REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BERNARD M. JONES, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Christopher Lorenz, seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). United States District Judge Stephen P. Friot has referred the matter for proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B), 636(B)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Commissioner has filed the Administrative Record (AR) [Doc. No. 11], and both parties have briefed their positions.1 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
I. Procedural Background
On September 25, 2015, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to DIB or SSI. AR 12-18. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Id. at 1-3. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision constitutes the Commissioner's final decision. See Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff timely commenced this action for judicial review.
II. The ALJ's Decision
"The Social Security Administration has established a five-step process for consideration of disability claims." Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2016). "At the second step, the [ALJ] is to consider whether an impairment is severe." Id. If the impairment is severe, the ALJ "must continue to consider the impairment through the third, fourth, and fifth steps." Id. "If the claimant has no severe impairments, the judge can end the review at the second step." Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) ("If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . or a combination of impairments that is severe . . . we will find that you are not disabled.").
Here, at step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from the medically determinable impairments of "cyclical vomiting syndrome" (CVS)2 and status post left wrist fracture but that the impairments, individually or in combination, had not significantly limited Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities and were therefore not severe. AR 14. Finding no severe impairments, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. Id. at 17-18.
III. Claims Presented for Judicial Review
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred when he found his CVS non-severe. In particular, Plaintiff claims: (1) the ALJ "rejected the treating medical findings"; (2) the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's credibility; and (3) substantial evidence does not support his finding. Pl.'s Br. at 2-12.3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds no grounds for reversal.
IV. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). A decision is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it. See Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). While the Court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, it does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
V. Analysis
At step two, the ALJ must determine "whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-141 (1987). The agency's "severity regulation" governs the determination, and provides in relevant part:
If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience.
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)).
A claimant need only make a "de minimis" showing that his medical condition is medically severe, however, "a mere diagnosis is patently insufficient." Timmons v. Astrue, 360 F. App'x 984, 987 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997)).
A. The ALJ's Alleged Rejection of "Treating Medical Findings"
Plaintiff first alleges that the ALJ's finding that his CVS is non-severe "rejected the treating opinion finding the same" and "rejects the treating medical findings." Pl.'s Br. at 2, 5. The Court finds no merit in this allegation.
On December 13, 2014, an emergency room physician diagnosed Plaintiff with CVS. AR 412. Plaintiff then saw gastroenterologist Dr. Tauseef Ali, M.D. on December 16, 2014, and that physician gave a "differential diagnosis" to include "[CVS], Celiac disease, drug abuse, [inflammatory bowel disease]." Id. at 418. When Dr. Ali saw Plaintiff approximately two months later, on February 27, 2015, he wrote:
We discussed stopping marijuana to see if that helps with his symptoms. I suspect this could be variant cannabis hyperemesis syndrome as gastric biopsies and colonoscopy and CT negative. Weight is stable.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
As long understood, an ALJ must evaluate relevant medical opinions, including diagnoses, and, if he rejects them, must articulate specific, legitimate reasons for his decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)-(c); 416.927(a)-(c); see also Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, the ALJ considered the evidence above, AR 17, and adopted the physicians' CVS diagnosis (even though Dr. Ali expressed reservations about the same). Id. at 14. Plaintiff does not point to any physician who opined that Plaintiff had "severe" CVS for purposes of disability or any physician who offered any opinion on Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities. And, as discussed further below, two State agency physicians' reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and opined that Plaintiff's CVS was non-severe. Id. at 54-78. In sum, Plaintiff wholly fails to establish that the ALJ rejected any medical opinion at step two.4
B. The ALJ's Alleged Credibility Assessment Errors
In finding that Plaintiff's CVS could produce the alleged symptoms, but that it did not significantly limit Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's credibility and found it lacking. Id. at 17. In a notably conclusory fashion, Plaintiff "challenges the ALJ's credibility determination," arguing that the "ALJ's assessment of [Plaintiff's] credibility is not well supported by the medical record and [Plaintiff's] testimony." Pl.'s Br. at 12. The Court should find no error.
"`Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.'" Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Some factors an ALJ may weigh in determining a claimant's credibility include: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than treatment used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *3 (July 2, 1996). "So long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant's credibility," a "formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence" is not required. Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).
As discussed in detail below, the ALJ considered all the relevant medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony. See infra at 6-7. In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff: (1) participates in normal physical activities; (2) had not stopped smoking cigarettes or marijuana as the physicians had recommended;5 (3) did not take all his prescribed medications;6 and (4) could obtain symptom relief with proper diet, warm baths, and low-stress. AR 15-17. These are all factors an ALJ may consider, and Plaintiff fails to identify what medical evidence or testimony is contrary to these findings. "[Tenth Circuit] precedents do not require more, and [the Court's] limited scope of review precludes us from reweighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that of the agency." Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). So, the Court should find no grounds for reversal in the ALJ's credibility assessment.
C. The Existence of Substantial Evidence
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's step two finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court should disagree.
The relevant medical records show that Plaintiff visited a hospital emergency room in May 2012 complaining of abdominal pain and nausea. AR 244-53. Tests revealed an abnormal gastric emptying study with "less than 50% of the activity emptying from the stomach at 90 minutes" but a normal ultrasound. Id. at 308-309. Plaintiff was given medication, instructions, and discharged. Id. at 253-61. Then, in August and September 2012, Plaintiff visited the Oklahoma City Indian Clinic to discuss his abdominal issues. Id. at 324, 328. Plaintiff was not taking any medications at that time. Id. at 324. Medical professionals advised Plaintiff to avoid spicy foods and tobacco, and prescribed him medications. Id. at 326, 329-30. Plaintiff sought emergency room services again on November 20, 2012, for his abdominal issues. Id. at 312. A CT scan was unremarkable. Id. at 318.
One year later, in November 2014, Plaintiff again sought emergency room care for stomach pain and vomiting and admitted he was still smoking tobacco. Id. at 367-68. Test results were all normal. Id. at 379-80. The next month, Plaintiff visited the hospital emergency room again, admitting to tobacco and daily marijuana use. Id. at 406. A physician diagnosed CVS. Id. at 412. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Ali. Id. at 415. Plaintiff told Dr. Ali that food and stress aggravated his condition. Id. Dr. Ali scheduled Plaintiff for numerous tests, including bloodwork, a colonoscopy, a CTS scan, and an endoscopy. These tests all came back negative or normal. Id. at 424, 447. As discussed above, Dr. Ali gave a "differential diagnosis" to include "[CVS], Celiac disease, drug abuse, [inflammatory bowel disease]." Id. at 418. Thereafter, Dr. Ali wrote: "We discussed stopping marijuana to see if that helps with his symptoms. I suspect this could be variant cannabis hyperemesis syndrome as gastric biopsies and colonoscopy and CT negative. Weight is stable." Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
Finally, two State agency physicians reviewed all the medical evidence and opined that Plaintiff's CVS was non-severe. Id. at 54-78. The ALJ gave these opinions "significant weight," id. at 17, and Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's reliance on those opinions.
In sum, the ALJ discussed all the relevant evidence, and notably, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that the ALJ ignored.7 Instead, Plaintiff essentially asks this Court to weigh the same evidence and reach a different conclusion. The Court cannot oblige, see Bowman, 511 F.3d at 1272, and thus should find no reversible error on this ground.
RECOMMENDATION
The ALJ considered the relevant medical evidence and analyzed Plaintiff's credibility. Plaintiff demonstrates no reversal error in those assessments and this Court cannot reweigh the medical evidence to reach a different conclusion. So, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by January 30, 2018. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
