KIMBERLY E. WEST, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Charlotte Mendez (the "Claimant") requests judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying Claimant's application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ incorrectly determined that Claimant was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, it is the finding of this Court that the Commissioner's decision should be and is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to Defendant for further proceedings.
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . ." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's determination is limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's review is limited to two inquiries: first, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and, second, whether the correct legal standards were applied.
Claimant was 52 years old at the time of the ALJ's latest decision. Claimant completed her high school education and one year of college. Claimant has worked in the past as a collections clerk, corrections officer, home attendant, appointment clerk, poultry hanger, bandsaw operator, and machine packager. Claimant alleges an inability to work beginning November 1, 2009 due to limitations resulting from degenerative disc disease, chronic back pain, arthritis, migraines, fibromyalgia, high blood pressure, diabetes, depression, and anxiety.
On October 11, 2011, Claimant protectively filed for disability insurance benefits under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.) of the Social Security Act. On September 13, 2011, Claimant filed an application for supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI (42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.) of the Social Security Act. Claimant's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. On February 7, 2013, an administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Doug Gabbard, II in McAlester, Oklahoma. By decision dated May 10, 2013, the ALJ denied Claimant's requests for benefits. The Appeals Council reversed and remanded the decision on June 11, 2014.
On remand, the ALJ conducted a second administrative hearing on November 20, 2014 in McAlester, Oklahoma. He issued a second unfavorable decision on January 8, 2015. The Appeals Council denied review on March 15, 2016. As a result, the decision of the ALJ represents the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of further appeal. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. He determined that while Claimant suffered from severe impairments, she did not meet a listing and retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with limitations.
Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in rejecting the opinion of her treatment provider that Claimant must use a cane to ambulate.
In his decision, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the severe impairments of minimal degenerative disc disease of the spine, left knee medial meniscus tear status post surgical repair, diabetes mellitus, and obesity. (Tr. 13). The ALJ determined Claimant retained the RFC to perform light work except that she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. She could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She could not reach overhead bilaterally. According to the ALJ, Claimant must be allowed to alternately sit and stand every 15 to 20 minutes throughout the workday for the purpose of changing positions without leaving the workstation. (Tr. 22).
After consultation with a vocational expert, the ALJ found Claimant could perform the representative jobs of arcade attendant, and small product assembler, both of which he found existed in sufficient numbers in the regional and national economies. (Tr. 29). As a result, the ALJ determined Claimant was not disabled from November 1, 2009 through the date of the decision.
Claimant contends the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of Claimant's medical treatment provider that she must have a cane to ambulate. On July 20, 2012, Tonya J. Boles, a certified physician's assistant, examined Claimant. She noted Claimant's xray showed arthritis in the right knee and Claimant complained of the knee buckling. (Tr. 569). Ms. Boles found Claimant's right knee to be tender to palpation. Among her assessments, Ms. Boles diagnosed Claimant with right knee buckling and osteoarthritis. (Tr. 570). Ms. Boles directed Claimant to begin using a cane as directed.
The ALJ discussed Ms. Boles treatment and assessments in his decision. (Tr. 15). He recognized Ms. Boles recommended the use of a cane due to buckling and tenderness.
A physician's assistant is not an "acceptable medical sources," as that term is defined by the regulations. Physician's assistants fall within the category of "other sources" and are deemed to be "medical sources" who are not "acceptable medical sources." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(1); 416.913(d)(1). The formulation of Soc. Sec. R. 06-3p was intended as a clarification of existing regulations. This ruling states, in pertinent part:
In order to effectuate this express policy, the ALJ should discuss these "other sources" and fully explain the weight given to any such opinion.
The decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were not applied. Therefore, this Court finds, in accordance with the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ruling of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration should be and is