OPINION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS, Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58), Defendant's Opposition (ECF No. 61), and Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 62). The Court also considers Plaintiff's Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena (ECF No. 63) and Defendant's Response in Opposition (ECF No. 64).1 For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) and Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena (ECF No. 63) are DENIED.

I.

A. Factual Allegations

On April 15, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff Aaron E. Young, a state inmate proceeding without the assistance of counsel, leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. (ECF No. 4.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Nicholas Hooks, a corrections officer, violated Plaintiff's rights under the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution when Defendant conducted a search of Plaintiff's cell. (ECF No. 9 (the "Amended Complaint" or "Am. Compl.").) Plaintiff specifically alleges as follows:

(Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 5-20.) Plaintiff, a Muslim who is required to wear prayer oil during five daily prayers, alleges that Defendant used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment when kicking Plaintiff in the ankles and that Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment by pouring out his prayer oil. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.)

B. Procedural History

After this Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims (ECF No. 25), Plaintiff appealed. (ECF Nos. 27, 33.) On September 5, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's free exercise claim but vacated its dismissal of Plaintiff's excessive force claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. (ECF No. 35 (concluding that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that Defendant substantially burdened his religious beliefs because Plaintiff alleged Defendant poured out his prayer oil on only a single occasion).) Following remand, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's excessive force claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 38), which this Court denied. (ECF Nos. 54, 55.)

Thereafter, the Court issued a case schedule, requiring, inter alia, that all discovery be completed by January 16, 2020, and that dispositive motions be filed by April 16, 2020. (ECF No. 57.) On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 58), which Defendant opposes (ECF No. 61), and Plaintiff has filed a Reply (ECF No. 62). On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena (ECF No. 63), which Defendant opposes (ECF No. 64). Plaintiff did not file a reply memorandum. These matters are now ripe for resolution.

II.

"District courts have broad discretion over docket control and the discovery process." Pittman v. Experian Info. Sol., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 642 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). "`It is well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993)). "`The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad.'" Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) identifies the acceptable scope of discovery:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) ("An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b)."), 34(a) ("A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b)[.]"). In short, "a plaintiff should have access to information necessary to establish her claim, but [] a plaintiff may not be permitted to `go fishing'; the trial court retains discretion." Anwar v. Dow Chem. Co., 876 F.3d 841, 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Superior Prod. P'ship v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co., Ltd., 784 F.3d 311, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2015) ("In sum, `[a]lthough a plaintiff should not be denied access to information necessary to establish her claim, neither may a plaintiff be permitted to `go fishing' and a trial court retains discretion to determine that a discovery request is too broad and oppressive.'" (quoting Surles ex rel. Johnson, 474 F.3d at 305)).

"[T]he movant bears the initial burden of showing that the information is sought is relevant." Prado v. Thomas, No. 3:16-cv-306, 2017 WL 5151377, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2017) (citing Gruenbaum v. Werner, 270 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D. Ohio 2010)). If the movant makes this showing, "then the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that to produce the information would be unduly burdensome." Id. (citing O'Malley v. NaphCare, Inc., 311 F.R.D. 461, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2015)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (stating that a party claiming undue burden or expense "ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the only information—with respect to that part of the determination" and that a "party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party understands them").

Finally, a party moving for an order compelling discovery must "include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); see also S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.1 ("[M]otions. . . relating to discovery shall not be filed in this Court. . . unless the parties have first exhausted among themselves all extrajudicial means for resolving the differences."). Here, Plaintiff includes a certification, representing that he attempted to confer with Defendant's counsel prior to filing the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 259 (referring to Exhibit 5 (copy of correspondence), attached thereto at PAGEID #284).) The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff satisfies this prerequisite.

III.

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling discovery from Defendant. (ECF No. 58.) In response, Defendant first argues that this Court should deny the Motion to Compel because Plaintiff does not state what remedy he seeks and, therefore, has violated Civil Local Rule 7.2(a)(1) by failing to adequately support the grounds for his Motion. (ECF No. 61 at 1-2.) Construing Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 58) and Reply (ECF No. 62) liberally, see Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)), the Court understands that Plaintiff seeks an order compelling supplemental responses to several interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Considering this standard and based on the present record, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion is sufficiently supported. Defendant's argument to deny the Motion to Compel on this basis is therefore not well taken.

The Court now considers in turn each disputed discovery request that Plaintiff identifies in his Motion to Compel.

A. Interrogatory Nos. 3, 4, and 5

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 3, 4, and 5 seek information related to Defendant's knowledge of and access to ODRC's policies. Specifically, these interrogatories and Defendant's answers are as follow:

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID ## 263-64 (emphasis in the original).)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's responses are evasive and that Defendant should have responded with "a simple `Yes' or `No.'" (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 258; ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 296.) Plaintiff argues that the requested information is relevant "to determine whether or not [Defendant] Hooks knew ODRC's Policies prior to using the excessive force" on Plaintiff and that the requested information "may lead to potential information favorable to" Plaintiff's case. (Id.)

