EDMONDSON, J.

¶ 1 The issues before us are: (1) Does a District Court in a guardianship proceeding have jurisdiction to approve a contingent fee agreement made by a guardian on behalf of a ward; (2) May a court in a guardianship proceeding decline to approve a contingent fee agreement for payment of a lawyer's services provided to the ward merely because payments pursuant to that agreement were made prior to court approval being sought; and (3) May a court in an open and continuing guardianship proceeding deny a motion to approve a contingent fee contract merely because of the length of time between creation of the contract and seeking court approval. We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second two in the negative.

¶ 2 Tracy Stanfield was injured in 1992. A settlement relating to his injuries resulted in an annuity providing periodic payments to Stanfield from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). In 1996, Stanfield assigned certain annuity payments, and the assignee in turn assigned them to J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership (Wentworth). In 1998, Stanfield caused MetLife to ignore the assignments to Wentworth.

¶ 3 Wentworth responded by filing an action in a Pennsylvania state court, and in May 1998 obtained a judgment against Stanfield for $572,747.05. Wentworth then filed a motion for a judgment against garnishee MetLife for the same amount. The Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, granted the motion in September 1998.

¶ 4 Stanfield's mother, Mildred Stanfield, filed a petition in the District Court of Seminole County, Oklahoma, to be appointed guardian of her son's estate. She was appointed guardian in March 1999. In March 2001, MetLife filed an interpleader action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and named as defendants Wentworth and Mildred Stanfield in her capacity as guardian of her son's estate. Mildred Stanfield asked Loyde Warren to accept service of process on her behalf, and he agreed. The judge in the federal case ordered a settlement conference. In May 2001, Stanfield signed Warren's contingency fee agreement that provided a legal fee of 33% of the gross recovery after legal costs were deducted, and if a hearing or trial was necessary, a fee of 40% of the gross recovery after legal costs were deducted.1

¶ 5 Warren engaged local counsel in Pennsylvania.2 That lawyer filed an answer in the federal case. At the settlement conference the parties agreed that Wentworth's judgment for $572,747.05 would be withdrawn; payment of $154,279.73 would be paid from Stanfield's annuity payments to Wentworth; the annuity assignment was rescinded; and future annuity payments from MetLife to Stanfield, as guardian, would be made payable in care of Warren. In September 2001, a consent order and settlement agreement was filed in the federal case. In 2005, Stanfield (or Guardian) obtained new counsel. Appellate briefs by both parties agree that in the District Court of Oklahoma County an action was filed against Warren relating to his representation of the ward;3 however, none of the filings in that case are part of the certified appellate record before us.4

¶ 6 In 2009, Warren filed a motion in the open and continuing guardianship case before the District Court of Seminole County for court approval of both the 2001 contract for legal representation and the payment of legal fees made pursuant to that contract. Guardian objected and argued that: (1) A contingency fee for successfully defending a client from a judgment was improper, and Warren's motion in this case was similar to a lawyer obtaining a contingency fee for successfully defending a client in a residential mortgage foreclosure proceeding and requesting 40% of the residence as a fee; (2) Guardian had been paying Warren based upon an hourly billing method, and Warren had improperly induced Guardian to sign the contingency fee agreement; (3) The fee agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the guardianship court; and (4) The motion should be denied because of breach of contract, fraud, breach of a fiduciary duty, and negligence.

¶ 7 The District Court stated, "Because the application was not filed prior to payment of the fee and was not filed until nearly eight years after the contract was executed, the Court DENIES the Application." Warren appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the District Court that Warren's request for approval of attorney fees was properly denied. The appellate court also stated that Warren could be entitled to legal fees if he showed that his services were necessary for the protection of the Ward's estate, the services were beneficial to the estate, and that the amount sought was reasonable, reflecting the trial court's statement in its order that Warren was entitled to "reasonable compensation."

¶ 8 Warren petitioned for certiorari, which we granted.5 Warren argues that a contingent fee agreement may be approved by the probate court after payment of the fee. He states that the contingent fee contract would have been approved by a court in 2001, and so a court should approve it now. He argues that the particular circumstances of his employment should be considered to create an exception to statutory language requiring court approval prior to payment. He also argues that 30 O.S. § 4-403(D) "exempts contingency fee contracts from the Guardianship Act," and that court approval is not required as a condition to enforce the fee agreement.

