RONALD A. WHITE, District Judge.
Before the court is the motion to dismiss of defendant. Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. He alleges the violation was carried out by means of a conspiracy between defendant (a McAlester, Oklahoma police officer) and "Lyles [McAlester police chief], the City and Miller [Assistant District Attorney]." (Complaint, ¶20). Plaintiff alleges that the "improper police actions" against him began after he complained about a ticket that defendant issued to plaintiff's wife and after he complained regarding defendant's "disrespectful treatment of [plaintiff's] family."
Under Rule 12(b)(6) F.R.Cv.P., the court assumes the truth of plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to him. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10
"To state a claim for relief under §1983, `a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'" Buchanan v. Oklahoma, 398 Fed.Appx. 339 (10
Still more specifically, allegations of conspiracy may form the basis of a §1983 claim. Kennedy v. Smith, 259 Fed.Appx. 150, 154 (10
Yet further, defendant has also asserted the doctrine of qualified immunity in his motion. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the court considers (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10
The court now addresses the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry in conjunction with the general Rule 12(b)(6) standard. The court concludes plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. First, plaintiff may only state a claim under §1983 to the extent defendant was acting under color of state law. The complaint, however, says during pertinent allegations that defendant acted "both as a civilian and implicating his police powers" (Complaint, ¶10), "both personally and as a law enforcement officer (¶11) and he "may have each been acting as a private citizen, while at other times described herein, he may have acting in his law enforcement capacities." (¶24). While a defendant's conduct as a private citizen, might give rise to some other claim under federal or state law, it does not give rise to a §1983 claim. The complaint is fatally vague on this point.
Next, while alleging a conspiracy, plaintiff has not alleged specific facts showing an agreement and concerted actions among defendant and others. Allegations are made as to conduct by the police chief and an assistant district attorney, but there is no indication that such conduct was in concert with defendant (as opposed to merely parallel) and no factual allegation that this conduct was motivated by First Amendment retaliation.
As to allegations against defendant himself, incidents are related which (taken as true) demonstrate unpleasant conduct by defendant toward plaintiff and his family. Again, however, there is no indication other than surmise that this conduct was motivated by plaintiff's protected conduct under the First Amendment. It is just as likely that some sort of personal animus was the motivation. For example, one section of the complaint (¶11) relates that defendant was angry because he believed defendant's wife had taken pictures of defendant's daughter at a dance. This may seem an odd thing about which to become angry, but it has no evident bearing upon retaliation for protected speech, as alleged in the complaint.
In the Rule 12(b)(6) context, plausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in the complaint; if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiff has not nudged his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10
It is the order of the court that the motion to dismiss (#9) is hereby granted.