BAY MITCHELL, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant Bankers Trust Company of California, N.A., as Custodian or Trustee (Bank) appeals from the trial court's Order dismissing the foreclosure/breach of contract action against Appellee Ronald R. Wallis and Janice M. Wallis, Husband and Wife (Home Owners) with prejudice pursuant to the statute of repose, 46 O.S.2001 § 301. The dismissal was entered upon a finding that the cause of action "is and has been an attempt to maintain the action in excess of seven or ten years" from the time upon which the full amount of principal and interest in the subject note sued upon became due and payable on February 29, 2000.1

¶ 2 To enable the purchase of their home in Claremore, Home Owners obtained a loan from Bank's predecessor in interest in 1997. Home Owner Ronald R. Wallis executed a promissory note and both Homeowners executed a real estate mortgage on October 29, 1997, in the principal amount of $182,500 with interest on the unpaid balance until paid in full (payable in monthly installments of $2,429.15).2

¶ 3 This foreclosure action has a complicated history. Bank initially filed suit to foreclose in February 2000. That suit was dismissed without prejudice on September 30, 2002 for failure to prosecute. The Petition in the instant case was filed on May 3, 2005. Sometime in the summer of 2007, the trial court mailed Bank's counsel a notice that the case would be placed on a civil disposition docket on September 5, 2007. Counsel never received the notice (because he had moved and had failed to provide the trial court with his new address). Thus, Bank's counsel failed to appear at the disposition hearing and subsequently, the court clerk entered an unsigned minute order on that date indicating on the docket "case dismissed with prejudice." Bank thereafter filed its July 2008 petition to vacate the dismissal pursuant to 12 O.S.2001 § 1031(3), due to "mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk," and § 1031(7) for "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" premised upon Bank's former counsel not receiving notices of the disposition docket in both the first and second actions. Home Owners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss the Bank's petition to vacate followed by a number of the parties' other motions, briefs and supplemental briefs. Ultimately, the trial court concluded a clerical error had occurred in the clerk's entry of the September 2007 dismissal and accordingly entered an amended minute order to reflect the case was dismissed without prejudice. The trial court thereafter entered an Order of April 15, 2009 granting Home Owner's Motion to Dismiss the Bank's Petition to Vacate. Bank unsuccessfully appealed from that determination.3

¶ 4 Subsequent to the first appeal and back in the trial court, in May 2011 Home Owners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice in the trial court on the basis that Bank's claims were now barred by the statute of repose applicable to foreclosure actions (46 O.S. § 301)4. They argued that because Bank has "maintained" this action for more than seven years, § 301 requires it be dismissed.

¶ 5 In its response, Bank argued the statute of repose is an affirmative defense, which Homeowners waived by failing to assert it timely in their answer.5 Additionally, Bank argued the statute of repose is inapplicable because the last maturing obligation of the mortgage has yet to become due (the note and mortgage expressly provide the last maturing obligation is due on November 4, 2012). Bank further asserted that if the filing of the Petition in the first action served to accelerate the maturity of the mortgage and commence the running of the statute, that case was dismissed without prejudice without any adjudication on the merits.6 Bank additionally argued that if the maturity of the mortgage has been accelerated by the May 2005 filing of the instant case, seven years from the commencement of this case will not expire until May, 2012 (and thus, the statute of repose has not run). Bank further argued alternatively that the Home Owners are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose.7 Finally, Bank argued the statute of repose — applicable only to the mortgage foreclosure claim — does not preclude Bank's breach of contract claim with respect to the promissory note.8

¶ 6 Home Owners' reply brief clarifies their primary position on the Motion to Dismiss, which is that Bank's case has been maintained for more than seven or ten years (depending on whether § 301(A) (ten years) or § 301(B) (seven years) applies). Additionally, Home Owners assert the statute of repose is not an affirmative defense and therefore cannot be waived. Ultimately, the trial court entered its July 13, 2011 Order granting Home Owners' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice upon a finding that the cause of action "is and has been an attempt to maintain the action in excess of seven or ten years" from February 29, 2000 contrary to 46 O.S. § 301 (emphasis added).