¶ 9 In a guardianship proceeding the procedure for payment of compensation to attorneys, guardians ad litem, and persons conducting evaluations is provided by a statute, 30 O.S.2001 § 4-403, which states:

¶ 10 Warren argues that § 4-403(D) exempts contingent fee contracts from the provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act (Guardianship Act), and that his particular fee agreement is a contingent fee contract not subject to the Act. The essence of this argument is that either (1) there exists an interdocket remedial boundary prohibiting court approval of a contingent fee contract within the procedural framework of a guardianship,6 or (2) that paragraph "D" must be read as a prohibition for court approval of such contracts in any type of proceeding. Because the parties frame one issue in terms whether a contingent fee contract is subject to the authority and jurisdiction of a guardianship court, we address the first issue in that context.

I. Jurisdiction of a Guardianship Court to Approve a Contingent Fee Agreement Involving the Interests of a Ward

¶ 11 When determining the meaning of an unambiguous statute, the ordinary rules of grammar must be applied unless they lead to an absurd result.7 The plain grammatical meaning of the phrase "[c]ontingent fees and contracts for recovery of property agreed upon and approved by courts" is that contingent fees and contracts for the recovery of property are agreements that must be approved by a court (or the ranking official representing the Secretary of the Interior in Oklahoma, who has supervision of any restricted Indian tribe) as a condition for such agreements to not come within the substantive and procedural provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. The opinions of this Court that predate the creation of § 4-403 combined with more recent opinions support this conclusion.

¶ 12 Language in § 4-403 was different when it was enacted in 1924. The 1924 version of the statute expressly stated amounts for the maximum attorney's fees to be paid from a ward's estate based upon the size of the estate. Further, it provided specific exceptions for deviating from those stated amounts: payment of fees for court proceedings and litigation, contingent fee contracts, and contracts for recovery of property. The 1924 statute, like the current version, provided for court approval, or approval by the Secretary of the Interior, or the representative for the Secretary when contingent fee agreements or contracts for recovery of property were involved.8

¶ 13 Prior to the 1924 enactment of language which became current § 4-403(D), our opinions explained that: (1) A guardian had a duty to employ counsel to recover property of the ward held by another;9 (2) A guardian's payment of an attorney's fee from the property of a ward could be successfully challenged and disallowed at the time of the final accounting when court approval of the fee had not been previously obtained or the services were not beneficial to the estate;10 (3) A guardian's payment of an attorney's fee from the property of a ward could not be successfully challenged at the time of the final accounting if court approval of the fee had been previously obtained from the court in a non-ex parte procedure;11 (4) An action at law could not be maintained against a minor by an attorney to recover fees for legal services rendered the estate of the minor without specific authorization of the probate court prior to the rendition of such services, or by an express allowance therefor by the court after the same were rendered;12 (5) A guardian's payment of an attorney's fee without approval of the court could result in a surcharge against the account of the guardian;13 (6) At the hearing on a final report and accounting the amount to be paid a lawyer for legal services could be completely disallowed although granted by a previous ex parte order, and a legal fee for court-authorized legal services could be reduced to a reasonable amount;14 and (7) We followed the general principle that the only statutory authority of the guardian for incurring liabilities against the estate of the ward was that incident to maintenance, support, and education of the ward, and a guardian had no power to bind the estate of the ward "in any manner or to create a lien thereon without specific authority from the county court so to do."15 In Mason v. Ford, 1924 OK 504, 102 Okla. 257, 226 P. 346, the Court stated that a special order of a guardianship court ordering the payment of an attorney's fee was not subject to attack in a final settlement of the ward's estate. In 1935, the Court explained that this principle in Mason and similar opinions was based upon the lawyer providing services to the ward, and not the guardian, and in such circumstances where the guardian could represent the minor at the hearing on the claim for such services without the guardian's interest conflicting with that of the ward.16 These opinions show that while we recognized the importance of contingent fee agreements for some minors and required court approval of these contracts, prior to the 1924 statute we also allowed a re-examination of a contingent fee contract at the time of the final report and accounting in the guardianship proceeding if certain circumstances were present.

