ORDER AND ENTRY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REINSTATING PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 8 VOUCHER DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS LAWSUIT

Michael J. Newman, United States Magistrate Judge.

This civil consent case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. 2. Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 6. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a reply. Doc. 8. The Court has carefully considered all of the foregoing,1 and Plaintiff's motion is ripe for decision.

I.

Plaintiff Tonya Watkins has participated in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program ("HCVP") for close to five years. Doc. 2-2 at PageID 40. She has an approximate monthly income of $1,100.00 per month. Id. Four minor children live with Plaintiff in her household. Id. at 41. One of her children stopped receiving a Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") check in May 2019, decreasing the household income by approximately $770.00. Id. The market rent for her residence is $625.00. Id. Through the HCVP, Plaintiff was responsible for thirty percent of her adjusted monthly income for rent while Defendant, Greene Metropolitan Housing Authority ("GMHA"), paid a subsidy for the remaining portion. Id; 24 C.F.R. § 982.1.

Plaintiff is legally married to DeWayne Watkins. Doc 2-2 at PageID 41. Mr. Watkins moved out of Plaintiff's home approximately four years ago when the couple separated and he is not listed on her HCVP voucher. Id. In October 2017, he applied to be a participant in the HCVP administered by GMHA, and Plaintiff's address was listed as contact information during that process. Id. When Plaintiff received mail from GMHA on Mr. Watkins's behalf regarding his application to the HCVP, she believed that she had only been listed as an emergency contact. Id.

In Mid-August 2018, Plaintiff reported to GMHA that Mr. Watkins was moving back into her residence and that she wished to add him to her lease. Id. On August 22, 2018, GMHA issued a Section 8 Notice of Termination of Benefits to Plaintiff, which proposed to terminate her participation in the Section 8 HCVP. Doc 1-1 at PageID 10. The notice stated the grounds for the proposed termination as follows: "Violation of Family Obligations: allowing unauthorized individual (Mr. Watkins) to use your address; Violation of voucher #4 and 24 CFR § 982.552." Id.

Plaintiff timely requested a hearing to contest the termination of her housing subsidy, and a hearing was held on September 5, 2018 before hearing officer Mary Jo Beatty, L.S.W. Doc 1-2 PageID 20. GMHA issued a decision on September 12, 2018, upholding the termination of Plaintiff's participation in the HCVP. Id. Specifically, the hearing officer concluded: "Ms. Tonya Watkins is in violation of the Family Reporting Responsibility. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned finds that Ms. Watkins allowed [Mr. Watkins] to stay at her federally subsidized rental home and use her address for mail." Id. at PageID 20. Plaintiff, proceeding with this assistance of Legal Aid of Western Ohio ("LAWO"), then filed suit with this Court, challenging the termination of her voucher. Doc. 1. She also filed a preliminary injunction seeking the reinstatement of her Section 8 voucher during the pendency of this suit. Doc. 2.

II.

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The purpose of a preliminary injunction is simply to preserve the status quo[,]" United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004), i.e., "to preserve the parties' relative positions in order to prevent irreparable injury prior to trial." Montgomery v. Carr, 848 F.Supp. 770, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1993).

In deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue, four factors must be examined: (1) whether the movant has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction." Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573. "These factors are not prerequisites, but are factors that are to be balanced against each other." Id.; but cf. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that "[d]espite the overall flexibility of the test for preliminary injunctive relief, and the discretion vested in the district court, equity has traditionally required ... irreparable harm before an interlocutory injunction may be issued").

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff has shown a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her claims. Plaintiff alleges that the termination of her voucher was unlawful because (1) the reason for termination was not permitted by applicable regulations, and (2) she received inadequate notice of such reason in violation of her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

As noted above, Plaintiff received notice regarding the termination of her voucher for a purported "Violation of Family Obligation" and, specifically, for "allowing [an] unauthorized individual (Mr. Watkins) to use [her] address." Doc. 1-1 at PageID 13. The notice cites "voucher #4" and 24 C.F.R. § 982.552. Id. It remains unclear to the Court what reference to "voucher #4" means, but certainly 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 is the applicable federal regulation setting forth a list of grounds upon which a Public Housing Authority ("PHA"), such as GMHA, can rely on to terminate Section 8 vouchers. Grounds for termination include circumstances were, as listed on the notice at issue here, a "family violates any family obligations under the program" as set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i).