¶ 7 This case presents a question of statutory construction and is thus a question of law subject to de novo review. Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, ¶ 8, 213 P.3d 550, 554. The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the legislature. TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, 829 P.2d 15, 20. The plain meaning of a statute's language is conclusive except in the rare case when literal construction would produce a result demonstrably at odds with legislative intent. Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307; City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Board, 1998 OK 92, ¶ 14, 967 P.2d 1214, 1220. Further, "[a]n absurd result cannot be presumed to have been intended by the drafters." Rogers v. Quiktrip Corp., 2010 OK 3, ¶ 11, 230 P.3d 853, 859.

¶ 8 As of the writing of this opinion, there is only one published opinion interpreting 46 O.S. § 301. See Cinco Enterprises, Inc. v. Botts, 1996 OK CIV APP 113, 931 P.2d 81. A statute of repose "restricts potential liability by limiting the time during which a cause can arise. It thus serves to bar a cause of action before it accrues." Id. at 82 (quoting Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1987 OK 3, 732 P.2d 466, n. 11). The Court in Cinco held § 301 was a statute of repose and found "the language [therein] sets the outer boundary beyond which an action for foreclosure may be brought and allows no exceptions thereto." Id. (emphasis added). In Cinco, the Court clearly interpreted the time period of § 301 as establishing the outer boundary beyond which thereafter no cause of action arises.

¶ 9 Cinco is silent as to whether § 301 may operate to extinguish a cause of action which has already arisen and suit has already been commenced within the statutorily permitted time, but remains pending beyond the statute of repose time period. General principles of law, however, governing statutes of repose9 do not lend support to a construction of this statute that would terminate a timely filed and pending case. "A statute of repose prescribes a time period within which an action may be initiated and that time period begins to run from a specific act or event...." Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 2009 OK 14, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1168, 1171-72, citing Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816 (providing no action shall be brought more than ten years after substantial completion of an improvement to real property pursuant to 12 O.S.2001 § 109).

¶ 10 The cause of action here was timely commenced — both with the filing of the Petition in the initial action in 2000, and with its re-filing in 2005.10 Although this case was timely filed within the applicable statute of limitation and within the time limits of the statute of repose, Home Owners contend that because the case has remained pending for an extended period of time (through one appeal and various delays caused by counsel, the court clerk, and apparently intermittent settlement negotiations) the case must now be dismissed pursuant to the statute of repose. Presumably, Home Owners derive this contention from the specific statutory text of § 301 that no foreclosure action "shall be had or maintained after the expiration" (emphasis added) of the statutory time period. Their argument rests upon the words "or maintained" as reflecting a presumed legislative intent to extinguish pending cases from continuing beyond the statutory time period. Home Owners cite no supportive authority for that construction aside from the specific language of the statute. Further, independent research reveals no authority supporting the dismissal of a timely filed foreclosure action for pending in excess of the time limits set forth in the statute of repose.

¶ 11 Our review of the entire statute, case law, and rules of statutory construction lead only to the conclusion that Home Owners' construction is strained, absurd, and inconsistent with legislative intent. "A statutory construction which would lead to an absurdity will be avoided if this can be done without violating the evident legislative intent." Wooten v. Hall, 1968 OK 90, 442 P.2d 334, 336. Further, "[a]n inept or incorrect choice of words [in the statute] will not be construed or applied in such manner as to destroy the real and obvious purpose of a legislative enactment." Id. (citation omitted). The Home Owners' strained interpretation is at odds with the obvious intent of the statute. To interpret the statute as providing for the extinguishment of timely filed actions pending in excess of the statutory time period would encourage and reward tactics designed to intentionally delay the resolution of foreclosure cases in an attempt to ultimately avoid legitimate mortgage payment obligations.

¶ 12 Further, as used in § 301, we construe the term "had or maintained" to be synonymous with "commenced." The Legislature intended § 301 as a statute of repose, which operates to set a fixed time period within which a party must file its foreclosure petition. The trial court erred in interpreting § 301 as extinguishing a pending cause of action, which had been timely commenced within the applicable statutory time period.

¶ 13 The trial court's dismissal of Bank's foreclosure action on the basis of 46 O.S. § 301 is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings.

BELL, P.J., and HETHERINGTON, J., concur.