EDMUND A. SARGUS, Jr., District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants TST Solutions, L.P., TST Truckload Express and Amar Iqbal Singh Virk's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 41.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) is
On January 21, 2015, Defendants TST Transforce and Mr. Virk (also referred to as "Mr. Iqbal") removed this action from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Ohio. Defendant TST TransForce is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in Canada, and Defendant Virk is a citizen of Canada. (Id.)
Plaintiff brings two claims arising from an automobile accident: the first claim is for personal injury and attendant damages based on Defendant Virk's alleged negligence, and the second claim is against the trucking company under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) The accident giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Franklin County, Ohio, on the evening of December 7, 2012. (Id.) It is undisputed that it was dark and rainy, and that Virk was driving his semi tractor-trailer on Route 33. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was stopped at a stop sign on Bixby Road perpendicular to the Route 33 prior to entering the highway. It is undisputed that Plaintiff made the turn onto the highway. Defendant Virk asserts that when he activated his brake in an attempt to avoid colliding with Plaintiff, his trailer jack-knifed. (Virk Dep., ECF No. 33-2, at 81.) The trailer struck Plaintiff's car. Plaintiff claims that Virk "negligently operated a motor vehicle thereby causing personal injury to Plaintiff Niko C. Miller, who was operating his vehicle within the lawful use of the highway." (Compl., ECF No. 2, ¶ 2.) Defendant Virk asserts a counterclaim, alleging that, on that date, "Plaintiff negligently operated his motor vehicle [on] West Jefferson Avenue, Franklin County, Ohio, causing it to collide with Defendant Iqbal's [Virk's] semi-tractor trailer." (ECF No. 7, at p. 7, ¶ 6.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 34), and the Plaintiff has filed his memorandum in opposition (Pl.'s Opp., ECF No. 38.) The motion is ripe for consideration.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The "party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying those portions" of the record which demonstrate "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). However, the Sixth Circuit has explained that, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must `present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'" Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257).
A genuine issue of material facts exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 486 (1986) (the requirement that a dispute be "genuine" means that there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts"). Consequently, the central issue is `"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 234-35 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
It is undisputed that Defendant Virk was traveling in his semi tractor-trailer on Route 33. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff entered Route 33 from a different direction, having been stopped at a stop sign waiting to turn onto Route 33. Defendants contend that Defendant Virk had the right of way, asserting that "[a] driver traveling within a statutorily defined right-of-way has an absolute preference so long as the driver is driving lawfully." (citations omitted) (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 34, at p. 4.) O.R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1) states that:
Thus, "[g]enerally, a motor vehicle has the right to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it is traveling in preference to any vehicle or pedestrian approaching from a different direction into its path." Neu v. Estate of Nussbaum, 2015-Ohio-159, 27 N.E.3d 906, at ¶ 17 (12th Dist., Ohio Ct. App. 2015), 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 139 (Jan. 20, 2015). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment against Plaintiff on the issue of the liability of Mr. Virk, the driver of the semi tractor-trailer, because he was "operating his vehicle in a lawful manner as he traveled down Route 33," and "had the right of way to proceed uninterrupted when Plaintiff decided to shoot out into his path with no time for the tractor-trailer to stop." (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 34, at p. 6.) In contrast, Plaintiff presents evidence that he was traveling on Route 33 when he was struck in the rear by Defendant Virk. (Miller Dep., ECF No. 37, at p. 32.)
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Virk is a basic negligence claim. "In order to recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, and (3) that the breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." Chambers v. St. Mary's School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 697 N.E.2d 198 (1988). However, the case also implicates an Ohio safety statute, the violation of which may constitute negligence-per-se. This Ohio law is often referred to as the "assured clear distance rule." O.R.C. 4522.21(A) provides the following:
In Cox v. Polster, 174 Ohio St. 224, 226, 188 N.E.2d 421 (1963), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this rule, and stated that "[t]he only defense which may be made to a violation of this section is such assured clear distance was suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance into the driver's lane of travel of some obstruction which rendered him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding with such obstruction." This "sudden emergency doctrine" is the basis for Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants assert that "[i]n a negligence action, the `emergency doctrine' negates liability where `there was a sudden and unexpected occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time for reflection or deliberation.'" Wylie v. Fed Ex Ground Package Sys., No. 3:13 CV 2798, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99761, at *8 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 2015) (quoting Hatala v. Craft, 165 Ohio App.3d 602, 607, 2006-Ohio-789, 847 N.E.2d 501 (7th Dist. 2006)). (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 34, at p. 5.)
In Hatala, the Court provided a primer on the interaction of an allegation of negligence and the violation of a specific safety statute:
Id. at 606-607. As the Hatala Court noted, "[s]ome types of sudden-emergency defenses do not easily lend themselves to resolution in summary judgment." Id. at 607.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff contends that, because he was struck from the rear, "a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Virk could reasonably have avoided the collision." (Pls. Opp., ECF No. 38, at p. 2.) Plaintiff asserts that, "[i]n other words, the facts relied upon by Defendants do not show that it was impossible for Defendant Virk to avoid the collision with Plaintiff Miller." (Id.)
Plaintiff is the only witness on his own behalf. In his deposition, he testified about the accident as follows:
(Pl.'s Dep., ECF No. 37, at p. 24.)
(Id. at pp. 28-30.)
Furthermore, to support the position that Defendant Virk may have been able to avoid the collision, Plaintiff points out that Defendant Virk testified in his deposition that he noticed Plaintiff "rocking" back and forth at the stop sign before Plaintiff pulled out from the stop sign and Bixby Road onto the highway. (Pl.'s Opp., ECF No. 38, at p. 4; Virk Dep., ECF No. 33-2, at p. 96.)
Defendant Virk's evidence of the accident includes his own deposition testimony and the testimony of a third-party witness to support the defense of "sudden emergency." Defendant Virk testified at deposition to his recollection of the events leading up to the accident, as follows:
(Virk Dep., ECF No. 33-2, at 77.) Defendant Virk testified further at his deposition that Plaintiff suddenly pulled out from the stop sign onto the highway, and created a sudden emergency. Virk swore that he did not have sufficient time to brake or respond to the sudden emergency created by the Plaintiff. (Id., at 78-81.)
Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to present genuine unresolved issues of material fact about whether Defendant Virk had sufficient reaction time to stop or whether he faced a "sudden emergency."
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the accident occurred so suddenly that Defendant Virk could not avoid it.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) is
