REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GARY M. PURCELL, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. Defendant has answered the Complaint and filed the administrative record (hereinafter AR ___), and the parties have briefed the issues. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

I. Administrative History and Agency Decision

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits in February 2014, alleging that she became disabled beginning August 1, 2007. (AR 209-10). She later amended her alleged disability onset date to April 15, 2011. (AR 45, 226). Plaintiff identified numerous physical and mental conditions as disabling impairments, including back surgery, breast cancer, chronic lymphedema, post-traumatic stress syndrome ("PTSD"), depression, anxiety, neuropathy, leg and foot pain, severe spinal stenosis, arthritis, and joint pain. (AR 243, 277). Plaintiff has a high school education, and she previously worked as a security guard.

Plaintiff filed a previous application for disability benefits that was denied on June 25, 2013. (AR 97). Based on her earnings record, the agency determined that Plaintiff was last insured for disability insurance benefits on December 31, 2013. (AR 101). Therefore, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate that she was disabled on or before that date. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010); Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1990)(per curiam); accord, Adams v. Chater, 93 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1996); Henrie v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 360 (10th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff appeared with her representative and testified at an administrative hearing conducted on February 16, 2015, before Administrative Law Judge Hamilton ("ALJ"). A vocational expert ("VE") also testified at the hearing.

The ALJ issued a decision in which the ALJ found no basis for reopening Plaintiff's prior disability insurance benefits application. (AR 12). Applying res judicata principles, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not be found disabled prior to June 27, 2013, the day following the administrative denial of her previous application. (AR 12). Due to the expiration of her insured status, the ALJ found that Plaintiff must demonstrate disability on or before December 31, 2013. (AR 13, 15).

Following the agency's five-step sequential evaluation procedure, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ determined that through the date Plaintiff was last insured for benefits she had severe impairments due to obesity, lymphedema, 2013 lumbar laminectomy, post cervical fusion, anxiety, depression, arthritis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"). (AR 15).

The ALJ determined at the next step that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 through the date she was last insured.

The ALJ next determined that through the date she was last insured Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work except she can no more than frequently perform bilateral fingering and feeling, she can have no more than occasional exposure to environmental irritants such as odors, fumes, dust, and gases, and her work must be limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with only occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, with no production rate pace. (AR 25).

Based on this RFC finding and Plaintiff's and the VE's testimony regarding the requirements of Plaintiff's previous work, the ALJ determined that the demands of Plaintiff's previous security guard position exceeded her RFC for work and she was therefore unable to perform her past relevant work.

Reaching the fifth and final step of the required sequential analysis, the ALJ found that through the date she was last insured for benefits Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs that existed in the national economy, including the jobs of document preparer, surveillance system monitor, and addressor. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, at any time from June 27, 2013, through December 31, 2013.

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Therefore, the ALJ's decision represents the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §404.981; Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009).

II. Issues Raised

Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commissioner's decision based on two issues asserted in her brief. She alleges "Treating Physician Error" and "Res Judicata Error." Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc. # 17), at 2, 4.

III. General Legal Standards Guiding Judicial Review

The Court must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010); Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). The "determination of whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Consequently, [the Court must] remain mindful that evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of benefits to an individual with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. A disability is an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.909 (duration requirement). Both the "impairment" and the "inability" must be expected to last not less than twelve months. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).

The agency follows a five-step sequential evaluation procedure in resolving the claims of disability applicants. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (b)-(g), 416.920(a)(4), (b)-(g). "If the claimant is not considered disabled at step three, but has satisfied her burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under steps one, two, and four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform other work in the national economy in view of her age, education, and work experience." Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). "The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he [or she] is not able to perform other work." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142 (1987).

IV. Consideration of Treating Physician's Medical Opinions

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred in failing to explicitly consider and weigh the medical opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Geister. Defendant concedes that the ALJ should have weighed Dr. Geister's opinions but argues that the error is harmless.

The ALJ must follow a two-step process, generally known as the treating physician rule, when considering a treating physician's medical opinion about a claimant. The ALJ "must first consider whether the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2014)(internal quotation and citation omitted). "If the ALJ finds that the opinion is well-supported, [the ALJ] must then confirm that the opinion is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). If the ALJ determines that the medical opinion is deficient in either of these respects, the ALJ may give the opinion less than controlling weight. Id. If the ALJ finds that a medical opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must proceed to the second phase of the inquiry to determine what weight has been given to the opinion "and give good reasons, tied to the factors specified in the [governing] regulations for this particular purpose, for the weight assigned." Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (listing the factors).

