ORDER

JOE HEATON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Sherry Dennis filed this case in Oklahoma state court in January 2014, seeking damages for injuries sustained by her in a 2012 car accident. Initially, the case was only against the driver of the other vehicle, Shelby Lunn. Later, on May 27, 2014, plaintiff filed an amended petition asserting claims for breach of contract and bad faith against her own auto insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company ("Progressive"), based on her auto policy's underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Several months later, Progressive moved for the bifurcation of the claims against it from the negligence claim against Lunn. The state court granted the motion on December 8, 2014, based on the potential for prejudice to the parties from the jury having information about the existence of insurance [Doc. #1-28]. It ordered that plaintiff's claims against Progressive be bifurcated from her claims against Lunn and that the claims be tried to separate juries, with the claims against Lunn to be tried first. Progressive then immediately removed the case to this court on December 12, 2014 [Doc. #1], asserting diversity of citizenship as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction and contending that Lunn had become a nominal party whose citizenship should be ignored for diversity purposes. Plaintiff has now moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that diversity is lacking due to plaintiff and Lunn both being citizens of Oklahoma. The motion is at issue.

Progressive asserts that entry of the bifurcation order made Lunn a "nominal party" whose citizenship should be ignored.1 Specifically, it argues that the state court's order for bifurcation was impliedly an order for severance and that the result was, in substance, the creation of two separate lawsuits. It argues that the suit between itself and plaintiff-now separate from that between plaintiff and Lunn, as Progressive sees it-involves diverse parties and is therefore removable.

Progressive's argument is resourceful and not without some appeal as a practical matter. However, in the circumstances of this case and against the backdrop of the presumption against expansive interpretation of the removal statutes,2 the court concludes it is not ultimately persuasive. There is a difference between "bifurcating" the claims in a case and "severing" them. Bifurcation does not produce two separate cases. It merely divides the claims for a limited period of time, i.e., during trial, but treats them as part of the same case for purposes of final resolution. Severance, by contract, results in separate actions. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1519 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1991) (analyzing Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b), which are substantially similar to 12 Okla. Stat. §§ 2021 and 2018D, respectively).3

Here, it is clear that Progressive explicitly sought "bifurcation." It titled its motion that way. See Doc. #1-20. The motion explicitly relied on 12 Okla. Stat. § 2018, the bifurcation statute. The state court ordered that the trial of plaintiff's claims against the two defendants be "bifurcated." [Doc. #1-28]. Given this explicit track record, the court is unpersuaded by the suggestion that the state court really meant to "sever" the cases rather than "bifurcate" them, or that it impliedly did so. Lunn and Progressive continued to be defendants in the same case.

The court is also unpersuaded that the other factors identified by Progressive, coupled with the bifurcation order, serve to make Lunn a "nominal" defendant. It is true that, in determining diversity, a court looks only to the citizenship of "real and substantial parties to the controversy" and "must disregard nominal or formal parties" in determining whether parties are completely diverse for jurisdictional purposes. Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1980). There is no mechanical or bright line rule for determining when a party should be viewed as merely nominal, with the focus of the inquiry being on whether the party has an actual interest in the substantive controversy. Chesapeake Exploration LLC v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. CIV-10-0519-HE, 2010 WL 2891668, at 2-3 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 2010). However, Lunn's status is not like that of defendants who are often challenged as being "nominal." It is undisputed that a valid claim was asserted against her and was, for the first few months of the case's existence, the only claim asserted. There is no suggestion that the claims against her and Progressive were improperly joined under Oklahoma law. The resolution of the claim against Lunn continues to be related to the resolution of the claim against Progressive, albeit by stipulation of Progressive that it will be bound by the result against Lunn, rather than by its direct participation in a trial.

Lunn continued to participate in the case to at least some degree, through her own counsel, after Progressive was joined. It is no doubt true that, from a financial standpoint, Lunn is a very minor player in any overall settlement or resolution of the claim against her. But she nonetheless has personal exposure on it, which insurance will probably, but may not necessarily, cover.4

Progressive suggests that Lunn is a nominal defendant, at least in part, because she is "judgment proof".5 However, the court has considerable doubt that an otherwise proper defendant becomes "nominal" simply by having no assets or by running out of money.6

In any event, the court concludes, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the bifurcation order entered by the state court did not turn defendant Lunn into a nominal defendant. Her citizenship must therefore be considered in determining whether the parties are diverse and, as both plaintiff and Lunn are Oklahoma citizens, they are not.

As complete diversity between the parties does not exist here, this court does not have jurisdiction and the case must be remanded. Plaintiff's motion to remand [Doc. #7] is therefore GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the District Court of Kay County, Oklahoma.

IT IS SO ORDERED.