COMBS, J.:

¶ 1 Ada Electric Cars, LLC (Plaintiff/Appellant) filed this lawsuit against Thomas Kemp Jr., Jerry Johnson, Dawn Cash, and Rick Miller (collectively, Defendants/Appellees), members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), in their individual capacities, in response to the OTC's denial of a statutory tax credit for certain models of Tomberlin low-speed electric vehicles (LSVs) sold by the Appellant to its customers. The statutory tax credit was originally enacted in the 1990s, and the controlling version in this case was codified at 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22. It provided for a one-time credit against income tax for investments in qualified electric motor vehicle property.1 This is the latest in several cases to come before this Court all concerning the LSV tax credit codified at 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22.2 The dispositive issue presented is whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity from suit for their determination that LSVs sold by Appellant did not qualify for the tax credit provided for in 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22. We hold that they are.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Appellant brings suit against Appellees in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Appellees violated Appellant's constitutional rights by infringing upon Appellant's freedom of speech and denying Appellant equal protection under the law.3 More specifically, Appellant alleges Appellees violated its rights by: 1) treating Appellant's vehicles and customers differently than other similarly situated LSV dealers due to the manner in which it applied the tax credit provided for in 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22; 2) applying a construction of the statute that produced inconsistent, arbitrary, discriminatory, and absurd results; and 3) retaliating against Appellant for what Appellant claims was its protected speech in advertising the applicability of the tax credit to its vehicles.

¶ 3 Appellees moved to dismiss Appellant's lawsuit on multiple grounds, including: 1) Appellant lacked standing; 2) the § 1983 claims failed because they were conclusory; 3) Appellant failed to properly assert a First Amendment claim or Equal Protection claim; and 4) Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims as a matter of law. Appellant responded to Appellees' motion to dismiss, disputing all of the above grounds for dismissal. On June 29, 2012, the trial court dismissed Appellant's First Amended Petition with prejudice, without stating grounds for dismissal. Appellant then filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied on August 13, 2012. Appellant appealed and filed its petition in error on August 29, 2012. We retained jurisdiction.

The applicability of the defense of qualified immunity is dispositive.

¶ 4 Appellees assert here, as they have previously when sued in their individual capacity by other LSV dealers, that they possess qualified immunity from suit. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which entitles government officials, performing discretionary functions, not to stand trial or face other burdens of litigation, such as discovery. Rooks v. State Through Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK CIV APP 155, ¶ 6, 842 P.2d 773, 776; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that:

The question of whether parties to a suit possess qualified immunity is a question of law, and we review it de novo. Barnthouse v. City of Edmond, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806; Melton v. City of Oklahoma, 879 F.2d 706, 726 (10th Cir.1989).

¶ 5 This Court has previously espoused that there exists a presumption of immunity in favor of government officials which is not overcome unless it is shown the government officials violated clearly established law or constitutional rights of which a reasonable official should have known. Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849. In Barnthouse, we held:

Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing: 1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and 2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727.

¶ 6 This court must examine the law as it was at the time of the officials' actions in order to determine whether the law allegedly violated was clearly established. Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. The plaintiff, in the underlying action must do more than identify a clearly established right in the abstract and allege it was violated: the contours of the law must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he/she is doing violates the established right. Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849; Anderson 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. At the time of the officials' actions, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Reichle v. Howards, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012); Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. at 2083. Requiring the right allegedly violated to be clearly established protects a balance between the need to safeguard constitutional rights and the need for government officials to be able to effectively perform their duties by ensuring they can anticipate when their actions might violate constitutional rights. See Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In short:

Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. at 2085 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

¶ 7 The First Amendment generally prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions for their speech. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 1701, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006). However, the United States Supreme Court has explained the right allegedly violated must be established not as a broad general proposition, but in a particularized sense so that the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable official. Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849; Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2094. Under this standard, Appellant must demonstrate that when the Appellees interpreted the statutory exemption to exclude Appellant's vehicles, they violated a clearly established right that Appellant possessed to advertise its vehicles qualified for the tax credit. For Appellees' qualified immunity to be overcome, it would have to have been clear to a reasonable member of the tax commission that disqualifying Appellant's vehicles from the tax credit would violate Appellant's constitutional right to advertise that its vehicles qualified for the tax credit provided for in 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22, and further that disqualifying Appellant's vehicles would somehow constitute retaliation against Appellant for advertising that its vehicles qualified.

¶ 8 Appellant has failed to demonstrate Appellees violated its clearly established right to freedom of speech in a manner that would enable Appellant to defeat Appellees' qualified immunity. Appellant has not demonstrated that reasonable government officials in Appellees' position would have thought they were impinging upon Appellant's freedom of speech by denying the tax credit to Appellant's customers based on Appellees' conflicting interpretation of the legislature's exclusionary language. At no point did Appellees take any action to affirmatively prevent Appellant from exercising its right to advertise freely, nor did they take any direct action against it as an entity at all. Appellees merely fulfilled their duty to interpret and apply a statutory provision granting a tax credit to certain types of LSVs and not to others. The fact that the Commission's interpretation was subsequently found to be in error would not invalidate the reasonableness of their earlier position, such as to prohibit the defense of qualified immunity: "[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in grey areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d 840, 847 (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992)).

¶ 9 Appellant also alleges that Appellees violated its right to equal protection of the laws as provided for in the United States Constitution by treating it, its products, and its customers differently under 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22 than other dealers and customers, without any rational basis for the differential treatment.4 In order to defeat Appellees' qualified immunity, Appellant's right to have its vehicles treated the same as other LSVs with regard to the tax credit would need to be sufficiently clear that by interpreting the tax credit to exclude Appellant's vehicles, "every `reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.'" Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034).

¶ 10 Title 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22(C) specifically carves out an exception to the tax credit: "The term `qualified electric motor vehicle property' shall not apply to vehicles known as `golf carts,' `go-carts' and other motor vehicles which are manufactured principally for use off the streets and highways." It is not unreasonable or beyond debate for the officials charged with construing and applying 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22(C) to find that certain types of vehicles fell within the exclusion and others did not. Appellant may not agree with the decision making criteria used by Appellants in making their determination, and they may believe that the determination was made as a result of budgetary pressure, but they have demonstrated no precedent indicating that by making a determination which vehicles were known as "golf carts," "go-carts" and other motor vehicles which are manufactured principally for use off the streets and highways, "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 585, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007).

CONCLUSION

¶ 11 The question of whether parties to a suit possess qualified immunity is a question of law, and we review it de novo. Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 20, 73 P.3d 840, 849; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806; Melton, 879 F.2d at 726. As a matter of law, Appellees are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Appellees did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of Appellant by determining that language in 68 O.S.Supp 2008, § 2357.22(c) excluded Appellant's vehicles from the tax credit but did not exclude others. Appellees' decision, which resulted in the exclusion of certain types of vehicles from benefiting from the tax credit, including lines sold by Appellant, was based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions.

¶ 12 Even though Appellees' reasonable determination was subsequently found to be erroneous, it was not the stepping across a bright line that would prevent the application of sovereign immunity. See Barnthouse, 2003 OK 42, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d 840, 847. "Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions, and when properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. at 2085. Inasmuch as this Court has determined the defense of qualified immunity applies and is dispositive of the underlying action, the Court need not address the remaining issues.

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFIRMED.

¶ 13 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.