CHELSEY M. VASCURA, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Traverse, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge
The Franklin County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Entry (Doc. 6-1, PAGEID ##123-124). Petitioner was indicted by the January 10, 2014, term of the Franklin County grand jury on one count of felonious assault in violation of O.R.C. § 2903.11. (Id. at PAGEID #46). After the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motions to suppress evidence, Petitioner entered a no contest plea. (Id. at PAGEID #150). On November 21, 2014, the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years of incarceration plus three years of post-release control. (Id. at PAGEID ##170-171). Represented by new counsel, Petitioner pursued a timely appeal. He raised the following assignments of error:
State v. Jones, No. 14AP-1050, 2015 WL 7902800, at *1 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Dec. 3, 2015). On December 3, 2015, the appellate court sustained Petitioner's third assignment of error, as the parties agreed "that the judgment entry signed by the trial court judge is incorrect when it states that Delshjaun Jones was convicted following a guilty plea" and remanded the case to the trial court to journalize a nunc pro tunc entry reflecting that Petitioner was found guilty following a plea of "no contest." Id. The appellate court otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. On May 4, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. State v. Jones, 145 Ohio St.3d 1458 (2016). On December 11, 2015, the trial court issued the Amended Judgment Entry. (Id. at PAGEID #316).
On March 6, 2017, Petitioner filed this pro se § 2254 Petition.
Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") sets forth standards governing this Court's review of state-court determinations. The United State Supreme Court described AEDPA as "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court" and emphasized that courts must not "lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the `extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings and demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt).
The factual findings of the state appellate court are presumed to be correct. Section 2254(e)(1) provides as follows:
"Under AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus should be denied unless the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts." Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir.) (citing Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 513 (6th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied sub. nom Coley v. Robinson, 134 S.Ct. 513 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (a petitioner must show that the state court relied on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained these standards as follows:
Coley, 706 F.3d at 748-49. The burden of satisfying the standards set forth in § 2254 rests with the petitioner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.170, 181 (2011).
"In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court precedent] unreasonable, . . . [t]he state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable," not merely "incorrect or erroneous." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003); Williams, 529. U.S. at 409); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 778 ("[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision")(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In considering claims of "unreasonable application" under § 2254(d)(1), courts must focus on the reasonableness of the result, not on the reasonableness of the state court's analysis. Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 341 (6th Cir. 2009) ("`[O]ur focus on the `unreasonable application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence'") (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied sub. nom. Neal v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003)); see also Nicely v. Mills, 521 F. App'x 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2013) (considering evidence in the state court record that was "not expressly considered by the state court in its opinion" to evaluate the reasonableness of state court's decision). Relatedly, in evaluating the reasonableness of a state court's ultimate legal conclusion under § 2254(d)(1), a court must review the state court's decision based solely on the record that was before it at the time it rendered its decision. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. Put simply, "review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did." Id. at 182.
In claim one, Petitioner asserts that police failed to follow the procedures required under state law when obtaining a photo identification of him from the alleged victim Samuel Lacy, resulting in an unduly suggestive identification. According to Petitioner, Lacy's identification of him was unreliable, as Lacy had little to no opportunity to view his assailant at the time of the offense, paid limited attention, provided a vague description of the perpetrator to police, and was uncertain of his identification of Petitioner. The state appellate court rejected this claim as follows:
State v. Jones, 2015 WL 7902800, at *1-2.
To the extent that Petitioner raises a claim regarding the alleged violation of state law, his claim fails to provide a basis for relief. Federal courts can grant habeas corpus relief only if the petitioner is confined in violation of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); e.g., Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
However, identification testimony based upon a pre-trial procedure that is so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" violates a criminal defendant's right to due process. Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). "It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). The Court first must determine whether the pre-trial identification procedure employed was unduly suggestive. Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1145 (1995). If so, the Court must then consider the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether the identification is nevertheless reliable. Id. at 1070 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992); Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 895). In making this determination, the Court must consider the following five factors:
Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1070 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200).
