JOE HEATON, District Judge.
Defendants Javier Alfredo Herrera-Hernandez ("Javier Herrera") and Julio Cesar Herrera-Hernandez ("Julio Herrera") were charged along with six others in a five-count indictment.
Both defendants have filed motions for a
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) permits the admission of an out-of-court statement offered against a party which was made "by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." To be admissible as non-hearsay, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and declarant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The evidence submitted at the hearing principally consisted of the testimony of DEA Special Agent Robert Murphy and transcripts of intercepted telephone exchanges among various defendants and a confidential informant. The evidence was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there existed a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, that the referenced statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of that conspiracy, and that Javier Herrera, Julio Herrera, and the other parties to the telephone exchanges were members of the conspiracy. Whether the government had identified these defendants as targets or had otherwise begun investigating them in particular by the time of those statements, or whether the defendants were part of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made, is not determinative of the admissibility of the statements. See
Accordingly, the motions requesting a pretrial determination of the admissibility of coconspirator statements [Doc. Nos. 81 and 117] are
Both defendants have moved for an order directing the government to give notice of its intent to rely on evidence to which Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) applies. The government's response acknowledges its obligations under the rule and identifies certain statements as to Javier Herrera [Doc. No. 124]. The government will be required to identify any other 404(b) evidence it intends to offer not less than seven days prior to trial. A request for notice, rather than a formal motion, is all that is required under Rule 404(b), so the motions [Doc. Nos. 79 and 116] are
Both defendants have moved to sever the trial of the charges against them, arguing they will be prejudiced by being tried jointly with other defendants who are charged with a completely separate conspiracy (a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it). However, all of the defendants charged in the marijuana conspiracy have either entered guilty pleas or are in the process of doing so. Thus, Javier Herrera and Julio Herrera no longer face any potential prejudice by reason of multiple conspiracies being charged.
To the extent that either defendant argues he is prejudiced by being tried for the same conspiracy with the other defendant, neither defendant has demonstrated that he will be actually prejudiced by a joint trial or that, if there is any prejudice, it is not outweighed by "the obviously important considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration."
Defendant Javier Herrera has moved to suppress the testimony of a confidential informant on the basis the informant's testimony was obtained in violation of the federal antigratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). Stating that he "believes that the payments [to the informant] in this case went beyond legal limits," Javier Herrera has requested a hearing to determine whether the witness's testimony was in consideration of one or more promises not normally made in exchange for testimony and whether the promises were inconsistent with the assistant U.S. attorney's role as a prosecutor. See
The government's response indicates the confidential informant involved is currently awaiting sentencing in another case in this district and that a sentence previously imposed in that case was vacated while the informant assists the DEA in several drug investigations. The government also indicates the payments to the CI have been made pursuant to DEA policy and that payment information will be provided to the defendant prior to trial.
Beyond speculation, defendant has offered nothing that would call into question the accuracy of the government's representations. On the present showing, the court concludes there is no basis for excluding the informant's testimony. Any payments made to the informant, like the prospect of leniency granted in the informant's criminal proceeding, may be explored on cross examination, but the fact of payments by itself is not a basis for excluding the testimony altogether. Defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of the confidential informant [Doc. No. 77] is
Javier Herrera has also moved to suppress statements he made in an interview with law enforcement agents after his arrest on October 6, 2015. He challenges the validity of his waiver of rights under
A defendant's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
At the hearing, Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics agent Larry Morgan testified about his interview of Javier Herrera. Agent Morgan testified that he explained Mr. Herrera's
Javier Herrera has also filed a motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge (Count I) against him. He argues that the government purposefully allowed the conspiracy to run until July 2015—four months after the government could have arrested him for selling methamphetamine to the confidential informant in a controlled purchase. He argues the government's failure to arrest him then was only for the purpose of adding to his sentence for conspiracy and that it therefore constituted "sentencing entrapment."
In the Tenth Circuit, the concept of "sentencing entrapment" is considered a form of outrageous governmental conduct.
Here, the government indicates the investigation continued after the March 2015 controlled drug buy for the purpose of tracing the source of the drugs and determining the identities and roles of other members in the conspiracy. Given the nature of the conspiracies and the relatively short duration of the timeframes involved, there is no basis here for characterizing the government's continued investigation as outrageous. Javier Herrera's motion to dismiss Count I [Doc. No. 78] is
Defendant Javier Herrera has also moved for a jury determination of forfeiture amounts in the event he is convicted. The government has responded that it does not object to this motion [Doc. No. 80], which is
Defendant Javier Herrera has also moved for suppression of all video surveillance conducted by the government. He argues that because no warrant was obtained, the videos may have been obtained by searches which were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by video surveillance obtained from cameras posted outside private property, where they observe no more than what any passerby would be able to observe and where the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area being viewed.
The government indicates in its response that the cameras were not placed on private property nor were they monitoring an area ("the Ranch") in which these defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy. It also indicates the cameras recorded silent video only. On the present showing, Mr. Herrera's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the camera surveillance. Defendant's motion to suppress video surveillance [Doc. No. 82] is