MICHAEL R. MERZ, Magistrate Judge.
This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Glenn Covert, is before the Court for report and recommendations on the merits. The relevant portions of the record are the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State Court Record ("SCR," ECF No. 4), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner's Traverse (ECF No. 9).
Mr. Covert was indicted by the Hamilton County grand jury on twelve drug and weapons related offenses. After successful plea negotiations, Covert pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in cocaine, one count of trafficking in heroin, and one count of having weapons while under a disability. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon mandatory minimum sentence of eight years imprisonment.
Covert appealed, asserting his plea was involuntary. The First District Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction. State v. Covert, Case No. C-140012 (1
Mr. Covert filed his Petition in this Court June 29, 2016, pleading the following Grounds for Relief:
(Petition, ECF No. 1.)
In his First Ground for Relief, Mr. Covert claims Ohio has provided him with an inadequate and deficient process for vindicating his federal rights. From the stated supporting facts, the Court understands his complaint is that the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court has not acted on his petition for post-conviction relief within the time allowed by Ohio S. Ct. Superintendence Rule 40.
Respondent asserts this claim is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus because it raises only a question of state law, to wit, whether the Common Pleas Court is in compliance with the rule imposed on it by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Covert's response is that he has a due process and equal protection right to a decision from that court where he admits his petition for post-conviction relief is still pending (Traverse, ECF No. 9, PageID 314).
Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
Mr. Covert's First Ground for Relief should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.
In his Second Ground for Relief, Mr. Covert asserts his conviction was the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness in only allowing him one minute on the morning on which trial was set to decide to accept the plea bargain he was offered.
The question of whether Covert's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was presented to the First District on direct appeal. Covert did not assert that his plea was coerced because he had only a short period of time to decide whether to accept the plea bargain. Because this was a fact that would have appeared of record, it was required to be raised on direct appeal, or it would be barred by Ohio's res judicata doctrine from being raised in post-conviction. In any event, Covert did not raise the claim in post-conviction and does not here assert that it depends on any evidence dehors the record.
A plea of guilty or no contest is valid if, but only if, it is entered voluntarily and intelligently, as determined by the totality of the circumstances. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151 (6
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. The voluntariness of a guilty or no contest plea is determined in light of all relevant circumstances surrounding the plea. Id. at 749. If a prosecutor's promise is illusory, then a plea is involuntary and unknowing. United States v. Randolph, 230 F.3d 243, 250-51 (6
When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000). The First District's decision on direct appeal is an objectively reasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent on the validity of guilty pleas in criminal cases and is therefore entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 23254(d)(1).
In the alternative, insofar as Mr. Covert asserts that the prosecutor's conduct is a separate ground for finding his plea involuntary, he has procedurally defaulted that claim, as the Respondent asserts, by never presenting it to the Ohio courts, i.e., by omitting it as an assignment of error on direct appeal and not raising it in his petition for post-conviction relief.
Covert asserts he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and that his actual innocence excuses any procedural default. First of all, by entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Secondly, the evidence relied on by Covert to show actual innocence does not meet the standards for the actual innocence "gateway" established by the Supreme Court:
Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 590 (6
Mr. Covert's Second Ground for Relief should be dismissed with prejudice either on the basis of deference to the First District's decision or because it is procedurally defaulted.
In his Third Ground for Relief, Mr. Covert asserts the state falsely labeled him a major drug offender before the indicting grand jury on the basis of false hearsay testimony from a confidential informant.
The Warden asserts this Ground for Relief is not cognizable in habeas corpus because it occurred before the guilty plea (Return, ECF No. 5, PageID 246). Covert does not respond to that point, but argues that the substance offered and sold to the confidential informant was not an illegal substance, but something called "party powder." (Traverse, ECF No. 9, PageID 311.)
A valid, unconditional guilty or no contest plea waives all "constitutional violations occurring prior to a plea of guilty once the defendant enters his plea," including a challenge to the evidence supporting a conviction and any pre-plea constitutional violations, unless expressly preserved in a plea agreement or at a plea hearing. United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 757 (6
Because Mr. Covert's Third Ground for Relief is barred by his guilty plea, it should be dismissed with prejudice.
In his Fourth Ground for Relief, Mr. Covert asserts the detectives involved in investigating his case seized evidence from his cell phone which was outside the scope of the search warrant.
The Warden asserts this claim is also barred by Covert's valid guilty plea. This defense is well-taken on the same basis as regards Ground Three.
Moreover, the Warden correctly asserts federal habeas review of this Fourth Amendment claim is barred by Supreme Court precedent. Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to state prisoners who allege they were convicted on illegally seized evidence if they were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate that question in the state courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone requires the district court to determine whether state procedure in the abstract provides full and fair opportunity to litigate, and Ohio procedure does. The district court must also decide if a Petitioner's presentation of claim was frustrated because of a failure of the state mechanism. Habeas relief is allowed if an unanticipated and unforeseeable application of a procedural rule prevents state court consideration of merits. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522 (6
Id. at 526.
Because review of this claim is barred by both Covert's guilty plea and Stone, supra, the Fourth Ground for Relief should be dismissed.
In his Fifth Ground for Relief, Mr. Covert asserts the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
As with Grounds Three and Four, this Ground for Relief is barred by Covert's valid guilty plea. Moreover, to the extent this claim depends on evidence dehors the record, it is procedurally defaulted by Covert's unexcused failure to include it in his petition for post-conviction relief.
On these bases, Ground Five should be dismissed with prejudice.
Covert's Sixth Ground for Relief is a boilerplate assertion of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate, interview witnesses, or move to suppress illegally seized evidence. As the Warden points out, this claim depends on evidence dehors the record but was not included in Covert's post-conviction petition and is therefore procedurally defaulted.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition herein be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, Petitioner should be denied a certificate of appealability and the Court should certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and therefore should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.