¶ 14 In the 1947 opinion, Emery v. Goff, 1947 OK 93, 198 Okla. 534, 180 P.2d 175, we adjudicated a controversy that involved a contract for a contingent attorney's fee approved by a court in a guardianship proceeding.17 Although approval by the guardianship court therein occurred slightly prior to the enactment of the 1924 statute,18 we relied upon the 1941 version of the 1924 statutory language to explain the power of a guardian to bind the ward or the ward's estate concerning "contingent fees or contracts for recovery of property agreed upon and approved by courts."19 We also relied upon several opinions that predated the 1924 statute, and we explained that in those opinions a contingent fee agreement made for the benefit of the ward and approved by a court was enforceable against the estate of the ward.20 We did not construe the statute as barring a court from approving a contingent fee contract in a guardianship proceeding. A similar result occurred three years later in an appeal that challenged an order on a final account rendered in a guardianship of an incompetent. We explained that the prior order approving the contingency fee contract could not be vacated by the guardianship court on hearing a final account, but the correctness of the amount paid pursuant to that contract could be challenged.21 In 1980 we addressed the power of a trial court to determine an attorney's fee where children were involved; we relied upon an opinion predating the 1924 statute; and we stated the "well-settled" principle of law that a guardian cannot make a contract which will bind the person or estate of the ward, unless authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction.22

¶ 15 Statutory guardianship proceedings are regulated by statute.23 The 1924 statute shows no language indicating any effort to regulate a lawyer's contingent fee contract. However, the 1924 enactment does mention contingent fee contracts in the context that they were approved by courts and not subject to "this Act." The "this Act" language in the 1924 statute refers to that specific enactment, i.e., 1923-24 Okla. Sess. Laws. Ch. 84 §§ 1-8, inclusive. The 1924 enactment involved the disqualification of guardians; how money belonging to the estate was to be invested; a definition of incompetency; and compensation for auditors, guardians, and lawyers. Nothing in the 1924 enactment removed the guardianship jurisdiction of a County Court to approve a contingent fee contract made for the benefit of a ward. It was not until 1990 that the phrase "do not come within the provisions of this Act" was amended to read "do not come within the provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act."24 The 1990 amendment which stated that contingent fees "do not come within the provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act" also stated that these fees are approved by courts. In summary, a contingent fee agreement is not subject to the Guardianship Act, but a court must still approve the agreement.

¶ 16 The requirement and practice of a County Court approving a lawyer's contingent fee contract continued in guardianship proceedings after the 1924 enactment, and the order of a County Court approving such a contract was deemed to be a final order not subject to collateral attack in that court.25 Court approval of a contingent fee contract by a County Court in a guardianship was not based upon an express statute or an inherent equitable power, but from power directly conferred by a former provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. In Evans v. Harris,26 an attorney's fee was sought based upon a County Court's prior order that approved of action by a guardian to employ counsel. A party made an argument that County Courts exercised a statutory power, and that a County Court lacked the power to consider a claim for an attorney's fee in the absence of direct statutory authority for a County Court to consider such a claim. We explained in 1916 that (1) a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution in effect at that time vested a "general jurisdiction" in County Courts for specific proceedings,27 (2) this jurisdiction included express constitutional authority to "transact all business appertaining to the estates of . . . minors, idiots, lunatics, persons non compos mentis," (3) the language of this constitutional provision "could hardly be broader," and (4) because of this broad language the County Court possessed jurisdiction to determine the issue of paying the attorney's fee, although this approval was in the absence of a direct statute expressly authorizing such.28

¶ 17 Similarly, when the power of a County Court was challenged because it authorized, without express statutory authority, a guardian to execute an oil and gas lease for a term extending beyond the ward's minority, we explained that (1) constitutional language in effect at that time vested an "exclusive jurisdiction" in County Courts, and (2) the constitutional language was sufficiently broad to allow a guardian to engage in those activities that were traditionally approved by courts of chancery exercising an equity power on behalf of a ward.29 County Courts did not possess any inherent equitable powers and they were not courts of equity.30 But when this Court construed the authority of a County Court in a guardianship proceeding, it examined the type of substantive relief in managing estates provided by other courts in guardianship proceedings, including those of a chancery court.31 The County Court's authority was due to (1) the broad constitutional language, (2) a statute which required a guardian to manage the estate of a ward for the ward's best interest, and (3) a statute which authorized the County Court to make "such other orders" needed for the management of the ward's estate.32

