OPINION AND ORDER
CLAIRE V. EAGAN, District Judge.
In this civil rights action, plaintiff Duane Harper claims that on February 9, 2015, defendants Sergeant James Pirtle, Detention Officer Sebastian Otalvaro, Detention Officer David Oakes, and Deputy Nicholas Tirello violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force while he was detained in the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center ("Tulsa County Jail") on alleged probation violations. Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 109). Harper filed a response (Dkt. # 114), and defendants filed a reply (Dkt. # 121). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court shall grant defendants' motion for summary judgment, deny Harper's request for summary judgment,2 and declare moot defendants' motion to strike (Dkt. # 110) and motion in limine (Dkt. # 111).
I.
The following facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to Harper.3 On January 7, 2015, Harper was arrested on outstanding felony warrants in two Tulsa County District Court cases, Case Nos. CF-2013-2465 and CF-2013-2140A, and booked into the Tulsa County Jail. Dkt. # 109-1, at 2-3.4 Id. at 2. During the booking process, the intake officer observed no visible signs of injury or trauma and no physical handicaps. Dkt. # 109-2, at 2. However, Harper answered "yes" in response to the following questions: "Are you injured or currently under psychiatric or a general Doctor's Care?" and "Are you currently taking any prescription medications." Id. When Harper was booked into jail, he received a copy of an inmate handbook which outlined his expected conduct, rules, discipline, right to hearings, classification level and housing assignments. Dkt. # 109-3.
The inmate housing history sheet reflects that, on January 16, 2015, Harper refused to go to "max pod" and threatened to commit suicide. Dkt. # 109-4, at 3. Notes corresponding to the January 16, 2015 entry further reflect that Harper was "a known issue in the jail and has prevous [sic] assaultive felonies, one on a detention officer," and "has mental health issues and poses an increased threat to officers and other inmates."5 Id. Harper was placed in a segregated cell and, several days later, was moved to a mental health cell. Id. at 2-3. On January 28, 2015, Harper was "cleared from mental health" and returned to general population. Id. at 2. Later that evening, Harper was involved in a physical altercation with other inmates. Dkt. # 109-5, at 2-3. After the altercation, Harper was examined in the medical unit and cleared for confinement in administrative segregation. Id. at 8. During the examination, the nurse observed Harper had facial injuries but was "ambulatory" and reported that Harper "denied other areas of injury." Dkt. # 109-15, at 2. Shortly after the examination, Harper reported to the nurse that he also hurt his right knee when he slipped and fell near the shower immediately before the altercation. Id. As a result of the altercation, Harper was placed in administrative segregation on January 29, 2015. Dkt. # 109-4, at 2. The next day, Harper was moved to a cell in the J-14 pod.6 Id.
On February 1, 2015, Harper submitted a request through the jail's kiosk message system. Dkt. # 114-4, at 7. Specifically, he requested to be seen by a nurse or doctor for a physical so he could start a job. Id. The next day, Harper received a response indicating he had a physical on January 19, 2015, and was "not cleared for work." Id. Later that day, Harper asked why he was not cleared for work and stated, "My body moves fine and I feel great can you please tell me what the reason is that I can [sic] work a job?" Id. Medical records submitted by Harper and relevant to his physical condition at the time of the alleged excessive-force incident reflect that he was treated in 2009 and 2010 for significant osteoarthritis in his right knee and right shoulder and that he is diabetic. Dkt. # 100-3, at 3, 8.7
On the morning of February 9, 2015, Harper was in the food line and became upset when Detention Officer Megan Palmer took the cellophane off his food tray. Dkt. # 109-7, at 3. Harper threatened to, and ultimately did, throw his food tray on the ground near Palmer's feet. Id. Palmer called for assistance and told the pod to lock down; Harper walked away to his jail cell. Id.
