KIMBERLY A. JOLSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Shakaira L. Davis, filed this action seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI. For the reasons that follow, it is
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on December 14, 2011, alleging disability beginning February 1, 2009, due to numerous physical and mental impairments. (Doc. 10, Tr. 206). An Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") held a hearing on April 5, 2013. (Id., Tr. 42-74) after Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. The ALJ denied benefits in a written decision on June 27, 2013. (Id., Tr. 13-36). That became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review. (Id., Tr. 1-4).
On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court seeking a review of the final decision of the Commissioner. Upon a joint motion of the parties, the District Court remanded the case to the Commissioner. (Tr. 813). The Appeals Council issued a Remand Order on May 6, 2015 (Tr. 814-15), and a hearing was held on February 12, 2016. (Tr. 711-36). On March 22, 2016, the ALJ denied benefits in a written decision. (Tr. 822-37). Plaintiff appealed that decision on June 14, 2016, which was denied due to a missed deadline. (Tr. 847-48). The Appeals Counsel remanded the case on September 16, 2016, after finding her appeal to have been timely filed. (Tr. 850-55). On February 8, 2017, another administrative hearing was held. (Tr. 691-710). On March 17, 2017, the ALJ again denied benefits in a written decision. (Tr. 662-79). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 639-42).
Plaintiff filed this action on May 14, 2018 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the administrative record on August 9, 2018 (Doc. 10). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors (Doc. 13), the Commissioner responded (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 17).
The ALJ usefully summarized the physical and medical evidence of record.
(Tr. 672-73).
(Tr. 674).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 1, 2009. (Tr. 666). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative arthritis of the spine and knees; bilateral trochanteric bursitis; fibromyalgia; myofascial pain syndrome; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); obesity; a major depressive disorder; an anxiety disorder; a post-traumatic stress disorder; a schizoaffective disorder; and a history of alcohol and marijuana abuse. (Tr. 667). The ALJ held, however, that there was no medical opinion of record to indicate the existence of an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled in severity the level of the Listings of Impairments. (Tr. 668).
The Court's review "is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards." Winn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App'x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
"After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ's decision, the determination of the council becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court." Olive v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, "even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff asserts one assignment of error: that the ALJ failed to follow the treating-physician rule when evaluating Dr. Ratliff's opinions.
Two related rules govern how an ALJ is required to analyze a treating physician's opinion. Dixon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-478, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016). The first is the "treating physician rule." Id. The rule requires an ALJ to "give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of the claimant's impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." LaRiccia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App'x 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Closely associated is "the good reasons rule," which requires an ALJ always to give "good reasons . . . for the weight given to the claimant's treating source opinion." Dixon, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (quoting Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406 (alterations in original)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). In order to meet the "good reasons" standard, the ALJ's determination "must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Cole, 661 F.3d at 937.
Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The treating physician rule and the good reasons rule together create what has been referred to as the "two-step analysis created by the Sixth Circuit." Allums v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 975 F.Supp.2d 823, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
This is how the ALJ evaluated Dr. Ratliff's opinions:
The physical residual functional capacity opinions from Dr. Ratliff that were rendered for Franklin County Job and Family Services indicating that the claimant is limited to a reduced range of sedentary work are given partial weight because they were limited examinations, each based on one physical examination, and a determination of who is "disabled" or "unable to work" is an area reserved to the Commissioner (Exhibits B15F, pp. 2-9, 12-14, 17-18, and B34F, pp. 3-10, 13-15, 18-19). Additionally, as discussed above, Dr. Kaeding's opinion is more consistent with the evidence of record.
(Tr. 675-76).
Dr. Ratliff addressed Plaintiff's physical and mental limitations. So too, the Undersigned considers both.
The Undersigned reads the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Ratliff's assessment as providing four primary reasons for assigning partial weight to the doctor's opinion regarding Plaintiff's physical impairments. First, the ALJ found Dr. Ratliff's opinion of lesser value because the doctor had assumed a certain time of environment—one with "strong fumes, poor ventilation, heavy lifting, or chronic lifting and bending." (Tr. 675). That is not an unreasonable interpretation of Dr. Ratliff's opinion because Dr. Ratcliff expressly stated that he was premising his assessment on the hypothetical work place having "strong fumes, poor ventilation, heavy lifting or chronic lifting and bending." (Tr. 1813). Given this, the ALJ had discretion to discount the application of Dr. Ratliff's opinion.
