CHELSEY M. VASCURA, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Cleola L. Earley ("Plaintiff"), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (ECF No. 13), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 18), and the administrative record (ECF No. 8). For the reasons that follow, it is
Plaintiff filed her application for Title II Social Security Benefits on June 26, 2015, alleging (after amendment) that she had been disabled since June 26, 2015. (R. 333, 205.) On March 29, 2018, following administrative denials of Plaintiff's application initially and on reconsideration, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Renita Bivins (the "ALJ"). (Id. at 200-232.) Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. Vocational expert Shawna McCullah (the "VE") also appeared and testified at the hearing. On July 5, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 13-26.) On August 24, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision. (R. 1-4.) Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.)
Plaintiff raises a single issue in her Statement of Errors (ECF No. 13): Plaintiff contends reversal is warranted because "[t]he ALJ's mental residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence." (Id. at 6.) Within this contention of error, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to explain why he did not include the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
In his Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 18), the Commissioner counters that the ALJ reasonably weighed the medical opinions and accounted for the limitations she found in Plaintiff's RFC.
On July 5, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. 13-26.) At step one of the sequential evaluation process,
(Id. at 17-18.) The ALJ then relied on the hearing testimony of the VE to conclude that Plaintiff is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. She therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act during the relevant period. (Id. at 26.)
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it `is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."). Under this standard, "substantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must "`take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)).
Nevertheless, "if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, "a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
As set forth above, within Plaintiff's sole contention of error challenging the ALJ's RFC determination, she maintains that the ALJ erred in his consideration of the opinions rendered by Mr. Spindler and Drs. Voyten and Lai. More specifically, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ erred in failing to explain why these sources' opined limitations were omitted from Plaintiff's RFC. The undersigned disagrees and finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of these opinions and that substantial evidence supports her RFC determination.
The determination of RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the Commissioner's RFC finding. Berry v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV000411, 2010 WL 3730983, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2010). ALJs must consider all medical opinions that they receive in evaluating a claimant's case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Further, "[i]f the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *7 (July 2, 1996). However, unlike opinions from treating medical sources, non-treating medical sources are not afforded any particular deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).
In assessing medical opinions, ALJs are required to consider the following factors:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Plaintiff did not submit medical opinions from any treating sources. As set forth above, the medical opinions at issue were drafted by one examining, but non-treating, psychologist (James N. Spindler, M.S., R. 823-29) and two non-examining state agency reviewing psychologists (Karla Voyten, Ph.D., R. 244-47, and Jaime Lai, Psy.D., R. 262-65).
Mr. Spindler diagnosed Plaintiff with an unspecified bipolar disorder, an unspecified depressive disorder, and an unspecified anxiety disorder. (R. 827.) He stated that Plaintiff appeared to be functioning in the average range of intelligence and that she seemed "intellectually capable of understanding, remembering and carrying out instructions in most job settings." (R. 828.) Mr. Spindler noted that Plaintiff "clearly is not motivated to return to work" and that it was "unlikely" that "she would have significant problems in responding appropriately to supervision and co-workers." (Id.) He observed that Plaintiff "did not appear to have any major difficulty focused during [the] interview," but opined that Plaintiff's mental problems would "make it difficult for her to sustain a working pace and to maintain a level of attention and concentration that would be required for most job settings." Finally, Mr. Spindler stated that it was "unlikely" that Plaintiff "would be willing to tolerate even the routine stressors of competitive employment." (R. 828.)
At the initial review level, state agency psychologist Dr. Voyten reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and accorded "great" weight to Mr. Spindler's opinions. (R. 242.) Dr. Voyten opined that Plaintiff had no limitation in her ability to carry out even detailed instructions, that her ability to maintain concentration and pace was moderately limited, and that she "could sustain an ordinary routine but may require occasional redirection in order to stay on task & to maintain an adequate work pace." (R. 245.) She further opined that Plaintiff could only have occasional and superficial contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. Finally, Dr. Voyten opined that Plaintiff's "ability to handle stress and pressure in the workplace would be reduced but adequate to handle the stresses of a routine, repetitive 3-4 step task." (R. 246.)
Dr. Lai, at the reconsideration level, agreed with Dr. Voyten that Plaintiff could "sustain adequate concentration and persistence to complete 3-4 step routine, repetitive tasks," and that Plaintiff "retains the capacity for occasional superficial contact" with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. (R. 263-64.) Dr. Lai added that Plaintiff "may require occasional redirection to task & intermittent checks by supervisor to ensure work standards of qualify and production are being maintained." (R. 263.) Dr. Lai also opined that Plaintiff could "handle the stresses of 3-4 step routine, repetitive tasks in a setting where changes are infrequent and any major changes occur with prior explanation and gradual implementation." (R. 264.) Finally, Dr. Lai observed that Mr. Spindler's opinion "relies heavily on the subjective reports of symptoms and limitations" Plaintiff provided and found that "the totality of the evidence does not support [Mr. Spindler's] opinion," which she further found "is an overestimate of the severity of [Plaintiff's] restrictions/limitations." (R. 266.)
