KENNETH L. BUETTNER, Judge.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs/Appellants Lynda Jackson and Aaron Williams (Parents), individually and as parents and next friends of Hakeem Williams (Student), appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of Defendant/Appellee Independent School District No. 89, Oklahoma City Public Schools (District). Parents alleged a teacher assaulted Student and made claims for respondeat superior liability as well as negligent hiring, training, and supervising. The record shows no dispute of material fact. District is exempt from liability for discretionary acts such as hiring, training and supervising. District is immune from liability for intentional torts of its employees because those acts are necessarily outside the scope of employment. Accordingly, District was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and we affirm.

¶ 2 In their Petition, Parents alleged a teacher physically assaulted Student at school. They asserted the teacher was acting in the course and scope of employment and therefore District was liable under respondeat superior. Parents asserted claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and contended District's negligence caused physical injuries and emotional distress. They asserted they had given notice of their claim as required by Oklahoma's Governmental Tort Claims Act but that District had failed to approve the claim within the statutory period.

¶ 3 District answered and acknowledged the teacher was its employee and Parents had complied with the GTCA. District denied Parents' remaining claims and asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including that it was exempt from liability under the GTCA.

¶ 4 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, District included 21 statements of undisputed facts which it argued showed it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 District noted the GTCA waived immunity only for torts committed in the course and scope of employment. District noted that Parents asserted Hollmon assaulted and battered Student, which necessarily was an intentional act and which therefore could not be an act within the scope of employment, so that District was immune from liability for the alleged assault and battery. District next argued that Parents could not show District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising Hollmon and that under the GTCA, District is exempt from liability for negligent hiring and training and failure to supervise, citing 51 O.S.2011 § 155(5).

¶ 5 In opposing summary judgment, Parents first provided a "general outline" of their arguments, which were that there is a private cause of action for excessive force, citing Bosh v. Cherokee County Building Authority, 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994; that an employer is liable for the acts of its agent when those acts are in furtherance of the business of the master, even if wilful, citing Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 1932 OK 790, 163 Okla. 122, 21 P.2d 1;2 and that there was additional evidence of Hollmon's improper or incompetent behavior towards students, "as the students themselves will attest to."3

¶ 6 Parents admitted all but four of District's statements of undisputed fact. In their response to District's statement of undisputed facts, Parents disputed District's statement of fact 10, by asserting that Student's mother testified she did not see Hollmon hit other students, but that there was no testimony that Hollmon did not hit any other student. As to fact 16, Parents admitted Student did not require medical treatment, but they disputed the claim that Student had no injuries caused by Hollmon.4 Parents denied fact 19, as well, claiming that their Petition showed they sought more than discipline for Hollmon. Finally, Parents denied fact 21 by asserting that Student's deposition testimony showed that Hollmon called students names which proved Hollmon was not properly trained or supervised.

¶ 7 Parents argued District was liable under the Oklahoma Supreme Court's recent decision in Bosh, supra. Parents next asserted attendance at school is involuntary and analogized students in school to inmates in custody and argued therefore District has a special duty of care towards students.

¶ 8 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of District September 5, 2013. The trial court expressly found that Bosh does not apply to the facts of this case. Parents appeal. Summary judgment proceedings are governed by Rule 13, Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S.2011, Ch. 2, App.1. Summary judgment is appropriate where the record establishes no substantial controversy of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. Alliance Real Estate Group, 1999 OK 7, 976 P.2d 1043, 1045. Summary judgment is not proper where reasonable minds could draw different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Id. We review the evidence de novo, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Vance v. Fed. Natl. Mortg. Assn., 1999 OK 73, 988 P.2d 1275.

¶ 9 In the GTCA, the state asserted its sovereign immunity from liability for torts, but waived its immunity "only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act." 51 O.S.2011 § 152.1. The state's liability is limited to loss resulting from the torts of the state or its employees acting in the scope of their employment. 51 O.S.2011 § 153.5 It is settled that intentional torts are outside the scope of employment and therefore District may not be liable for a teacher's assault and battery. It is also settled that a school's hiring, training, and supervising decisions are discretionary and therefore a school may not be liable for damages resulting from those decisions. Houston v. Independent School Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma County, 949 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1109 (W.D.Okla.2013); 51 O.S.2011 § 155(5). The GTCA also extends immunity for "(t)he use of necessary and reasonable force by a school district employee to control and discipline a student during the time the student is in attendance...." 51 O.S.2011 § 155(35).

¶ 10 Parents here appear to concede that District is immune for discretionary functions and that Hollmon's alleged conduct was outside the scope of employment. Nevertheless, they argue District is liable outside the GTCA for a teacher's excessive force and pursuant to an alleged special duty owed to Student. Parents' reliance on Bosh is misplaced. In Bosh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court extended its earlier holding, that incarcerated persons may have a private cause of action for excessive force against offending officials, to those who have been arrested or seized but not yet incarcerated. The court found that in such cases excessive force may violate the constitutional protection against unwarranted seizure established in Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30. In this case, Parents did not assert a constitutional claim in the Petition and Student was not arrested or seized. "The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30 applies to citizens who are seized — arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees.... [We] hold that the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the requirements and limitations of the OGTCA." Id. at ¶ 22-23.

¶ 11 Parents' final argument is that District and Student had a "special relationship" and that based on compulsory attendance, Student was effectively in District's custody. Parents appear to argue here for a heightened duty of care in terms of negligence. Parents cite Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999), which recognized that parents could make a claim for Title IX civil rights violations where a school allowed harassment of one student by another. But as noted above, Parents have not asserted a constitutional or civil rights claim against District. Parents have failed to provide authority that District is subject to tort liability for the intentional tort alleged here.

¶ 12 The summary judgment record shows District was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and we AFFIRM.

JOPLIN, P.J., and HETHERINGTON, V.C.J., concur.