¶ 18 County Courts were abolished by a constitutional amendment and the duties performed by such courts were given to the District Courts, courts which possess an "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters"33 including an equity jurisdiction that does not rely upon specific statutory authority.34 Thus, in Oklahoma a District Court not only possesses the power to appoint a guardian pursuant to the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, 30 O.S.2011 § 1-101 through § 4-904,35 but also an equitable power to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor, an incompetent, or a person needing court intervention for that person's protection.36 We have explained that a District Court approves an attorney's fee for services rendered to the ward paid by the guardian ad litem.37

¶ 19 We have noted that the exercise of power by a County Court when approving a contingent fee contract came from the former constitutional provision vesting a "general jurisdiction," a general guardianship statute vesting a power to issue orders necessary for the ward's benefit, and the role of chancery courts providing certain types of relief within a guardianship proceeding. This explains why in 1924 the Legislature could create a statute that recognized the role of a County Court in approving contingent fee contracts in guardianship proceedings while at the same time stating that such contracts were not subject to "this Act," the 1924 enactment relating to compensation of guardians and lawyers. Similarly, a District Court in a guardianship proceeding is vested with a constitutional "unlimited original jurisdiction," possesses equitable powers such as those used in chancery courts to approve contingent fee contracts on behalf of a ward, and also possesses statutory authority to "make such further orders as the court deems necessary for the best interest of the ward for care of the ward and maintenance or management of the ward's property...."38 Further, the express language of § 4-403(D) recognizes court approval of contingent fee agreements.

¶ 20 Contemporaneously with the 1924 enactment we observed that public policy favored allowing payment of a contingency fee contract for legal representation provided to the estate of a ward when the estate did not possess funds to employ a lawyer without such a contract.39 Contingency fee agreements still serve a public policy of providing a practical means for some people to have access to courts.40 Courts still possess jurisdiction and the duty to protect the financial interests of minors, incompetents, and other persons needing court intervention from unreasonable attorney's fees.41 We also observe that although a "guardian" is distinct from a "guardian ad litem" for purposes of the Oklahoma Guardian and Conservatorship Act,42 the public policy for protecting a statutory ward is the same as that for protecting a ward created by an exercise of the trial court's equity powers, and the public policy of protecting the interests of wards who are minors is equally applicable to protecting the interests of other types of wards, such as in the case before us.43

¶ 21 We therefore conclude that a District Court possesses jurisdiction in a guardianship proceeding to approve a contingent fee agreement made on behalf of a ward. Warren filed his motion for court approval in the guardianship proceeding, and he alleged that the fee was a reverse contingent fee to be paid from the estate of the ward for services provided to the ward.44 We thus hold that the guardianship court possessed jurisdiction to hear Warren's motion for approval of the contingent fee contract.

II. Timeliness of Motion for Approval of a Lawyer's Contingent Fee Contract

¶ 22 There remains the question presented by the parties as to the meaning of "do not come within the provisions of the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act," as such relates to the timing of the request for approval and payment of the fee. The trial court concluded that while contracts may be approved after negotiation by a guardian, 30 O.S. § 4-403(C) required approval from the court prior to payment. Paragraph "C" states that "All compensation and reimbursements pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be approved by the court prior to payment." The trial court denied approval of the contingent fee contract based, in part, upon the fact that approval had not been sought prior to payment. However, the trial court also indicated that Warren was entitled to reasonable compensation to be paid from the estate. The trial court did not explain whether this reasonable compensation was also subject to the condition in paragraph "C" of court approval prior to payment. We have concluded that the guardianship court has jurisdiction to hear a motion for approval of a contingent fee contract. The next issue is whether paragraph "C" applies to an order of a guardianship court that approves a lawyer's contingent fee contract on behalf of a ward or the interests of a ward.