In arriving at Plaintiff's mental RFC, the ALJ discussed each of these opinions. She assigned the opinions of Drs. Voyten and Lai "some weight," pointing out that they are "nonexamining sources." (R. 23.) She likewise assigned Mr. Spindler's opinion "some weight," observing that his opinion "was based on a one-time examination in non-treating context." (Id.) The ALJ added that the opinions were "largely consistent with each other and with other evidence, such as [Plaintiff's] counseling records." (R. 23-24 (citing numerous treatment records reflecting that Plaintiff presented with "varying moods").)
Also in support of her mental RFC finding, the ALJ offered a substantial discussion of Plaintiff's mental health treatment records, a discussion of the significant activities of daily living ("ADLs") Plaintiff endorsed, and a discussion of her observations of Plaintiff during the hearing. For example, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's treatment records from Neurobehavioral Medicine Consultants and points out that in January 2018, Plaintiff complained that her "main problem" was the stress she was under, which Plaintiff attributed to "having to do everything such as shop, give her son a bath and get him dinner along with the rest of the family, clean the house, take care of the bills making sure they are paid on time, give family money and so on." (R. 22 (citing Exhibit 30F at p. 1, R. 2403).) The ALJ also pointed out that Plaintiff's records reflected that she was "not medication or treatment compliant." (R. 22 (citing Exhibit 30F at p. 24, R. 2426 (Feb. 2018 treatment record noting that Plaintiff "reports that she has not been taking [L]amictal . . . [and] that she is not medication or treatment compliant")).) The ALJ further observed that in April 2018, in addition to Plaintiff's other household and childrearing duties, she was caring for her mother, who was living with her and struggling with many health problems. (R. 22 (citing Apr. 2018 treatment record).) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's testimony and record evidence reflecting that she cooks, vacuums, washes dishes, shops, performs laundry activities, watches television programing such as the news and weather channel, uses her cell phone without difficulty, can count change, as well as evidence reflecting that she cares for her children, ages 5 and 15; and also her mother, who lives with her and struggles with many health issues. The ALJ offered the following discussion of his observations of Plaintiff at the hearing:
(R. 20 (internal citations to the record omitted).)
The ALJ also offered a discussion in support of his conclusions that Plaintiff had only moderate limitation in the areas of understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and concentration, persistence, or pace, as well as an explanation of how these limitations were accommodated within the RFC. (R. 16-17; 22-23.)
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned concludes the ALJ's discussion of the record evidence, together with his findings, allow for meaningful review and that substantial evidence supports his mental RFC determination and nondisability finding.
Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unavailing for several reasons. First, although the ALJ found these opinions "largely consistent" with the remainder of the record, consistency is but one factor that must be considered under § 404.1527(c). As the ALJ appropriately noted, non-treating and non-examining sources such as Mr. Spindler and Drs. Voyten Lai are generally given less weight. See Andres v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 733 F. App'x 241, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2018) (the absence of an on-going treatment relationship means "the ALJ is entitled to give less weight to the consultative examiner's opinion") (citing Staymate v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 681 F. App'x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2017)). Further, "ALJs must give `good reasons' only for their weighing of `treating source' opinions." Livingston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 776 F. App'x 897, 899 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff received mental health treatment throughout the claimed period of disability, but did not submit an opinion from any treating source that might have been entitled to greater deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).
Second, the ALJ's mental RFC is quite restrictive and largely consistent with and accounts for much of the limitations Mr. Spindler and Drs. Voyten, and Lai suggest. For example, the RFC the ALJ assessed accounts for Drs. Voyten's and Lai's opinions that Plaintiff retains the capacity for occasional superficial contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors (R. 246, 264), by limiting Plaintiff to "occasional superficial interaction with the public and co-workers" and further limiting her to "working with things rather than people," (R. 18).
Third, the ALJ provided a sufficient explanation for why she was not persuaded by Mr. Spindler's or Drs. Voyten's and Lai's opinions to include more severe mental restrictions. As discussed above, the ALJ considered treatment notes from Plaintiff's treating mental health professionals in which Plaintiff endorsed significant environmental stressors such as caring for her young children and mother in addition to her significant household duties and further acknowledged that she was "not medication or treatment compliant." (R. 22 (citing Exhibit 30F at p. 24, R. 2426 (Feb. 2018 treatment record noting that Plaintiff "reports that she has not been taking [L]amictal . . . [and] that she is not medication or treatment compliant")).) Cf. Sias v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 861 F.2d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 1988) (discounting the claimant's allegations where he failed to follow prescribed treatment). The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff's significant ADLs and offered her observations of Plaintiff during the hearing.
Finally, many of the limitations Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have adopted are not definitive limitations; that is, the source used equivocal and ambiguous language. Mr. Spindler's opinions that "it seems unlikely that [Plaintiff] would be willing
In summary, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of the at-issue opinions and that substantial evidence supports her mental RFC determination.
In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision denying benefits. For the foregoing reasons, it is
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