Plaintiff's arguments are not well taken. The Court finds Defendant's answers as presently formulated sufficiently responsive. Accordingly, as it relates to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 3, 4, and 5, the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) is DENIED.

B. Interrogatory No. 6

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories No. 6 and Defendant's answer are as follow:

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 264 (emphasis in the original).)

Plaintiff contends that this information "is relevant to determine whether or not [Defendant] Hooks and ODRC intentionally destroyed evidence by not complying with ODRC record retention schedule. Hooks has already stated that the video footage of the incident no longer exist[s]." (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 258; ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 296.) While Defendant responded that he is not the party responsible for records retention, he later represented to the Court in his response to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena that he obtained and sent a copy of the records retention policy to Plaintiff on December 20, 2019. (ECF No. 64 at 1.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply memorandum addressing this matter. Therefore, based on the present record, this matter appears resolved. Accordingly, as it relates to Interrogatory No. 6, the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) and Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena (ECF No. 63) are DENIED AS MOOT.

C. Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8 seek information related to Defendant's training. Specifically, these interrogatories and Defendant's answers are as follow:

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID ## 264-65 (emphasis in the original).)

Plaintiff contends that these answers are evasive and that the interrogatories "are relevant to determine whether or not [Defendant] Hooks was trained to kick an inmate who he had full control of while frisking the inmate, or was Hooks acting outside of his job scope." (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 259; ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 297.) Plaintiff further argues that the requested information "may lead to potential information favorable" to his case. (Id.)

Plaintiff's arguments are not well taken. The Court finds Defendant's answers as presently formulated sufficiently responsive. Accordingly, as it relates to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8, the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) is DENIED.

D. Interrogatory No. 10 and Request for Production ("RFP") No. 1

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories No. 10 and RFP No. 1 seek information related to Defendant's discipline, if any, while employed at ODRC. Specifically, these interrogatories and Defendant's answers are as follow:

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 266 (emphasis in the original).)

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 272 (emphasis in the original).)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's responses are misleading because the requested information is not confidential and is a public record. (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 259; ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 297.) Plaintiff further argues that this information "is relevant to determine whether or not [Defendant] Hooks has exhibited similar behavior of abusing his powers" and the information "may lead to potential information favorable to Young." (Id.)

Plaintiff's arguments are not well taken. The Court is not persuaded that this overbroad request is relevant to whether Defendant used excessive force in the particular incident at issue in this case involving Plaintiff. See Brooks v. Yates, No. 1:09-cv-922, 2011 WL 6257684, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2011) (sustaining correction officers objection to inmate's request for production of officer's disciplinary records on grounds of relevancy and overbreadth where inmate sought records to demonstrate that the officers had a history of violent acts). While Plaintiff speculates that the requested information "may lead to potential information favorable to Young[,]" (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 259 (emphasis added); ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 297 (emphasis added), Plaintiff is not permitted to "go fishing[.]" Anwar, 876 F.3d at 854. Finally, even if the requested information had some relevance, Plaintiff has not persuaded this Court that this degree of relevance outweighs the security concerns triggered in the production of such records in this case. See Perry v. Rousseau, No. 18-cv-12914, 2019 WL 3561920, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2019) (denying prisoner plaintiff's motion to compel where the defendants' disciplinary records "could contain information not within the general knowledge of the prison population, such as specific prison policies or protocols violated by an employee, the disclosure of which could undermine the security of the prisons" and "could also contain information about Defendants that could make them vulnerable to prisoner threats or manipulation. Plaintiffs' [sic] general assertion of relevance does not outweigh the security and safety concerns associated with production of Defendants' disciplinary records"). Accordingly, as it relates to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories No. 10 and RFP No. 1, the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) is DENIED.

E. RFP No. 5

Plaintiff's RFP No. 5 and Defendant's response are as follow:

(ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 273 (emphasis in the original).)

Plaintiff contends that this information is readily available to Defendant and should be produced. (ECF No. 58 at PAGEID # 258-59; ECF No. 62 at PAGEID # 296-97.) The Court disagrees. Defendant has represented that no video of the allege incident exists. The Court cannot compel Defendant to produce something that does not exist. See Miller v. Experian Info. Sol., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-90, 2014 WL 5513477, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2014) (collecting cases establishing that "[p]arties have no duty to create documents simply to comply with another party's discovery request."); see also Brown v. Warden Ross Corr. Inst., No. 2:10-cv-822, 2011 WL 1877706, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2011) ("Defendants have represented that they do not have the information Plaintiff seeks. The Court cannot require them to produce what they do not have."). Accordingly, as it relates to RFP No. 5, the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) is DENIED.

IV.

For all these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 58) is DENIED consistent with the foregoing and Motion for the Court to Direct the United States Marshal to Serve Subpoena (ECF No. 63) is DENIED AS MOOT.

Considering the procedural history and current posture of this Court, the undersigned finds that this case would benefit from Court-facilitated mediation. The Court will issue a separate order addressing such mediation, including the appointment of a pro bono attorney to represent Plaintiff for the limited purpose of representing Plaintiff in settlement negotiations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.