JOE HEATON, District Judge.
Plaintiff David Madden filed this § 1983 action against defendants Regional University System of Oklahoma ("RUSO"), Northeastern State University ("NSU"), and Cari Keller and Phillip Bridgmon, both individually and in their official capacities, for alleged violations of various constitutional rights relating to the decision to not renew his contract for the 2013-2014 academic year. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss arguing that they are protected by Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity, and that the complaint fails to state claims for violations of equal protection or due process.
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim when the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all wellpleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
The following description of background facts is based on the allegations of the complaint, which, for purposes of this motion, the court assumes to be true.
Between 2008 and 2013, the plaintiff was employed as a professor in the Criminal Justice and Legal Studies Program at Northeastern State University. During that period he consistently received satisfactory or above satisfactory reviews from his superiors, and was committed to improving the teaching and scholarship quality of his program. In 2009, the plaintif's employment changed from adjunct professor to full time, tenure track assistant professor.
In March 2012, the plaintiff was asked by a colleague, Dr. Brad Agnew, to interpret NSU's anti-nepotism policy. The conversation was prompted by Dr. Agnew's concern that the Political Science Department hiring committee might be pressured to hire the wife of the incoming Dean, defendant Phillip Bridgmon, for a position in that department. After review, the plaintiff concluded that the hire would indeed violate the school's anti-nepotism policy, and he communicated that finding to Dr. Agnew.
On February 11, 2013, the plaintiff met with defendant Cari Keller, the chair of the Criminal Justice and Legal Studies Department, for his annual evaluation. The plaintiff again received at least satisfactory evaluations in all areas. Ms. Keller recommended that the plaintiff be retained for the 2013-2014 school year.
At some point over the next week, Ms. Keller learned of the plaintiff's interpretation of the university's anti-nepotism policy. Through email and in-person conversations, she informed the plaintiff that Dean Bridgmon and the chair of the Social Sciences Department had conversations with Ms. Keller about the plaintiff's anti-nepotism policy interpretation. In these conversations, the plaintiff apparently received some form of unofficial reprimand from Ms. Keller.
On February 27, 2013, the plaintiff was summoned to Dean Bridgmon's office where he was informed that the university would not retain him for the upcoming school year. Although the university stated that the plaintiff was not kept because of "failure to meet scholarship requirements" and "non-collegiality," the plaintiff argues that these were merely pretext to cover up the real reason for his firing—his interpretation and discussion of the university's anti-nepotism policy in regard to the Dean's wife.
In this § 1983 action, plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech and his due process and equal protection rights.
Defendants argue that RUSO and NSU are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and the court agrees. Because the plaintiff has requested only monetary damages,
Plaintiff asserts that RUSO is less like a state agency and more like a municipality, which is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, both the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have already spoken on this issue, and both determined that boards of regents are state entities protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Plaintiff, aware of
"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself."
The due process and equal protection claims against Bridgmon and Keller in their individual capacities are challenged on two grounds. Defendants assert the complaint does not state a plausible claim as to them and that, in any event, they are protected by the defense of qualified immunity. It is unnecessary to reach the qualified immunity issue, as the court concludes due process and equal protection claims have not been stated.
As to the equal protection claim, the plaintiff asserts that he is a "class-of-one" and was treated differently from others similarly situated. Plaintiff's Surreply [Doc. #15 at 6]. However, the Supreme Court has held that class-of-one equal protection claims do not arise in the public employment setting.
In order to state a claim for violation of due process, the plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a liberty or property interest. See
Property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."
Likewise, the complaint does not allege a basis for concluding a property interest was created by Keller's evaluation of plaintiff. Although the end result of the evaluation was a recommendation for future employment, there is no apparent basis for concluding it was anything other than just that—a recommendation. By its very nature, a recommendation can either be followed or ignored by the person with the ultimate decision-making power. There is nothing in the complaint to suggest that Keller was that person. Any expectation that the plaintiff had following his evaluation was unilateral, and such expectations do not create a protected property interest. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, applying
For the reasons stated, defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. #9] is