Defendants responded to Palmer's call for assistance. Dkt. # 109-8 (Pirtle Affidavit), at 2; Dkt. # 109-9 (Otalvaro Affidavit), at 2; Dkt. # 109-10 (Oakes Affidavit), at 2; Dkt. # 109-11 (Tirello Affidavit), at 2. Tirello began locking down the J-14 pod and getting inmates into their cells. Dkt. # 109-11, at 2. Pirtle, a supervisor, decided Harper should be restrained and placed in administrative segregation based on Harper's interaction with Palmer. Dkt. # 109-8, at 2. Oakes was the first to arrive at Harper's cell door. Dkt. # 109-10, at 2. Oakes ordered Harper to lay down on the ground. Id. According to Oakes, Harper "shook his head `no' and refused to comply." Id. Pirtle joined Oakes outside the door of Harper's cell, followed shortly thereafter by Otalvaro. Dkt. # 109-8, at 2; Dkt. # 109-9, at 2. Pirtle unlocked the cell door, and Oakes opened the door. Dkt. # 109-8, at 3. Pirtle ordered Harper to get on the ground two more times, but Harper did not comply. Id.; Dkt. # 109-9, at 2; Dkt. # 109-10, at 2. Instead, Harper, who was sitting on his bed, "shook his head from side to side and refused to comply."8 Dkt. # 109-8, at 3; Dkt. # 109-9, at 2; Dkt. # 109-10, at 2. Tirello headed in Pirtle's direction when he heard Pirtle ordering Harper to the ground. Dkt. # 109-11, at 2.
Before Tirello arrived, Pirtle presented his Taser and twice ordered Harper to get on the ground; Harper did not comply. Dkt. # 109-8, at 3; Dkt. # 109-9, at 2; Dkt. # 109-10, at 2. Pirtle then deployed his Taser and the cartridge probes contacted Harper, causing him to fall to the ground.9 Dkt. # 109-8, at 3; Dkt. # 109-9, at 2; Dkt. # 109-10, at 3. Tirello arrived at Harper's cell just as Pirtle deployed his Taser. Dkt. # 109-11, at 2. After the Taser's five-second cycle ended, Tirello, Oakes, and Otalvaro entered Harper's cell, removed the Taser's probes, and placed him in handcuffs. Dkt. # 109-8, at 3; Dkt. # 109-12, at 2. Tirello and Oakes then escorted Harper to the medical unit for a physical examination. Dkt. # 109-10, at 3; Dkt. # 109-11, at 2. Nurse Jessica Mobley examined Harper and cleared him for confinement in administrative segregation. Dkt. # 109-13, at 2. Although Harper complained of shoulder pain, Mobley did not find any apparent injuries during the examination. Id.; Dkt. # 109-6, at 2; Dkt. # 109-15, at 11-12. Following the examination, Harper was placed in administrative segregation. Dkt. # 109-8, at 4.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Conversely, "summary judgment will not lie" if there exists a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and a fact is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law." Id. At the summary-judgment stage, the court's task "is not `to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). In applying the summary-judgment standard, the court "view[s] the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011)). But the Court is not required to adopt plaintiff's version of the facts if that version lacks record support, Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1325, or is "blatantly contradicted" by the record, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)). Consistent with the plain language of Rule 56(a), the movant bears the ultimate burden to show there are no genuine issues for the jury to resolve and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1326.
However, when a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, "[t]he plaintiff first must shoulder a heavy two-part burden." Id. at 1325. In determining whether plaintiff has met his or her burden to show "(1) that defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established, ordinarily courts must `adopt' plaintiff's `version of the facts.'" Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). Nonetheless, as discussed, "a plaintiff's version of the facts must find support in the record" at the summary-judgment stage. Id. And the court need not adopt plaintiff's version of the facts if that version is "`so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed' it." Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). The court has discretion to determine "which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first," Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), "and may resolve the question by finding either requirement is not met," Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2011).
III.
Harper's amended complaint presents one claim: that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by using excessive force—i.e., by tasering him—after he caused a disruption in the food line, walked back to his jail cell, and then refused to comply with defendants' repeated verbal orders to get on the ground of his cell. See Dkt. # 39; Dkt. # 74, at 13-14. Because Harper was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged use of excessive force, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause governs his claim. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a pretrial detainee must show that "the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable." Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. In excessive-force cases "objective reasonableness turns on the `facts and circumstances of each particular case.'" Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Ultimately, several factors "bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used," including, but not limited to: "the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting." Id. In considering these factors, courts also "must take account of the legitimate interests in managing a jail, acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional security is appropriate." Id. at 2474.
Relying on Kingsley, Harper contends Pirtle's deployment of his Taser was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances because Harper was sitting on his bed in a secured jail cell, he was not being combative or aggressive, and he could not get on the ground because he has osteoarthritis in both knees and needs a shoulder replacement. Dkt. # 114, at 21. Harper appears to contend that Oakes, Tirello, and Otalvaro are liable for Pirtle's use of excessive force because they either participated in the use of force or failed to intervene. Id. at 14, 15, 19; see Mascorro, 656 F.3d at 1204 n.5 (stating that "an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer's use of excessive force, can be held liable [under § 1983] for his nonfeasance" (quoting Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996))).
