KIMBERLY A. JOLSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Kenneth Charles O'Neil, filed this action seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI. The parties in this matter consented to the Undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 9, 10). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. 14) is
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on August 17, 2012 under Title XVI, alleging disability beginning on November 1, 2007. (Doc. 13, Tr. 174-79). His application was denied initially and again on reconsideration, and after a hearing held on August 12, 2014 (Tr. 50-72), Administrative Law Judge Edmund E. Giorgione (the "ALJ") issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 536-58). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review making the ALJ's decision the final decision for purposes of judicial review. (Tr. 530-35). Plaintiff then filed a case in this Court. (See O'Neil v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2:16-cv-117 (S.D. Ohio)). On August 17, 2016, the case was remanded to the Commissioner. (Tr. 519-23, 524-29).
Another hearing was held before ALJ Jeffrey Hartranft on August 21, 2017. (Tr. 496-518). On September 6, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 473-95). Again, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court. (See O'Neil v. Comm'r of Social Security, 2:17-cv-978 (S.D. Ohio)). That case was also remanded to the Commissioner. (Tr. 830-39). Another hearing was held before ALJ Hartranft on February 12, 2019. (Tr. 803-24). On May 7, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 776-802). That decision became the final decision for purposes of judicial review.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 9, 2019 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the administrative record on September 19, 2019 (Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors (Doc. 14), the Commissioner responded (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 17).
Plaintiff's statement of errors concerns his alleged mental impairments. The ALJ helpfully summarized the relevant evidence:
(Tr. 788-90).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: borderline intellectual functioning; mood disorder; depressive disorder; personality disorder; and an anxiety disorder. (Tr. 783). The ALJ held, however, that there was no medical opinion of record to indicate the existence of an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled in severity the level of the Listings of Impairments. (Tr. 784).
In formulating Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ considered multiple medical source opinions:
(Tr. 790-91).
After reviewing the medical record and opinion evidence, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's RFC, concluding that:
(Tr. 787). He further found that:
(Tr. 792).
The ALJ, therefore, concluded that "[t]he claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a car mechanic helper. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 416.965)." (Id.). He also found that "there are other jobs existing in the national economy that he is also able to perform," including laundry worker and packer. (Tr. 793-94).
The Court's review "is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards." Winn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App'x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
"After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ's decision, the determination of the council becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court." Olive v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, "even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC analysis is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 14 at 14-19). Specifically, he argues that the ALJ "failed to weigh the opinion evidence in accordance with the appropriate legal standards," challenging the ALJ's consideration of the opinions of Drs. Lewin, Terry, and Sisson. (Id.).
A plaintiff's RFC "is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and mental limitations resulting from her impairments." Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App'x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The Social Security regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit precedent provide that the ALJ is charged with the final responsibility in determining a claimant's residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding the residual functional capacity "is reserved to the Commissioner"). In doing so, the ALJ is charged with evaluating several factors when determining the RFC, including the medical evidence (not limited to medical opinion testimony), and the claimant's testimony. Henderson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-cv-2080, 2010 WL 750222, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Webb v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004)). Ultimately, it is the ALJ who resolves conflicts in the medical evidence. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984).
"The Social Security Administration defines three types of medical sources: non-examining sources, non-treating (but examining) sources, and treating sources." Reeves v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App'x 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). When the opinion comes from a non-treating or non-examining source, it is usually not entitled to controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Rather, the ALJ should consider relevant factors, including supportability, consistency, and specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). There is however, no "reasons-giving requirement" for non-treating source opinions. Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App'x 255, 259 (6th Cir. 2016). Instead, the ALJ must provide only "a meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to particular medical source opinions." Mason v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18 CV 1737, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019) (citing SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2).
The ALJ did not err in his analysis of Dr. Terry's opinion. Relevant here, Dr. Terry opined that Plaintiff "will perform optimally in a more solitary setting, where tasks do not require direct collaborative efforts with others for task completion and he is not required to interact with the general public." (Tr. 120). Continuing, she stated that Plaintiff "should not be required to have constant direct over-the-shoulder supervision and correction/criticism needs to be presented in a constructive manner." (Id.).
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Terry's opinions were "generally consistent with the evidence" and limited Plaintiff "to no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers or supervisors." (Tr. 790). He applied this limitation despite finding that "the evidence shows that the claimant was most often cooperative with others and had no noted difficulties with providers or performing a range of activities including attending a concert." (Id.).
Addressing Dr. Terry's opinion that Plaintiff "should not be required to have constant direct over-the-shoulder supervision and correction/criticism needs to be presented in a constructive manner," the ALJ stated that he "did not fully adopt these limitations," but found that "based upon the evidence as a whole," limiting Plaintiff to "not work[ing] in tandem and... only occasional interaction with supervisors" addressed those concerns. (Id.). The ALJ confirmed that the jobs that Plaintiff could perform would not require "over the shoulder supervision" and emphasized that the record did support the limitation that "correction or criticism need[ed] to be presented in a constructive manner." (Id.). In contrast, he emphasized, Plaintiff "has often been cooperative with his treating providers, and he has never been fired or let go from a job because of difficulties interacting with his supervisors or coworkers." (Id.).
