TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.
This civil action is before the Court on Defendant's motion to compel arbitration (Doc. 7) and the parties' responsive memoranda (Docs. 9, 10).
Perkins supplies a wide variety of food products to over 400 owned or franchised restaurants, as well as numerous retail outlets throughout the United States. (Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 3). To do so, Perkins purchases and manages inventory, including materials, food ingredients, and other source products to support its business operation from distributors and wholesalers located throughout the United States. (Id.)
Plaintiff began working for the Foxtail Foods division of Perkins in 1995. (Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 4). When he was discharged on April 29, 2015, Plaintiff was employed as a Senior Food Scientist at the Foxtail Foods facility located in Fairfield, Ohio. (Id.)
On June 2, 2011, while Plaintiff was employed by the company, Plaintiff and the Foxtail Foods division entered into an Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement ("Arbitration Agreement"), in which they agreed that any dispute between them would be submitted to arbitration. In the Arbitration Agreement, the parties agreed:
(Doc. 7-1. Ex. A). Plaintiff printed and signed his name at the bottom of the Arbitration Agreement directly under the capitalized statement: "DO NOT SIGN UNTIL YOU HAVE READ THE ABOVE STATEMENT & AGREEMENT." (Id.) The Arbitration Agreement appears printed as a separate agreement at the end of the Foxtail Foods Employee Handbook, following and separate from the Employee Handbook policies which are acknowledged via a separate Employee Acknowledgement Form. (Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 7).
On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint against Defendant alleging various claims relating to his employment arising under: (1) the Family Medical Leave Act; (2) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and (3) the Food Safety Act. Defendant moves the Court to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate these claims.
When asked by a party to compel arbitration under a contract, a federal court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000). Courts are to examine the language of the contract in light of the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (the FAA "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural polices to the contrary"). Any ambiguities in the contract or doubts as to the parties' intentions should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Stout, 228 F.3d at 714. The "primary purpose" of the FAA is to ensure "that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
Section 3 of the FAA provides:
9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 thus "requires" a court in which suit has been brought "upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration to stay the court action pending arbitration once it is satisfied that the issue is arbitratable under the agreement." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
In considering a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, a court has four tasks: (1) it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitration; (2) it must determine the scope of the arbitration agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the action are subject to arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings pending arbitration. Strout, 228 F.3d at 714.
The Sixth Circuit applies "the cardinal rule that, in the absence of fraud or willful deceit, one who signs a contract which he has had an opportunity to read and understand, is bound by its provisions." Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907, 913 (6th Cir. 1960). It is settled authority that doubt regarding the applicability of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. Indeed, "any doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2007). If parties contract to resolve their disputes in arbitration rather than in the courts, a party may not renege on that contract absent the most extreme circumstances. Allied Steel & Conveyors, 277 F.2d at 913. Furthermore, a district court's duty to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA is not diminished when a party bound by the agreement raises claims arising from statutory rights. Id.
It is undisputed that on June 2, 2011, Plaintiff voluntarily signed the Arbitration Agreement, agreeing that disputes between him and Perkins as his employer "shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act." (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A).
A valid contract under Ohio law requires an offer, mutual assent, and consideration. Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ohio 2002). In this case, Defendant presented Plaintiff with an offer to continue employment with the company pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and Plaintiff accepted the offer which is evidenced by his signature.
Plaintiff claims that the Arbitration Agreement is not enforceable because: (1) it is illusory; (2) it lacks consideration; and (3) it is "too indefinite to be enforced."
First, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is illusory because the Employee Handbook states that it is subject to unilateral modification or revocation at any time. See, e.g., Stanich v. Hissong Grp., No. 2:09cv143, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98709, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (arbitration clause was unenforceable where it was contained in a handbook that permitted unilateral modification of the agreement at any time).
Plaintiff also argues that the Arbitration Agreement is illusory because it is not separate and distinct from the Employee Handbook. However, the case law Plaintiff cites in support of this argument is unpersuasive, because the arbitration agreements in those cases were embedded in employee handbooks. The Arbitration Agreement at issue in this case is not embedded within the Employee Handbook; it is a separate agreement. While an arbitration disclaimer in an employee handbook cannot serve as the basis for an order compelling arbitration, a separate stand-alone arbitration agreement can bind employees to arbitration.
For example, in Cunningham-Malhoit v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. L-02-1277, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2515 (Ohio App. May 30, 3003), an employee signed two documents entitled "Employee Handbook Receipt Form." Id. at 9. The employee handbooks to which each of these forms pertained both contained contractual waivers and reserved the right to change or modify handbook polices or procedures without notice. Id. at 7-8. The employee in Cunningham objected to arbitration on the grounds that the employee handbooks could not be binding contracts. The Ohio Court of Appeals agreed with the employee that the handbooks—each of which contained contractual waivers— could not provide the basis for a binding agreement to arbitrate. However, the court enforced the arbitration agreement on the basis that the Employee Handbook Receipt Forms operated as separate signed agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 8.
Similarly, here, Defendant is not arguing that the description of the alternative dispute resolution policy in the Employee Handbook is binding on the Plaintiff. Instead, the binding agreement is the separately-executed single-page document entitled "ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT." (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A). Accordingly, the Arbitration Agreement is not illusory. See also Corl v. Thomas & King, No. 05AP-1128, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828, at *11 (Ohio App. June 13, 2006); Butcher v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No. 81593, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1639, at *16 (Ohio App. Apr. 3, 2003).
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Arbitration Agreement fails for lack of consideration. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that "Defendant did not offer him anything at the time ... did not offer him a raise or a bonus in exchange for him signing." (Doc. 9 at 8). However, continued employment is sufficient consideration to support an agreement to arbitrate. Dantz v. Am. Apple Group, LLC, 123 F. App'x 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2005) (the employer made an offer for an unilateral contract involving mandatory and binding arbitration which the employee accepted by his continued employment). It is undisputed that Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement on June 2, 2011 and continued to work for Defendant thereafter. See, e.g., Corl, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828 at 13-14 (the employee accepted the terms of the arbitration agreement with his continued employment which is valid consideration for the agreement). Accordingly, the Arbitration Agreement does not fail for lack of consideration.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is fatally ambiguous for the following reasons: (1) the method for appointment of an arbitrator; (2) the scope of discovery; and (3) the payment of arbitration fees.
The Arbitration Agreement incorporates the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, stating that disputes between the parties "shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act." (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A). While the text of the Arbitration Agreement itself is silent with respect to the mechanism for appointing an arbitrator, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is not:
9 U.S.C. § 5. Accordingly, the method for appointing an arbitrator is not ambiguous.
The Arbitration Agreement also states that it has generally incorporated the federal rules of procedure and evidence. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A). "To the extent applicable in civil actions in the United States District Courts, the following shall apply and be observed: all rules of pleading, all rules of evidence, and all rights to resolution of the dispute by means of motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, and/or for judgment on the pleadings." Id. Accordingly, the terms and scope of discovery are not ambiguous.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement fails because it is silent regarding the handling of arbitration fees.
Accordingly, the Arbitration Agreement is not fatally ambiguous.
For these reasons, Defendant's motion to compel arbitration (Doc. 7) is