Here, Officer Brian Wildman testified that, on March 8, 2014, he was contacted about a stabbing at the Schrock Tavern and given Petitioner's name as the suspect. He assembled a photo lineup which included Petitioner's photograph, and went to the hospital in order to interview Samuel Lacy, the alleged victim. Transcript of Suppression Hearing (Doc. 6-2, PAGEID # 338). Wildman gave the photo array to a "blind administrator," i.e., an officer who did not know the identification of the suspect. (Id. at PAGEID #340). Lacy told police he had had prior dealings with his assailant. "It was clear he had dealt with the person before." Lacy did not know the name of his attacker, but was clearly familiar with the man. (Id. at PAGEID #341). Lacy described him as a light skinned black male, approximately six feet two inches tall, with large lips and "he mentioned something about his eyebrows." (Id. at PAGEID #342). Wildman recorded the interview with Lacy, and it was played during the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence. (Id. at PAGEID #345). The recording indicated that Lacy was working security at the Schrock Tavern on the night he was attacked.
(Id. at PAGEID ##348-349). Lacy recognized his assailant as a rapper who had frequented the club in the past. (Id.). The man usually came to the club with "his boys," whom Lacy also recognized. (Id.). Lacy recognized the nickname, "Deli," but said the man also went by another name. (Id. at PAGEID #349). Lacy described him as a black male with light skin, a couple inches taller than himself. Lacy could recognize him if provided with a photograph. (Id. at PAGEID #350). "Uh-huh. Can't miss him. He got big lips and — (inaudible) — eyebrows. — (inaudible)—he got some tattoos and stuff. You know what I mean? You can't miss him." (Id.). Officer Wildman was not present when Lacy identified Petitioner from the photo array. (Id. at PAGEID ##400, 410).
Officer Gregory Potter also responded to the Schrock Tavern and followed Lacy to Riverside Hospital. (Id. at PAGEID #416). Potter showed the photo array provided by Officer Wildman to Lacy and asked Lacy if he could identify the person who had assaulted him at the bar. (Id. at PAGEID #417). Potter did not know, at that time, the identity of the suspect. (Id. at PAGEID ##417-418). An audiotape was made of the identification procedure, which was played during the hearing on the motion to suppress. It indicates that Potter instructed Lacy as follows:
(Id. at PAGEID #421). Lacy identified photograph number six as "one of the dudes's he's connected with" and photograph number four, or Petitioner's photograph, as the person who cut him. (Id. at PAGEID ##421-422). Lacy stated, "I want to be sure. I don't want to mess up. Make sure I get the right person. That's got to be him then. Because I remember — I seen him before throwing him out the club." (Id. at PAGEID #422).
(Id.). Potter denied making any suggestive remarks regarding the identification of the suspect. (Id. at PAGEID ##422-423). The photo array also was entered into evidence and has been made a part of the record before this Court. (See Id. at PAGEID #322; ECF No. 19).
Petitioner argues that the state appellate court's decision denying his claim constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented because police improperly provided Lacy with Petitioner's name and put his name beneath his photograph on the photo array during the time that Lacy made his identification. Traverse (ECF No. 10, at PAGEID #536). He further contends that Lacy identified another person prior to identifying Petitioner as the perpetrator of the offense. (Id. at PAGEID #539). However, the record does not support these allegations. The record does not indicate that the photo array was unduly suggestive, and it contains no evidence of any improper or suggestive conduct on the part of the police. Likewise, the record does not support Petitioner's claim that police put Petitioner's name underneath his photograph when they asked Lacy to make an identification. Petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to the state court's factual findings in this regard. Lacy recognized Petitioner, knew him from prior contacts, and made his identification on this basis. This Court has reviewed the photographic array used by police. It does not indicate that police identified Petitioner's photograph and does not appear unduly suggestive in any other respect.
Claim one is without merit.
In claim two, Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly admitted his statements to police as obtained in violation Miranda. Petitioner states that he was intoxicated and under the influence of alcohol and Percocet when police interviewed him and therefore did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Petitioner maintains that he twice requested to terminate the interview, but the police improperly failed to honor his requests and illegally continued to question him. Petitioner argues that the videotape of his interview with police will support his claim that the appellate court unreasonably applied federal law when it rejected his claim, as it shows that his speech was slurred, he had difficulty staying awake, and that he told police he felt "pretty faded" at the time.