The family obligations set forth in § 982.551 include obligations regarding the "use and occupancy" of the housing unit provided. None of the obligations in that regulation, however, prohibit a voucher recipient from permitting another individual to use the address to receive mail — that is, unless, of course, the use of the mail is related to fraud or drug-related criminal activity, none of which appears to be at issue here.2 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. Thus, from the undersigned's perspective, a termination of Plaintiff's voucher for this reason alone would be improper. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) ("The PHA must adopt ... local policies in accordance with HUD requirements"); see also Coe v. Hous. Auth. of Milwaukee, No. 14-cv-0022, 2016 WL 393955, at *5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11477, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Feb 1, 2016) (interpreting a "legitimate reason to terminate plaintiff's [voucher]" as one falling within 24 C.F.R. § 982.552).

However, as argued by Defendants, Plaintiff's voucher was also terminated because she permitted Mr. Watkins "to stay at her federally subsidized rental home." Doc. 1-2 at PageID 20. The family obligations set forth in federal regulations includes the requirement that "[t]he composition of the assisted family residing in the unit must be approved by the PHA" and that "[t]he family must request PHA approval to add any other family member as an occupant of the unit." 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2). In other words, "[n]o other person [i.e., nobody but members of the assisted family] may reside in the unit[.]" Id. The undersigned concludes that permitting Mr. Watkins to stay at her address would be a lawful purpose for terminating Plaintiff's voucher. Accord Coe, 2016 WL 393955, at *5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11477, at *10 ("Defendant needed only one legitimate reason to terminate plaintiff's benefits and plaintiff's violation of the 15-day reporting rule was such a reason").

The remaining question, then, is whether Plaintiff received adequate notice that Defendants sought to terminate her voucher for allowing Mr. Watkins to reside at her address. The Due Process Clause imposes restraints on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of liberty or property interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The specific restraints and procedures that are due turn on a consideration of: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. Applying these factors, the Supreme Court has determined that when the government terminates an individual's interest in the continued receipt of benefits, due process mandates "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).

Moreover, federal regulations require that when, as here, a participant's voucher is terminated as a result of "the family's act," a PHA is required to give "prompt written notice" that must: "(i) [c]ontain a brief statement of reasons for the decision, (ii) [s]tate that if the family does not agree with the decision, the family may request an informal hearing on the decision, and (iii) [s]tate the deadline for the family to request an informal hearing." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. The purpose of this notice, "under the Due Process Clause[,] is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending `hearing.'" Colon v. Wagner, 462 F.Supp.2d 162, 169 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 2003)) (additional citation omitted); see also Barry v. Corrigan, 79 F.Supp.3d 712, 741 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2015) ("The central point emerging from the relevant Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases is that the explanation of the proposed action and of the reasons for the action must be detailed enough to allow for a meaningful hearing") (citing Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 S.Ct. 1129 (1938); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 561 (6th Cir. 2004)); Edgecomb v. Housing Auth., 824 F.Supp. 312, 314 (D. Conn. 1993) citing Billington v. Underwood, 613 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[N]otice should be `sufficiently specific ... to enable [the] applicant to prepare rebuttal evidence to introduce at his hearing appearance'")).

The undersigned concludes that the notice, here, failed to adequately apprise Plaintiff that Defendants sought to terminate her benefits for allowing Mr. Watkins to reside at her address. Courts routinely find notice insufficient where such notice simply "parrots the broad language of applicable regulations." See e.g., Billington v. Underwood, 613 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1980); Woods v. Willis, No. 3:09CV2412, 2010 WL 3808279, at *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108197, *10-11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2010). This is because such notices do not alert individuals of the specific behavior that led to the termination of their benefits, and they are thus unprepared to combat the charges against them. Young v. Maryville Hous. Auth., No. 3:09-CV-37, 2009 WL 2043891, *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56539, *15-18 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2009) ("[T]he MHA's failure to isolate a specific charge, such as assault or trespass, or to even isolate a particular category of crime almost certainly fell below the statutory threshold of notice"). Here, the notice failed to even match the broad language of the applicable regulation. Compare 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2) ("No other person [i.e., nobody but members of the assisted family] may reside in the unit") (emphasis added) with PageID 10 ("allowing an unauthorized individual... to use your address"). Similar to the notices that "parrot the broad language of applicable regulations," the notice here did not alert Plaintiff of the specific actions that lead to the termination of her benefits.