"It is the ALJ's duty to give consideration to all the medical opinions in the record. [The ALJ] must also discuss the weight [assigned] to such opinions." Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012). However, the need for express analysis of a medical opinion is weakened "[w]hen the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant's RFC." Id. at 1162. Further, an ALJ's failure to expressly consider and weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ's assessment of the claimant's RFC. Id. at 1162-63.

In this case, it is not disputed that the ALJ failed to explicitly weigh the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating oncologist, Dr. Geister, as required by the treating physician rule. The record contains four letters authored by Dr. Geister and addressed "To Whom It May Concern." In July 2013, Dr. Geister opined in the first such letter that he had treated Plaintiff for approximately 5 years, that she had undergone surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation as treatment for breast cancer, that she had developed lymphedema within her arm as a result of her treatment, and that he recommended she "lift less than 25 pounds at all times." (AR 546). Later, in August 2014, Dr. Geister stated in two identical letters that Plaintiff's cancer had not recurred but that because of Plaintiff's pain "it would be difficult for her to hold down a full-time job." (AR 668, 672).

In January 2016, Dr. Geister stated in a fourth letter that due to her "chronic right arm lymphedema" and symptoms Plaintiff should not lift over 20 pounds and she could not perform her previous job as a security guard. (AR 875).

Although the ALJ expressly considered Dr. Geister's opinions and medical records of treatment of Plaintiff, the ALJ erred by failing to explicitly weigh those opinions. This error, however, is harmless. The ALJ found that during the relevant time period prior to the date her insured status expired Plaintiff was capable of performing a limited range of sedentary work. Sedentary work requires mostly sitting and lifting up to ten pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Considering Dr. Geister's medical opinions contained in his July 2013 letter and in his January 2016 letter, those opinions are consistent with the ALJ's RFC finding. Hence, Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the ALJ's failure to explicitly weigh these opinions "because giving greater weight to [the opinions] would not have helped her." Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1163. The error in failing to weigh these opinions was therefore harmless.

With regard to Dr. Geister's remaining two letters, the ALJ's failure to explicitly weigh the statements set forth in these letters is not error. Pursuant to the agency's regulations and rulings, an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether or not a claimant is "disabled," is not entitled to controlling weight or special significance. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d); Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 ("[T]reating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance."); Castellano v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994)(treating physician's opinion on issue reserved to the Commissioner is not binding on Commissioner in making ultimate determination of disability).

In Dr. Geister's August 14, 2014 letters, he surmised that it would be difficult for Plaintiff to hold down full-time employment as result of her symptoms. In Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2008), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a "true medical opinion" was one that contained a doctor's "judgment about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] physical limitations, or any information about what activities [the claimant] could still perform." These statements made by Dr. Geister, like the generalized statements the court considered in Cowan, are "not a true medical opinion" but, rather, judgments about "an issue reserved to the Commissioner." Id. at 1189 (holding "statement that the doctor did not know if Mr. Cowan would be able to return to work [was] an issue reserved to the Commissioner"). Thus, the ALJ did not err in failing to weigh the statements under the treating physician rule.

V. The ALJ's Decision Not to Reopen Previous Disability Application is Not Reviewable

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by declining to reopen her previous disability application. Plaintiff's argument relies on an incorrect reading of the regulation governing the reopening of a final, unappealed administrative decision. The governing regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.987, provides that the Commissioner "may" reopen a final administrative decision on its own initiative or upon the request of a claimant, if certain conditions are met as explained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.988.

This Court generally has no jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision not to reopen a claimant's previous disability application. See Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990)(holding Secretary's decision not to reopen a previously-adjudicated application is discretionary and not a final decision reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). It is well established that "`[a]bsent a colorable constitutional claim . . ., a district court does not have jurisdiction to review the [Commissioner's] discretionary decision not to reopen an earlier adjudication.'" Blair v. Apfel, 229 F.3d 1294, 1295 (10th Cir. 2000)(per curiam)(quoting Nelson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff does not argue that she has presented a colorable constitutional claim, and the record does not reflect any circumstances from which to infer such a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim of error lacks merit.

The ALJ properly relied on the VE's testimony to support the step five nondisability determination. Because that determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing findings, it is recommended that judgment enter AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner to deny Plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties are advised of their respective right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before November 21st, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996)("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.