Defendants move for summary judgment on the excessive-force claim asserting (1) that they did not violate Harper's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and (2), that even if they did, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. # 109, at 13, 19.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct `does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). As discussed, to overcome defendants' assertion of qualified immunity, Harper bears the initial burden to show both (1) that defendants' violated the constitution and (2) that the law as to the constitutional right at issue is clearly established. Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1325. If he fails to make either showing, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Mascorro, 656 F.3d at 1204. Here, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve whether Pirtle used excessive force in deploying his Taser, or whether the remaining defendants can be held liable for failing to intervene, because Harper fails to satisfy the "clearly established" prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.
"The `dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S.Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). "A plaintiff may show clearly established law by pointing to either a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision, or the weight of authority from other courts, existing at the time of the alleged violation." T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff need not point to "a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established." Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)). But "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 551). In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts should not "define clearly established law at a high level of generality." Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015)). "[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the [Supreme] Court has recognized that `[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.'" Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205). This is so because the "[u]se of excessive force is an area of the law `in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,' and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent `squarely governs' the specific facts at issue." Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309); see also Aldaba v. Pickens, 844 F.3d 870, 876 (10th Cir. 2016) (applying Mullenix and noting that courts may not "rely[] on excessive-force cases markedly different from" the case at hand to conclude that the law is clearly established). In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that the same objectivereasonableness standard that applies in Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims also applies in Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims asserted by pretrial detainees. 135 S. Ct. at 2473. Thus, the same need for specificity, i.e., the need for existing precedent that squarely governs the specific facts at issue, exists in the Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force context.10
Viewing the undisputed facts in Harper's favor—to the extent those facts find support in the record—shows that Harper had no apparent physical disabilities when he was booked into the Tulsa County Jail on January 7, 2015. Dkt. # 109-2, at 2. Harper did, however, have a prior diagnosis of osteoarthritis in his right knee and right shoulder. Dkt. # 100-3, at 3, 8. On January 28, 2015, Harper fell near the shower and was involved in an altercation with other inmates. Dkt. # 109-5, at 2-3; Dkt. # 109-15, at 2. Following the altercation, a nurse examined Harper and observed facial injuries but noted that Harper was "ambulatory." Dkt. # 109-15, at 2. Later that day, Harper told the nurse he had swelling in his right knee from falling near the shower. Id. A few days after his fall, on February 1, 2015, Harper requested a physical so he could be cleared for work, reporting that his "body moves fine" and he "feel[s] great." Dkt. # 114-4, at 7. Eight days after requesting work clearance, on February 9, 2015, Harper caused a disruption in the food line by throwing a food tray near Palmer's feet, walked back to his cell,11 sat on his bed, and closed the cell door. Dkt. # 109-7, at 3. Palmer called for assistance and initiated a lock down. Id. Pirtle, a supervisor, responded to Palmer's call and determined Harper's actions toward Palmer warranted placing Harper in administrative segregation. Dkt. # 109-8, at 2. At the time of the incident, Pirtle was aware that Harper had been "classified as an assault risk."12 Id. at 4.
After Harper refused to comply with Oakes' multiple commands to get on the ground of his jail cell, Pirtle unlocked the cell door, and Oakes opened it. Dkt. # 109-8, at 2-3; Dkt. # 109-10, at 2. Pirtle twice more directed Harper to get on the ground; Harper refused, shaking his head left to right. Dkt. # 109-8, at 3. Pirtle presented his Taser and repeated his verbal commands two more times; Harper did not comply. Id. Pirtle then deployed his Taser for one, five-second cycle. Id.; Dkt. # 109-12, at 2. This permitted Oakes, Otalvaro, and Tirello to restrain Harper and extract him from his jail cell so he could be transported to administrative segregation. Dkt. # 109-8, at 3-4; Dkt. # 109-10, at 3.
On this record, the situation defendants confronted was one that required them to extract from a jail cell a pretrial detainee who (1) had been classified as an "assault risk" based on his behavior during his stay in the jail, (2) had just caused a disruption in a common area of the jail, precipitating a lock down, (3) refused to comply with defendants' repeated verbal orders to get on the ground, and (4) had no apparent physical disabilities that would prevent him from complying with those orders.