Second, the ALJ valued Dr. Kaeding's opinion more than Dr. Ratliff's because the ALJ found that Dr. Kaeding's opinion was more consistent with the record evidence. For this point, the ALJ referred to his previous discussion of Plaintiff's medical history wherein the ALJ detailed a number of Plaintiff's medical records. (See Tr. 672-73). Although Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's ultimate interpretation of the record, the ALJ sufficiently explained why he favored Dr. Kaeding's opinion and offered adequate support for his conclusion. In reply, Plaintiff further challenges the ALJ's decisions to prefer Dr. Kaeding's opinion over Dr. Ratcliff's based upon the fact that the ALJ ultimately assessed greater restrictions than Dr. Kaeding proposed. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, this shows that the ALJ weighed the evidence and thoughtfully crafted the RFC. See Ray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 940 F.Supp.2d 718, 727 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (noting that "[i]t is theCommissioner's function to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence[.]").
Third, the ALJ discounted Dr. Ratliff's opinion because it was based upon only one physical examination. Plaintiff attempts to challenge this conclusion (Doc. 13 at 11), but it is true that Dr. Ratcliff's treatment notes appear to refer to a single physical examination. (See, e.g., Tr. 1166, 1169, 1171, 1175, 1181 (generally referring to the same examination)). The ALJ had discretion to discount Dr. Ratcliff's opinion for this reason. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) ("The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.").
Fourth, the ALJ gave only partial weight to the physical residual functional capacity opinions from Dr. Ratliff that were rendered for Franklin County Job and Family Services for the above reasons and because "determination of who is `disabled' or `unable to work' is an area reserved to the Commissioner." (Tr. 675). That was a correct application of the law. See, e.g., Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App'x 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that treating physician's opinion that plaintiff was "unable to work" was entitled to no deference because that issue was "reserved to the commissioner").
Based upon the above reasons, the Undersigned concludes that the ALJ sufficiently explained why he did not credit Dr. Ratliff's opinions regarding Plaintiff's physical limitations and provided good reasons for doing so.
Dr. Ratliff also completed a Medical Functional Capacity Assessment, which addressed Plaintiff's mental impairments. (Tr. 1178). Dr. Ratliff opined that Plaintiff had moderate to marked limitations in every area except understanding and remembering simple instructions, interacting with the general public, and responding appropriately to supervisors. (Id.). The ALJ gave this opinion little weight because, according to the ALJ, the opinion was based upon a limited examination, was inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, and Dr. Ratliff is not a mental health specialist. (Tr. 676). The ALJ also concluded that the record showed that Plaintiff had no more than moderate mental health symptoms and that her condition was stable when she was appropriately medicated. (Id.).
First, the ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Ratliff is not a mental health specialist. The law makes clear that an "ALJ may discredit the opinion of a physician that is outside her area of expertise." See Adams v. Massanari, 55 F. App'x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2003); Thacker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-5546, 1990 WL 200375, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 1990) (affirming a denial of benefits when there was no evidence that the physician was a specialist in the area of mental impairments). Here, nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Ratliff has specialized mental health training, and the ALJ was permitted to discount his opinion based upon that fact. Second, the ALJ cited to specific clinical findings in order to conclude that Dr. Ratliff's opinion was inconsistent with the evidence. (Tr. 676 (citing Tr. 1920, 1929, 1935, 1985, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2012)). Those records generally show that Plaintiff's mental health was stable when she was compliant with treatment. For example, on February 11, 2015, Plaintiff reported "no mental health issue," and she stated "she [was] doing well." (Tr. 1920). She further reported that her "medication [was] really effective," and that she was "managing to be stable mentally." (Id.) Plaintiff offered similarly positive mental health throughout 2015. (Tr. 1927, 1935, 1985, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2012). Relatedly, the ALJ noted that when Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital due to psychiatric symptoms in early 2016, Plaintiff admitted that she had been off her medications, and she stabilized when she resumed treatment. (Tr. 676). Again, there is record support for this conclusion. (See Tr. 446, 465, 477). In later 2016, when Plaintiff was compliant with treatment, she again reported doing well mentally. (See, e.g., Tr. 1985 (reporting that Plaintiff was compliant with her medication and "seem[s] to be in a stable mental condition")).
Plaintiff cites evidence that arguably could support a different conclusion (Doc. 13 at 15), but that is not what this Court must consider. Instead, this Court asks whether the ALJ's conclusion has support. See Price v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App'x 172, 175-76 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Where the opinion of a treating physician is not supported by objective evidence or is inconsistent with the other medical evidence in the record, this Court generally will uphold an ALJ's decision to discount that opinion."). The Undersigned concludes there is support for the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence, and, consequently, the ALJ did not err.
For the reasons stated, it is
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152-53 (1985).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