At best, the notice condemning the "use of an address" was vague and open to multiple interpretations. Young, 2009 WL 2043891, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56539, at *15-18 (granting preliminary injunction and finding notice insufficient where it "gave the Plaintiff only the vaguest notice of the reason for the decision —i.e. that she had committed either a violent crime, a drug-related crime, or a crime near her residence"). It was GMHA's duty to put Plaintiff on notice of the specific grounds for voucher's termination. Jones v. Lansing Hous. Comm'n, No. 5:03-CV-123, 2003 WL 26118817, at *7, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28327, at *19 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2003). In notifying Plaintiff about an "unauthorized ... use of her address," a charge that is not necessarily synonymous with permitting an unauthorized individual to reside at her home, GMHA failed to fulfill its responsibility. Id. (finding "the notice sent to plaintiff was plainly insufficient" because "[a]n allegation of `misrepresentation' alone is not necessarily synonymous, legally or in the vernacular, with fraud"). Thus, the notice did not adequately identify the specific behavior leading to the termination of her voucher.

Because Plaintiff was not put on notice of the specific lawful basis for the termination of her benefits, the undersigned finds, for purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff would likely succeed in proving her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.3 The first preliminary injunction prong is thus satisfied.

B. Irreparable Harm

An injury is irreparable only "if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages." Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). The injury "must be likely[,] not just possible." Tri-County Wholesale Distribs. v. Wine Group, Inc., 565 Fed. Appx. 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). A loss of housing constitutes an irreparable harm. See, e.g., Alms Residents Ass'n v. United States HUD, No. 1:17-cv-605, 2017 WL 4553401, at *13, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168842, at *36 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2017) citing Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1424 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining the irreparable nature of having to move during the pendency of housing litigation: "a person ... cannot remain in limbo while a court resolves the matter. He or she must find housing elsewhere, and once that housing is found ... it becomes difficult to disrupt new friendships and other community ties by uprooting oneself again."); Chapp v. Bowman, 750 F.Supp. 274, 277 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding irreparable harm where "it appears that their primary loss will be the opportunity to make the 429 Pearl Street house their residence"); Young, 2009 WL 2043891, at *10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56539, at *29-30 (finding irreparable harm where "without a rent subsidy, the Plaintiff will be unable to meet her rent obligation and will face imminent eviction").

Here, it is reasonable to expect Plaintiff's landlord to seek full obligation of rent payments. McNeill v. N.Y. City Housing Auth'y, 719 F.Supp. 233, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (reasoning that without injunction a landlord will continue to seek the full rental obligation and since the plaintiffs, by definition, cannot afford to pay the full rent, they will face eviction). It is also reasonable to doubt Plaintiff's ability to fulfill even reduced-rent payments because of the terminated voucher and her recently reduced income. The undersigned thus finds Plaintiff and her four children are at risk of imminent irreparable harm in the form of being evicted from their home. Aguirre v. Aurora Housing Auth., No. 91 C 7847, 1991 WL 287109, at *5, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1991) (finding "[t]here can be no doubt that [the prospect of an indigent mother of two young children losing her housing] constitutes irreparable harm for which there can be no adequate monetary compensation"). As noted above, the primary function of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo. Montgomery, 848 F. Supp. at 779. Because Plaintiff and her children's housing situation is at imminent risk of change and the preliminary injunction will prevent eviction, the undersigned second the third factor weighs in favor of granting the preliminary injunction.

C. Harm to Third Parties

Defendants assert that third parties will be harmed if funds are diverted to reinstate Plaintiff's voucher but, in so arguing, they put forth no evidence of any financial inability to service other applicants in addition to continuing Plaintiff's voucher through the completion of this lawsuit. Considering that Plaintiff's constitutional rights are at stake, the potential harm to third parties does not weigh substantially in favor of Defendants. Litsey v. Hous. Auth. of Bardstown, No. CIV.A. 399CV114H, 1999 WL 33604017, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 1999) ("[C]onsidering the rights involved and the Housing Authority's presumed financial ability, this harm [to third parties] does not seem substantial").

D. Public Interest

The fourth and final factor is whether the public interest will be served by the granting of a preliminary injunction. The public has an interest in "guaranteeing that those in financial need are not unreasonably terminated from public assistance benefits." Jones, 2003 WL 26118817, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28327, at *19 (quoting Jackson v. Jacobs, 971 F.Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Ga. 1997)). Because the undersigned here finds GMHA likely terminated Plaintiff from her Section 8 housing voucher without due process of law, see supra II.A., the public interest will be served by the reinstatement of her voucher. Accord. Id. This last factor thus also weighs favorably in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.

III.

Thus, in light of all the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to promptly reinstate Plaintiff's Section 8 voucher during the pendency of this lawsuit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.