ORDER

VICKI MILES-LaGRANGE, District Judge.

Before the Court is plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Lusk to Personally Appear at Trial, filed December 30, 2015. On January 4, 2016, defendant Ron Lusk ("Lusk") filed his response. Based upon the parties' submissions, the Court makes its determination.

Plaintiffs' counsel recently learned from defendants' counsel that Lusk may not appear at the trial of this case.1 Lusk owns 100% of defendant Westlake Management Company and 99% of defendant Westlake Nursing Home Limited Partnership.2 Additionally, Lusk is the sole witness to the allegedly fraudulent transfers at issue in this case. However, Lusk is located more than 100 miles from this Court. In light of the above, plaintiffs now move this Court to enter an order compelling Lusk to personally appear at the trial of this case.

Plaintiffs assert that Lusk's personal appearance at trial is necessary for a fair, full, and complete adjudication of this case. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that Lusk's testimony is necessary to explain the evidence and his absence would create many questions for the jury and would cause confusion. Further, plaintiffs assert they were not allowed to fully depose Lusk because there were several times Lusk refused to answer questions and Lusk's depositions were discovery depositions and not trial depositions. Plaintiffs, therefore, contend that this Court should use its inherent powers to order Lusk's appearance at trial.

Plaintiffs also assert that based upon previous correspondence between counsel, plaintiffs understood that Lusk would be appearing at trial.3 Plaintiffs further contend that Lusk's inconsistent position concerning his refusal to personally appear at the trial of this case has placed plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage and equitable estoppel precludes Lusk from refusing to personally appear at trial to testify. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the current version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires Lusk to personally appear at trial. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the current business of defendants in Oklahoma is to defend and resolve any pending litigation that is related or incident thereto or connected with the nursing home and Lusk, therefore, is required to personally appear at trial because all defendants, including Lusk, "regularly transact business in person" in the State of Oklahoma.

Lusk asserts that Rule 45(c)(1) does not permit the Court to order him to personally appear at trial, as he is located more than 100 miles from this District. Lusk further asserts that it is improper for this Court to rely on its inherent powers to compel his attendance at trial because it would be in direct contravention of Rule 45(c) and would make the restrictions in Rule 45(c) meaningless. Additionally, Lusk asserts that he does not regularly transact business in person in Oklahoma. Specifically, Lusk contends that defending litigation is not "transacting business" and the small number of times he has been in Oklahoma does not constitute "regularly" transacting business. Further, Lusk contends that none of the alleged "business" was done by him in his personal capacity, but it was done in his capacity as an officer of defendant Westlake Management Company. Finally, Lusk asserts that equitable estoppel does not apply to the instant circumstances.

Rule 45(c)(1) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1).

Having carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds that Rule 45 does not require Lusk to personally appear at trial. First, Lusk resides in Texas, and this Court is not within 100 miles of where Lusk resides. Second, this Court finds that Lusk does not regularly transact business in Oklahoma. Specifically, the Court finds "defending litigation" does not equate to "transacting business," and even if it did, the small number of times Lusk has been in Oklahoma defending litigation does not constitute "regularly" transacting business.4 Additionally, the Court finds that it would be inappropriate for this Court to use its inherent powers to compel Lusk to personally appear at the trial in this case because doing so would directly contravene the plain language of Rule 45(c)(1).

However, the Court finds that plaintiffs would be significantly prejudiced if Lusk did not personally appear and testify at trial and they were required to rely on the depositions taken thus far in this case. The Court, therefore, finds that the equities of this case require the Court to take some action regarding Lusk's appearance at trial, albeit action short of compelling Lusk to personally appear at the trial. Accordingly, if Lusk does not agree to personally appear at trial, the Court grants plaintiffs leave to take a video trial deposition of Lusk to be used during the trial of this case. The Court will not continue this case from the Court's January trial docket but realizes that the parties may not be able to take the deposition prior to the January 12, 2016 start date of the trial. Jury selection will still be held on January 12, 2016, but if the parties have not taken Lusk's deposition by that date, the presentation of evidence will not begin until a later date in January. At the pretrial conference scheduled for January 6, 2016 at 2:00 p.m., the parties shall advise the Court whether Lusk will be personally appearing at the trial and if not, when the trial deposition will be taken and when trial will be able to commence.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Lusk to Personally Appear at Trial [docket no. 166] but GRANTS plaintiffs leave to take a video trial deposition of Lusk to be used during the trial of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.