, the record evidence shows that the MCSO implemented strict investigative and disciplinary procedures regarding use of force incidents. Indeed, prior disciplinary actions evidence that MCSO is vigilant about investigating and disciplining misconduct. Additionally, the undisputed record evidence shows Deputy Caito received annual use of force training. The fact that Defendant Caito has not been the subject of disciplinary action related to the use of excessive force since the one 2010 incident (but for the allegations in this case) evidences that the prior disciplinary action taken and annual retraining program was sufficient, indeed, effective — regardless of Plaintiff's subjective opinion to the contrary.
For Plaintiff to present a viable Monell claim, he must identify a specific policy or custom that was the "moving force" behind Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violation. Sexton v. Kenton County Det. Ctr., 702 F.Supp.2d 784, 790 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996)). To constitute a "moving force," the policy or custom must be closely related to the plaintiff's ultimate injury. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. "[P]roof merely that such a policy or custom was `likely' to cause a particular violation is not sufficient; there must be proven at least an `affirmative link' between policy or custom and violation; in tort principle terms, the causal connection must be `proximate,' not merely `but-for' causation-in-fact." Mann v. Helmig, 289 F. App'x 845, 850 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1388 (4th Cir. 1987)); see also, Sexton, 707 F.Supp.2d at 790. To satisfy the Monell requirements a plaintiff must "identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy." Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987)); see Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 287 (6th Cir. 1994).
Here, apart from voicing dissatisfaction with the course of disciplinary action taken against Deputy Caito for his prior use of force violation, Plaintiff fails to identify definitively any
Further, as previously stated, the undisputed facts evidence that the MCSO, a CALEA-accredited department, had thorough policies and procedures in place to strictly govern the use of force. Additionally, where the MCSO's lengthy investigative process determined that excessive force was used, there were disciplinary procedures and training programs for the offending deputy, and further training for the entire department if the underlying conduct presented a particular concern or trend. Accordingly, the assertion that the Montgomery County policies or procedures were the `moving force' behind Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violations or claimed injuries is unsupported by the uncontroverted record evidence.
In sum, there are no genuine issues as to any of the material facts relating to Montgomery County's policies, procedures, and training. The MCSO is an accredited department that utilizes CALEA-approved policies and procedures. Montgomery County has ongoing and in-depth annual training for its deputies, under which Deputy Bemis and Deputy Caito have received and continue to receive appropriate training. Further, the MCSO engages in thorough investigative and disciplinary actions in all situations resulting in use of force. Accordingly, Montgomery County's policies, procedures, customs, and practices regarding use of force training, supervision, and discipline are entirely appropriate as written and as implemented by the MCSO. As there are no factual disputes for a jury to resolve with respect to any Monell claim, and, as Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is warranted.
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Monell Claim (Doc. 112) is
Here, had any of the Monell claims survived summary judgment, this Court would have granted Defendants' motion to bifurcate, as the claims present entirely separate issues involving distinct evidence, and prejudice to Defendants would significantly outweigh the interests of judicial economy. Further, this Court finds Judge Walter H. Rice's observations and holding in Wells v. City of Dayton, 495 F.Supp.2d 793, 795 (S.D. Ohio 2006), granting bifurcation of Monell claims from § 1983 claims against individual police officers, to be instructive and applicable here:
The Court anticipates so ruling on any prospective motion in limine.