The state appellate court denied Petitioner's claim, reasoning in relevant part as follows:
State v. Jones, 2015 WL 7902800, at *1-2.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the government from using any statement against a criminal defendant "stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "[B]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. A person being questioned in a custodial interrogation must be warned "that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. A suspect subject to custodial interrogation may waive his Miranda rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Waiver depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. See Bush v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 573 F. App'x 503, 510 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. "[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
Id. Where a suspect's request to cease questioning is "ambiguous or equivocal," cessation of questioning is not required. See Tolliver v. Sheets, 530 F.Supp.2d 957, 994 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Calhoun v. McKee, No. 05-74614, 2007 WL 1452911 (E.D. Mich May 15, 2007) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994))). The defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his right to silence before police are required to stop questioning him. United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2000). Additionally, Miranda does not prohibit the admission of voluntary statements made while an accused is in police custody in the absence of express police questioning or its equivalent. United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir.1997) ("where a defendant makes a voluntary statement without being questioned or pressured by an interrogator, the statements are admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that, absent coercion, a waiver will be deemed voluntary even where the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating medication or had been drinking heavily at the time. United States v. Miller, 562 F. App'x 272, 290 (6th Cir.) (citing United States v. Dunn, 269 F. App'x 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied sub. nom. Dorsey v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 184 (2014).
United States v. Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2010). In cases involving Miranda waivers by intoxicated defendants, "courts examine the `totality of the circumstances,' including the suspect's `age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.'" Id. at 573 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). A statement obtained by police in violation of Miranda is subject to the harmless error doctrine. Tolliver, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).
Officer Brian Wildman interviewed Petitioner at police headquarters at approximately 5:52 a.m. Transcript (ECF No. 6-2, at PAGEID ##342, 389). He did not notice anything unusual about Petitioner's behavior or demeanor at that time. Id.
Id. The videotape of that interview was played during the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence. Petitioner indicated that he had been advised of his Miranda rights many times previously. (Id. at PAGEID #358). He had a high school education. (Id.) He had consumed a half liter of vodka and stated, "I am intoxicated right now." (Id. at PAGEID #359). "Like, I'm, I'm pretty faded, you know, this, this'll wake you up a little bit, you know; but I'm there and I ain't about to throw up or pass out or nothing." (Id. at PAGEID #360). He said he understood all the questions. (Id.). He had taken 15 mg. of Percocet between 11:30 and 12:00. (Id. at PAGEID ##360-361). Wildman advised him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner repeatedly indicated that he understood. (Id. at PAGEID ##361-362). Before making any statements, he asked to be advised of the charges against him. Wildman informed him that he had been charged with felonious assault. (Id. at PAGEID #363). Petitioner stated that he had gotten into a fight with his brother earlier in the evening. (Id. at PAGEID #364).
(Id. at PAGEID #365). He had been at the Schrock Tavern and acknowledged that he had had problems with security there in the past. (Id. at PAGEID #366).
(Id. at PAGEID #367). Petitioner then indicated that a couple of men had grabbed him and told him that he could not go into the bar. (Id. at PAGEID ##367-368). He turned around and swung. (Id. at PAGEID #368). He denied using a knife. "I don't understand why this is felonious assault. I break his jaw?" (Id. at PAGEID #369).
(Id. at PAGEID ##369-370). Petitioner admitted throwing a couple of punches, but repeatedly denied using a knife. (Id. at PAGEID ## 371, 373, 385, 387).
This Court has reviewed the entire record, including the videotape of the interview with police. Petitioner appears to be lucid and coherent and to understand what is happening. He indicates that he understands. His speech is not slurred. He asks appropriate questions. Although he mentions that he has no reason to speak with police, because they have already decided to file charges against him, he never requests counsel or indicates that he wishes to cease the police interview. To the contrary, he continues responding to questions and asking questions of his own. As discussed, he denies use of a knife repeatedly. The police did not engage in coercive tactics. The totality of the circumstances supports the state court's conclusion that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police. Moreover, the record does not indicate that he ever clearly and unequivocally indicated that he no longer wished to speak to police or asserted his right to remain silent. In view of this record, Petitioner has failed to establish that relief is warranted.
Claim two is without merit.
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
The parties are further advised that, if they intend to file an appeal of any adverse decision, they may submit arguments in any objections filed, regarding whether a certificate of appealability should issue.