¶ 23 Paragraph "C" refers to compensation and reimbursements "pursuant to the provisions of this section." Is a lawyer's contingent fee contract a form of compensation or reimbursement pursuant to § 4-403? Our opinions prior to the 1924 enactment explained that the approval of a contingent fee contract by a court was based upon the necessity of the contract and the reasonableness of the fee provided therein. The 1924 version of the statute expressly set forth reasonable fees in the form of maximum fees based upon the value of the estate involved. The express statutory amounts were later changed to a "reasonable compensation."45 However, the expressly stated amounts for fees in the 1924 statute and the subsequent "reasonable compensation" language did not include express amounts for, or limitations on, a contract for a lawyer's contingent fee.46 We thus hold that paragraph "C" is not a condition imposed upon court approval of a lawyer's contingent fee contract in a guardianship proceeding.47

¶ 24 The trial court also denied the motion for approval of the fee because of the passage of time from the contract's date of execution to the date Warren sought court approval of the contract. This reason for the denial appears to be unwarranted for the following reasons: (1) Guardian did not plead or rely upon any statutory time limit to bar the motion; (2) In an equity proceeding the mere passage of time is not a ground for application of laches;48 (3) The mere passage of time will not prevent a court from awarding relief in an open and continuing proceeding,49 and the guardianship in this case was open and continuing; (4) Laches is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pled,50 and the record before us does not show such a defense pled by Guardian, and (5) A court generally may not raise sua sponte a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense such as laches;51 and if it does, its judgment risks becoming coram non judice on that issue.52

¶ 25 Further, in Abel v. Tisdale, 1980 OK 161, 619 P.2d 608, we discussed a trial court's role in determining the proper amount for a contingent fee contract involving minors where that determination occurred after a jury trial, appeal, and settlement. We discussed the procedure for the trial court upon remand and, for example, we approvingly discussed (1) the use of "hindsight" by the trial court, (2) when a fee was based on a percentage the court should decrease the amount of the fee as the recovery increased, and (3) that the trial court "should not attempt solely to assess the reasonableness of a contingent fee agreement at the time it was entered into."53 Therein the determination of the trial court on remand occurred a few years after the mother of the minors entered into a fee agreement. In Sneed v. Sneed, 1984 OK 22, 681 P.2d 754, we also discussed several factors for the trial court to consider regarding a contingent fee contract previously executed by a guardian ad litem on behalf of a minor.54 These two cases serve as examples where court approval of a contingent fee agreement involving a minor need not occur contemporaneously with the date the agreement is made.

¶ 26 In summary, we hold that § 4-403(C) is not a condition imposed upon court approval of a lawyer's contingency contract in a guardianship proceeding, and that the mere delay between negotiation of the contingent contract and Warren's motion seeking court approval is insufficient to deny court approval of the contract.

III. Conclusion

¶ 27 Guardian made various allegations in the trial court, some of which related to the Oklahoma County proceeding, and these included theories relating to breach of contract, fraud, breach of a fiduciary duty, and negligence. These theories and related allegations were raised by Guardian as legal justifications to prevent judicial approval and enforcement of the reverse contingent fee contract. Guardian also stated that any fee awarded to Warren should be based upon quantum meruit. Warren disputed both allegations of fact and theories of law raised by Guardian. This Court does not make first-instance determinations of disputed issues of either law or fact in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.55 Warren's motion for approval of the contingent fee agreement and the Guardian's claims and defenses must be determined on remand. We make no conclusions whether a contingent fee should be approved herein, or what compensation should be proper if such a fee is approved or not approved.

¶ 28 We hold that a District Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate in a guardianship proceeding a motion seeking court approval of a lawyer's contingent fee contract. We hold that a guardian's failure to obtain court approval of a contingent fee agreement prior to payment under that agreement is not, by itself, a legally sufficient reason for a court to deny a motion to approve the agreement; and that the mere passage of time between creation of a contingent fee agreement and when it is presented to a court for approval in an open and continuing guardianship proceeding is not a legally sufficient reason to deny approval of that agreement. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated, the order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 29 TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, and COMBS, JJ., concur.

¶ 30 COLBERT, V.C.J., and WATT, J., not participating.

¶ 31 GURICH, J., recused.