In the Court's view, the ALJ provided a meaningful explanation for the weight assigned to Dr. Terry's opinion. He noted that Dr. Terry's proposed limitation regarding constructive criticism was not supported by the record and stressed that the record demonstrated consistently that Plaintiff was cooperative with others. (See id.). The Regulations do not require more. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Plaintiff, nonetheless, argues that the ALJ ignored key evidence supporting Dr. Terry's opinion that he needed correction or criticism to be given in a constructive manner. (Doc. 14 at 15-16). There is no dispute that the record contains some evidence of Plaintiff's interpersonal difficulties. (See id.). But the relevant question is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion, and, on the record before the Court, (see Tr. 788-90), there is no question that it does. In other words, "[e]ven if it is true that the record contains some evidence that may support Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion." Bryan v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-CV-554, 2019 WL 2021156, at *7 (S.D. Ohio May 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-CV-554, 2019 WL 2912089 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2019) (citation and quotations omitted). "Rather, it is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and that is exactly what the ALJ did here." Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Because the ALJ considered the relevant regulatory factors and provided a meaningful explanation in analyzing Dr. Terry's opinion, he did not err.
Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in his analysis of Dr. Lewin's opinion evidence is similarly unpersuasive. Relevant here, after an earlier decision, the Appeals Council remanded to the ALJ with instructions to explain whether he was adopting Dr. Lewin's opinion that Plaintiff should be limited to 1-2 step tasks. (Tr. 790-91). The ALJ found "that the record as a whole" did not support that limitation; instead, he concluded, it supported limiting Plaintiff "to simple, routine, repetitive tasks with only simple work related decisions and few, if any, workplace changes." (Tr. 791). In support of this conclusion, the ALJ cited evidence that Plaintiff had "intact memory, attention, and concentration" and had "previously been employed as a car mechanic." (Id.). Relying on Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff "did not have difficulty performing the work or learning the job required of him, but instead was let go after a mistake caused damage to a car." (Id.).
Given the low bar for evaluating the opinion of non-treating sources, the ALJ did not err here. He cited the medical record and Plaintiff's work history to support his conclusion that Dr. Lewin's opinion limiting Plaintiff to 1-2 step tasks was not supported by the record. And in doing so, the ALJ satisfied the requirement that he provide a "meaningful explanation," Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7 (citing SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2), regarding the weight given to Dr. Lewin's opinion.
Plaintiff disagrees and cites numerous pieces of evidence that he believes support Dr. Lewin's proposed limitation. (Doc. 14 at 18). But again, it is the ALJ's job to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and so long as his analysis is supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not reverse his decision. See Bryan, 2019 WL 2021156, at *7. Because that is the case here, the Court finds no error in the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Lewin's opinion.
Plaintiff's argument regarding the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Sisson's opinion fares no better. The ALJ gave "partial weight" to the opinion of Dr. Sisson. (Tr. 791). On the one hand, he noted, Dr. Sisson's opinion that Plaintiff "would be limited to simple work tasks, low stress work, and would work at a slower pace" was generally consistent with Plaintiff's intelligence testing and borderline intellectual functioning. (Id.). On the other hand, the ALJ observed, Dr. Sisson's opinion that Plaintiff "would require supervision, checks for understanding, and redirection of tasks" was not accepted because "the totality of the evidence, including minimal mental impairments on assessment and the claimant's prior work history d[id] not support the extent of these limitations." (Id.). Indeed, "[o]n testing throughout the record, [Plaintiff] was found to have no deficits in memory, attention or concentration." (Id.).
Again, the Court finds no error in the ALJ's analysis. He explained that the medical record and Plaintiff's work history demonstrated that Plaintiff was not as limited as Dr. Sisson concluded. And while Plaintiff has cited evidence supporting Dr. Sisson's conclusion, (see Doc. 14 at 16-17), that conflicting evidence does not compel a finding of error here, see Bryan, 2019 WL 2021156, at *7.
For each of the three doctors above, Plaintiff generally argues that "[t]he ALJ rejected the limitations contained" in their opinions "without providing adequate reasons for doing so." (Doc. 14 at 17). He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ ignored evidence in assessing his RFC. (Id. (citing Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.Supp.2d 875, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2011)). A review of the ALJ's decision suggests otherwise, (see Tr. 788-91), and, in any event, "an ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered." Dykes ex rel. Brymer v. Barnhart, 112 F. App'x 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2004). Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by "reject[ing] the medical opinions and independently craft[ing] an RFC in contradiction of those opinions." (Doc. 14 at 17 (collecting cases)). But, as demonstrated above, the ALJ complied with the applicable regulations in analyzing the relevant opinion evidence, and there is no basis for the Court to order a remand here.
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. 14) is
IT IS SO ORDERED.