Harper fails to cite any existing case law clearly establishing that Pirtle's use of a Taser in this situation was unlawful. Harper addresses clearly established law in two sections of his response. In both sections, he cites this court's unpublished decision in Williams v. Miller, No. 15-CV-0028-JED-FHM, 2016 WL 4537750 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2016) (unpublished). Dkt. # 114, at 25, 28-29. Harper's reliance on this unpublished decision is misplaced. See Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1305 n. 10 (10th Cir. 2009) (reiterating that "[i]n determining whether the law is clearly established . . . [a court] may not rely upon unpublished decisions"); Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiff's reliance on factually distinguishable unpublished Tenth Circuit decision and stating, "[a]n unpublished opinion . . . even if the facts were closer, provides little support for the notion that the law is clearly established"); Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1397 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that "a district court decision will not ordinarily clearly establish the law even of its own circuit" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court therefore presumes Harper intends to rely on the excessive-force cases discussed in Williams to support his position that the law is clearly established. However, even granting Harper that generous presumption, the Court finds that none of those cases is "close enough on point to make the unlawfulness of [defendants'] actions apparent." Mascorro, 656 F.3d at 1208.
First, the two published Tenth Circuit decisions this court examined in Williams involved significantly different situations. See Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 424-26 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding reasonable jury could find that deputies used excessive force against arrestee during booking process when—while arrestee was handcuffed, face down on ground, and subdued by multiple deputies—one deputy placed substantial pressure on arrestee's back, a second deputy used a Taser on arrestee for three seconds longer than recommended, a third deputy applied a carotid restraint for approximately two and a half minutes, and arrestee died as a result of the carotid restraint); Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1279, 1282-86 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding reasonable jury could find that city police officers used excessive force when, without warning, they "grabbed, tackled, Tasered, and beat[]" a citizen for temporarily removing a court file from a public courthouse when he went outside the courthouse to retrieve money from his truck to pay a traffic fine). And, to the extent Harper relies on this Court's statement in Williams that Casey "laid out the ground rules that a Taser is not to be employed where a lesser amount of force could be used to gain compliance," Williams, 2016 WL 4537750, at *8, that reliance is misplaced. Even accepting that Casey laid out that rule, it is stated in overly general terms and does not clearly establish "the violative nature of [defendants'] particular conduct." Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (reiterating that courts should not "define clearly established law at a high level of generality"). In short, reading Casey and Booker "would not apprise every objectively reasonable [detention] officer" that it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on the use of excessive force to use a Taser for five seconds against a pretrial detainee who (1) caused a disturbance in a common area of the jail, (2) returned to his cell and sat on his bunk, (3) refused to comply with repeated verbal commands to get on the ground, and (4) had no readily apparent physical limitations that prevented his compliance. Aldaba, 844 F.3d at 877. Thus, these two Tenth Circuit decisions do not advance Harper's position that Pirtle's use of the Taser, or the conduct of the other officers in failing to intervene, violated clearly established law.13
Likewise, none of the out-of-circuit decisions discussed in Williams squarely governs the specific facts at issue in this case. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding reasonable jury could find detention officer used excessive force in violation of Eighth Amendment by deploying Taser, without warning, against inmate who was "lying on his bunk" with his back to the cell door and "weak" from several days of fasting after inmate failed to comply with "a single order" to get up); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446-47 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding reasonable jury could find deputy's use of Taser against "unruly" female arrestee violated constitution when arrestee "was handcuffed, weighed about 100 pounds, had her ankles loosened in the hobbling device which [another deputy] was tightening, and was locked in the back seat cage" of a patrol car), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding, "as a matter of law, that the use of a stun gun to enforce" orders from several detention officers that inmate sweep his jail cell "was both an exaggerated response to" inmate's refusal to comply with the housekeeping order and "a summary corporal punishment that violated [his] Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment"). Each of these cases is "markedly different from this one." Aldaba, 844 F.3d at 876. As a result, these cases also do not support Harper's position that Pirtle's use of the Taser, and the other officers' failure to intervene, violated clearly established law.
IV.
Because Harper failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the defendants' conduct in this case violated clearly established law, all four defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Harper's Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim. The Court therefore grants defendants' motion for summary judgment, denies Harper's request for summary judgment, and declares moot defendants' pending motions. As a result of the summary judgment ruling in defendants' favor, all remaining scheduling order deadlines are hereby stricken and this case is terminated.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 109) is granted on the basis of qualified immunity.
2. Harper's request for summary judgment (Dkt. # 114) is denied.
4. Defendants' motion to strike (Dkt. # 110) and motion in limine (Dkt. # 111) are declared moot.
5. All remaining scheduling order deadlines are hereby stricken and this case is terminated.
6. A separate judgment shall be entered herewith.